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ARTICLE 
THE PRESIDENT AND THE DETAINEES 
AZIZ Z. HUQ† 
Entering the White House in 2009, President Barack Obama committed to closing 
the military detention facility at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. Eight years later, the facility 
remains open. This Article uses the puzzle of why Obama’s goal proved so recalcitrant 
as a case study of separation-of-powers constraints upon presidential power. Deploying a 
combination of empirical, doctrinal, and positive political science tools, it isolates the 
salient actors and dynamics that impeded Obama’s goal. Its core descriptive finding is 
that a bureaucratic–legislative alliance was pivotal in blocking the White House’s 
agenda. This alliance leveraged its asymmetrical access to information to generate 
constraints on the President. The most significant of these constraints operated through 
political channels; statutory prohibitions with the force of law were of distinctly secondary 
importance. The analysis, furthermore, sheds light on why individualized judicial 
review, secured through the mechanism of habeas petitions under the Constitution’s 
Suspension Clause, had scant effect. Contrary to standard approaches to the 
Constitution’s separation of powers, the case study developed here points to the value of 
granular, retail analysis that accounts for internally heterogeneous incentives and 
agendas instead of abstract theory that reifies branches as unitary and ahistorical entities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama was sworn into office as the 44th 
President of the United States. His campaign platform included a pledge to 
shutter the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay. A century-old U.S. 
military facility on the southeastern littoral of Cuba’s Oriente Province,1 
Guantánamo had been used to house individuals seized in extraterritorial 
counterterrorism operations since January 2002.2 As early as August 2007, 
then-candidate Obama committed himself to dispersing those individuals 
and winding up detention operations at the Cuban base.3 In the wake of his 
November 2008 victory, his campaign team reiterated that goal, signaling the 
President’s ambition of making a “sharp break” with the George W. Bush 
Administration.4 Yet on the seven-year anniversary of this declaration, 
ninety-three individuals remained in custody at Guantánamo.5 Far from 
achieving its ambition, the Obama Administration had downgraded its 
aspirations to a goal it had already achieved: a detainee population in the 
double digits.6 A policy once perceived as a signature legacy of the George 
W. Bush Administration had become a keystone of the Obama legacy.7 
The persistence of the Guantánamo detentions ought by rights to be a 
puzzle for constitutional law. A common theme in recent public-law 
scholarship is the increasing, even “unbound[ed],” power of the executive 
 
1 See JONATHAN M. HANSEN, GUANTÁNAMO: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 12-15, 50 (2011) 
(describing the geography and location of Guantánamo Bay). 
2 See generally KAREN GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 
DAYS (2009) (providing a narrative account of the start of detention operations at Guantánamo). 
3 Malathi Nayak, Factbox: Has Obama Delivered on His 2008 Campaign Promises?, REUTERS 
(Oct. 28, 2011, 11:08 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/28/us-usa-campaign-obama-prom
ises-idUSTRE79R3M920111028 [https://perma.cc/T58N-9HF6]. 
4 Peter Finn, Guantanamo Closure Called Obama Priority, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/11/AR2008111102865.html [https://pe
rma.cc/L6J2-SPNP]. The President’s policy was effectuated through an executive order issued days 
after his inauguration. See Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 3, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
5 See N.Y. TIMES: THE GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo 
[https://perma.cc/HU9H-FFTT] (last updated Oct. 20, 2016). 
6 See Hannah Fairfield et al., How Will Obama’s Plan to Close Guantánamo Work?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/23/us/guantanamo-bay-obama.html 
[https://perma.cc/5JRL-UN59] (describing the decline in detainee population from 242 to sixty-one 
during Obama’s presidency); see also Charlie Savage, Frustrated in Efforts to Close Guantánamo Prison, 
Officials Look to Reduce Population, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/us/
politics/president-obama-guantanamo-bay-closing-plans-detainees.html [https://perma.cc/MD92-9BAR] 
(describing the Administration’s efforts to reduce the detainee population at Guantánamo Bay after 
encountering difficulties with shutting it down completely). 
7 Charlie Savage, President’s Plan for Guantánamo Is Seen Faltering, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2015, at 
A1. A recently edited collection evocatively makes the same point through its title. See OBAMA’S 
GUANTÁNAMO: STORIES FROM AN ENDURING PRISON (Jonathan Hafetz ed., 2016) [hereinafter 
OBAMA’S GUANTÁNAMO]. 
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branch,8 in contrast to a polarized and “gridlocked” Congress.9 As a matter of 
constitutional structure, Presidents’ unified and hierarchical control over the 
executive branch ought by rights to enable efficient and rational policymaking 
of a kind that can easily elude the multitudinous and disputative Congress.10 
In the Guantánamo case, it is also a result of the substantive law at issue. 
Discretionary executive legal and policy authority is customarily thought to 
be at its zenith in the national security domain.11 Correspondingly, the case 
for judicial and congressional deference to the Executive is commonly 
thought stronger on security matters than on ordinary regulatory issues.12 
And even apart from the presidency’s structural and legal advantages, the 
White House has a demonstrated capacity to shape the policy environment 
though informal “rhetorical” strategies that “‘go over the heads’ of Congress 
to the people at large.”13 Whether assessed in terms of institutional structure, 
law, or politics, the White House would seem at a distinct advantage to other 
political actors. 
The Guantánamo detentions themselves illustrate each of these advantages. 
To begin with, the executive branch under President Bush undertook a series 
 
8 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4-5 (2010); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 141, 184-85 (2010) (describing an “institutional presidency . . . on the 
march” and positing that “[t]he Constitution is now governing a system in which an institutionalized 
presidency rules through a politicized White House that dominates the cabinet secretaries and sets 
the agenda for Congress”). 
9 See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1772 
(2015); see id. at 1762-72 (describing congressional polarization and its effects on the policy opportunities 
available to administrative agencies); see also Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2065, 2076-77 n.66 (2013) (discussing how party concentration in a branch affects 
institutional checks). 
10 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2339 (2001) 
(concluding that structural features of the executive branch enable “cost-effectiveness, consistency, 
and rational priority-setting”). 
11 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 682 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court’s “duty to defer to the Executive’s military and foreign policy judgment is at its 
zenith” in conducting war, especially with congressional authorization). Some commentators have 
discerned few legal limits to the President’s authority in this context. See John Yoo, Transferring 
Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2004) (arguing that “the authority to determine the 
handling of military detainees is conferred on the President by the Commander in Chief Clause, 
which is located in Article II of the Constitution”). But this is a minority position. 
12 See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CAL. L. REV. 887, 895-99 
(2012) [hereinafter Huq, Structural Constitutionalism] (collecting sources that posit that view). In 
other work, I have challenged this conventional wisdom. See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security 
Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 236-40 (pointing to evidence of continuity in judicial 
deference levels between security matters and other matters). 
13 JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 4 (1987); see also SAMUEL KERNELL, 
GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 10-47 (4th ed. 2007) (describing 
the incentive for Presidents to shun bargaining with Congress and instead influence Congress by 
appealing directly to the public). 
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of swift and unilateral policy decisions about how to process and detain 
individuals captured in the Afghanistan–Pakistan theater with little input 
from Congress or the courts. Those policy decisions were reached in a context 
uncluttered by perceived legal constraints.14 And just as the White House was 
shaping facts on the ground and contouring the legal landscape, it was also 
molding the public narrative about detainees on the basis of its lopsided 
access to information about what was happening at the Cuban base.15 
But if one President could unilaterally create a prison at Guantánamo, 
why couldn’t a subsequent Chief Executive end it? This question cuts to the 
heart of the idea of the separation of powers. Whereas the establishment of 
the Guantánamo detentions was characterized by swift and unilateral 
executive action, the subsequent phase of Guantánamo’s operation was 
characterized by increasing levels of interbranch involvement. First courts, 
and then Congress, intervened. Between 2004 and 2008, the Supreme Court 
issued several opinions regulating military detention in ways that increasingly 
pinched on executive branch discretion.16 These rulings culminated in 2008 
 
14 See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorneys 
Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens 
Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Dec. 28, 2001), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/
documents/20011228.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2X2-C9JW] [hereinafter Philbin/Yoo Memorandum] 
(concluding that federal districts courts could not properly exercise federal habeas jurisdiction over 
an alien detained at Guantánamo Bay); Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
Gen., and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of 
Def., Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/documents/20020109.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW8D-MLXS] 
[hereinafter Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum] (concluding that international treaties regarding the 
treatment of individuals detained by U.S. forces do not apply to members of al Qaeda). 
15 For some examples of shaping the political narrative from different points in time, see Katharine 
Q. Seelye, Detainees Are Not P.O.W.’s, Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at A6 
(reporting the Vice President and Defense Secretary of the Bush Administration positing that the 
Geneva Convention does not apply to Guantánamo detainees); Joby Warrick, A Blind Eye to 
Guantanamo?; Book Says White House Ignored CIA on Detainees’ Innocence, WASH. POST (July 12, 
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/11/AR2008071102954.html 
[https://perma.cc/666N-ZF52] (reflecting on new information that the Bush Administration 
ignored CIA evidence that up to a third of detainees at Guantánamo may have been mistakenly 
imprisoned); Margot Williams et al., Voices Baffled, Brash and Irate in Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
6, 2006, at A1 (noting that the executive branch has withheld voluminous amounts of information 
regarding the detainees—including the names of detainees and the evidence against them). To 
identify this asymmetry is not to imply that executive branch conduct was necessarily improper. It 
is standard fare for officials to use their privileged access to information to shape political debate. 
In the national security context, the asymmetry between officials and the general public is simply 
wider than on other matters. 
16 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (extending the constitutional writ of 
habeas corpus to Guantánamo Bay detainees); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631-32 (2006) 
(invalidating first-generation military commissions and requiring that Guantánamo detainees are 
tried before a “regularly constituted court affording all of the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536-38 (2004) 
(holding that a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy combatant has a due process right to judicial 
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in Boumediene v. Bush, which extended the Suspension Clause of Article I, 
Section 917 to Guantánamo.18 As a result of Boumediene, federal judges in the 
District of Columbia began adjudicating individual challenges to detention. 
In doing so, they exercised retail superintendence of a policy that until then 
had been under near-exclusive executive branch suzerainty. Further, they 
started to fill gaps and ambiguities in what until then had been a skeletal 
statutory definition of lawful detention authority.19 In 2009, Congress too 
entered the fray by enacting restrictions on detainees’ transfers20 and by 
refining the lawful bounds of detention authority.21 
Until now, neither the causes nor the consequences that these judicial and 
legislative interventions have had for presidential discretion have been 
carefully studied. A body of existing scholarship, to be sure, focuses on the 
early role played by private and public-interest lawyers who challenged 
detentions. In a 2010 Article, for example, I presented data on changes in the 
overall detention population, and argued that habeas suits from 2004 onwards 
operated as “shots across the bow,” pushing the executive to adopt policies 
characterized by “professionalism and reliability” rather than ad hoc and 
unreliable decisionmaking.22 Subsequently, commentators from divergent 
political and policy perspectives have argued that legal challenges from civil 
society can motivate changes to security policy. In 2012, for example, Jack 
Goldsmith characterized civil litigation as an element of a larger ecosystem 
of transparency that constrains the presidency.23 From the other side of the 
political spectrum, David Cole in 2016 enthusiastically celebrated “[t]he 
 
review of grounds for his military detention); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2004) (extending 
statutory habeas jurisdiction to Guantánamo Bay detentions). 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
18 553 U.S. at 798. 
19 See infra subsections II.C.1–3 (describing post-Boumediene jurisprudence in federal courts). 
20 See, e.g., Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103, 123 Stat. 
1859, 1920 (2009) (barring the use of federal funds for the transfer of prisoners from Guantánamo 
unless certain conditions are met); see also infra text accompanying notes 67–70 (discussing statutory 
limitations on transfer enacted by Congress beginning in 2009). 
21 See National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 
(2011) (affirming that the President has the authority to detain those involved in certain terrorist activities). 
22 For an early account of post-Boumediene judicial review, see Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is 
Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 422-23, 426-27 (2010) [hereinafter Huq, What Good is Habeas]. 
For an argument that an expectation of litigation influences outcomes in the national security 
context, see Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy 
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 843-49 (2013). 
23 See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY 
AFTER 9/11, 161-77 (2012) (describing how the “ecology of transparency ensured that the clashes 
between military and civilian lawyers spilled into the public realm”). Goldsmith’s book is trenchantly 
critiqued both for its factual errors and flawed arguments. See generally Baher Azmy, An Insufficiently 
Accountable Presidency: Some Reflections on Jack Goldsmith’s Power and Constraint, 45 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 23 (2012). 
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Power of Citizen Activists to Make Constitutional Law.”24 These encomiums 
to civil society as an effectual and needful friction on governmental power, 
however accurately they may depict Guantánamo’s early years, do not 
explain—and, indeed, do not purport to explain—the persistence of Guantánamo’s 
prison in the context of an active separation of powers. It is necessary to look 
beyond the invisible hand of Toquevillian civil society to explain why the 
detentions persisted as long as they did. 
My aim in this Article is to cast light on that puzzle with a close empirical 
study of the effects of interbranch dynamics upon Guantánamo policy. First, 
the Guantánamo prison is, for better or worse, a synecdoche for a much larger 
constellation of controversial counterterrorism policies associated with 
President George W. Bush. Celebrating the mobilizations that sought to 
apply constitutional limits to those operations—and thus to end practices that 
many believe to be immoral and unwarranted—is surely worthwhile, 
especially given the seeming risk today that many of those policies will be 
revived. But it is also important to understand how and why this particular 
cluster of controversial policies persisted long after being roundly rejected as 
inconsistent with shared legal and normative commitments. Why Guantánamo 
persisted, in short, is an intensely specific question—but one that should 
matter to us not only as scholars, but also as citizens. Second, the case study 
of the Guantánamo detentions casts light on how our separation of powers 
works in practice. Although I do not develop here a new theory of the 
separation of powers,25 I do identify several important causal mechanisms 
through which interbranch interactions flow—mechanisms that have received 
insufficient attention in legal scholarship. I also hope to drill down on a quite 
specific policy question for which precise quantitative data is available. I do 
so in order to see if anything can be learned about how the three branches of 
the federal government interact and about what elements of interbranch 
behavior might predict the effect of such interaction. 
 
24 See generally DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS 
TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016). 
25 In separate works, I have developed more stylized “theories” of the separation of powers that 
focus on (1) the dynamic, consensual character of many of our national institutional arrangements and 
(2) the key role of institutional and normative pluralism for thinking about our separated branches. 
See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1618-44 (2014) 
[hereinafter Huq, Negotiated Separation of Powers] (articulating a bargaining-based model of 
interbranch and federal–state interaction); see also Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of 
Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 407-16 (2016) (developing a theoretical account 
of the separation of powers that seeks to justify doctrinal cycling between rules and standards). I draw 
upon these more stylized and abstract approaches as relevant here since both underscore the dynamic 
and multitudinous character of national institutional arrangements in the same way that the current 
study does. Nevertheless, the ambition of this Article is not to “prove” in some mechanical way the 
claims proffered in that theoretical work. 
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This exercise yields two complementary payoffs. The first is discrete and 
historical in nature; the other is normative and doctrinal. This Article’s threshold 
contribution is a new and more fulsome positive account of the persistence of 
the Guantánamo prison. This descriptive effort snaps into focus causal 
mechanisms that until now have been largely ignored. Conventional wisdom 
blames the persistence of Guantánamo on growing concern about detainee 
recidivism during President Obama’s first term26 and ensuing public opposition 
to President Obama’s closure plan.27 This opposition is typically understood as 
a freestanding dynamic that arose exogenously to derail White House plans. 
More careful empirical analysis, however, suggests that opposition based on 
recidivism-related fears cannot be explained by external events. There was no 
change in the risk posed by the marginal detainee slated for transfer from the 
lame–duck Bush Administration to the Obama Administration. And there was 
no external shock, such as a high-profile act of violence by a former Guantánamo 
detainee, that justified the pivot in public or congressional mood. 
This Article offers a different explanation. President Obama’s agenda, I 
argue, was derailed by an interbranch alliance between the military bureaucracy 
and a legislative faction hostile to the new President’s agenda. The alliance 
was catalyzed by dynamics internal to the executive. That is, a conflict between 
the President and his putative subordinates diffused out from Article II into 
a larger separation-of-powers context to become an interbranch affair. That 
military–legislative alliance then injected the recidivism question into public 
discourse via strategic disclosures, asymmetrical leaks, and elite-level policy 
entrepreneurship. The alliance’s effort to change the politics of detainee 
transfers succeeded in precipitating legislative limits on transfer. But the 
efficacy of these statutory limits did not rest on any law-like constraining 
element. Instead, their causal force hinged on the extent to which they 
 
26 For illustrative versions of this argument, see, for example, HOUSE ARMED SERVS. COMM., 
LEAVING GUANTANAMO: POLICIES, PRESSURES, AND DETAINEES RETURNING TO THE FIGHT 
11-12, 64 (Jan. 2012), https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/
themes/rep_armed_services/largedocs/leaving_guantanamo_web_3_27.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5D
8-RW7Q], noting that the threat of detainee recidivism would continue if President Obama’s closure 
plan was implemented. 
27 For illustrative versions of this argument, see, for example, Jennifer Daskal & Steve Vladeck, 
Where Did Things Go Wrong? Three Key Moments that Shaped Obama’s Failed Guantánamo Policy, JUST 
SECURITY (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/27514/wrong-key-moments-shaped-obamas
-failed-guantanamo-policy/ [https://perma.cc/25FD-2LZ6], which discusses how several key decisions 
on Guantánamo policy early in the Obama Administration fueled political opposition to closing the 
prison, and Marty Lederman, The Insoluble Guantánamo Problem (Part One: The President’s Successful 
Transformation of U.S. Detention Practices . . . and the GTMO Exception), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 12, 
2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/27549/guantanamo-problem-remains-insoluble-part-one-preside
nts-successful-transformation-u-s-detention-practices-gtmo-exception/ [https://perma.cc/76PU-TLVQ], 
which presents the Obama Administration’s detainee policy as successfully transformative and limited 
only by “the strong opposition of important national security critics in the Republican Party.” 
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provided leverage for the bureaucracy to resist the White House’s agenda.28 
External politics fostered to maximize concern about detainee transfers thus 
enabled an internal politics inimical to President Obama’s aims. In stark 
contrast to the robust effect of bureaucratic–legislative alliances, post-Boumediene 
federal courts played a minor role aiding the President—and arguably did 
more to entrench rather than to dissolve the prison doors at Guantánamo. 
Motivated by institutional concerns, the judiciary conspicuously declined 
invitations to use law to salve frictions generated by the bureaucratic–legislative 
alliance. To the contrary, while discrete judicial review was playing a role in a 
de minimis proportion of detainee transfers, federal judges’ pronouncements 
on the substance of detention law exceeded the government’s positions and 
practice in their hostility to detainees. The internal logic of Article III thus 
led judges to exhort confinement while eschewing even the tender drams of 
mercy titrated out by the executive. In brief then, this account aims to render 
lucidly and in granular detail what others have pitched only in abstracted and 
theoretical terms: in the national security domain, the political branches’ 
authorities “overlap” and “the freedom with which each branch may exercise 
its constitutional authority is affected by the existence and employment of 
the other branch’s powers.”29 
This Article’s second contribution leverages the distinctive separation-of-
powers context of the Guantánamo detentions—a trajectory from unilateral 
executive branch policymaking to three-branch contestation. It asks whether 
lessons can be drawn about how interbranch engagement impinges on 
presidential power from this trajectory. 
Consider three inferences with potentially wider and more generative 
consequences that might be extracted from my descriptive account, each of 
which clash or contrast with some leading account of the separation of powers. 
First, the descriptive account cultivated here points toward the need to 
understand the separation of powers, and its constraining effect upon 
presidential authority, in terms of actors both within and outside the 
branches. There is a dense, and systematically significant, ecosystem of internal 
 
28 This element of my account is underscored by a recent Article by Connie Bruck. See Connie 
Bruck, The Guantánamo Failure: Who’s Really to Blame?, NEW YORKER, Aug. 1, 2016, at 34. Bruck 
emphasizes “a highly charged series of political maneuvers, involving nearly every part of the 
Administration” in explaining why Guantánamo remains open. Id. In particular, she emphasizes the 
Pentagon’s resistance to releases. Id. My account is consistent with her findings, although I identify 
a distinct set of causal mechanisms, including strategic leaks, political entrepreneurship, and judicial 
self-defense. 
29 H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 542 (1999); see also id. at 529 (arguing for an “executive primary” view 
of the separation of powers in which the President has “primary constitutional authority” over 
national security). Powell’s point is about the law, however, whereas my argument here concerns the 
operation of the branches in practice—i.e., the law on the ground rather than the law on the books. 
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and external interest groups, ideological factions, and institutional actors that 
Jon Michaels and I elsewhere label the “thick political surround.”30 Dynamic 
interactions between diverse elements of the thick political surround (such as 
bureaucrats and legislative factions) can check presidential initiatives even 
when bilateral interbranch interactions (between the executive branch and 
Congress) cannot. The account offered here thus draws attention to the 
institutionally granular determinants of interbranch relations. These help 
explain how Presidents can be thwarted even absent divided government. It 
also identifies endogenous political dynamics—as distinct from the civil-society 
actors championed by Goldsmith and Cole—as pivotal.31 If anything, actors 
internal to the government exercise a distorting influence upon the substance of 
public preferences through a selective, and arguably misleading, stream of 
disclosures. Accounts of civil society as a molding force in structural constitutional 
law should account for this possibility. 
Second, the persistence of Guantánamo has implications for our understanding 
of how legal constraints on the presidency are produced in the first instance, 
as well as why they are efficacious. Once again, it is worth drawing attention 
to the endogenous, as opposed to the external, nature of legal constraints on 
executive power. The observed constraints on President Obama did not 
obtain their purchase through any coercive potentiality.32 Rather, the limiting 
force of legal rules depended on the availability of political costs to the presidency. 
Law enabled internal bureaucratic political actors to impose political costs, 
depending on what the White House did. By exploiting this leverage, those 
internal actors placed effective barriers on the realization of a presidential goal. 
Third, leading analyses of the separation of powers focus on the deflating 
effect of partisan dynamics upon the separation of powers.33 My descriptive 
account contains space for the congressional Republican opponents of 
President Obama, supporting these claims about the theoretical importance 
of partisan dynamics. But an exclusive focus on partisan incentives does not 
illuminate why national security bureaucrats contrived to undermine the 
 
30 See Huq & Michaels, supra note 25, at 381. 
31 The claim advanced here is descriptive, rather than normative. In contrast, Gillian Metzger 
has recently argued that there is a “duty to supervise . . . based on Article II [that] demands 
supervision by and within the executive branch [as] . . . a basic precept of our federal constitutional 
structure.” Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1842 (2015) 
[hereinafter Metzger, Constitutional Duty]. The thrust of my descriptive claim is that this duty to 
supervise is difficult for the President to carry out, even when his or her formal and informal powers 
might seem at their zenith. 
32 Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 52 (2015) (arguing that “coercion 
resurfaces as the likely most significant source of law’s widespread effectiveness”). 
33 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2312, 2312-16, 2326-37 (2006) (emphasizing the possibility of convergence in policy preferences 
of the executive branch and the legislature during periods of unified government). 
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White House. Equally, it fails to explain and elucidate observed judicial 
frailty. When the Boumediene Court extended the reach of the Suspension 
Clause to Guantánamo, tasking district courts with the management of retail 
habeas litigation, it forcefully underscored the federal bench’s role in serving 
as a beneficial separation-of-powers check on executive discretion and a shield 
of individual liberty.34 By supplementing arguments about partisan effects, 
therefore, this study highlights the role of institutional incentives in determining 
the consequences of interbranch engagement. Attention to the institutional 
incentives of the federal judiciary, and not partisan motives, helps us understand 
the gap between Boumediene’s soaring rhetoric and the more ambiguous legacy 
of judicial intervention on the ground. More ambitiously, my account might 
be understood to suggest that institutional incentives can induce officials to 
engage in political entrepreneurship that has the effect of accelerating 
partisan competition. Acting to pursue their own narrow institutional agendas, 
officials can deepen polarization across a wider political landscape.35 
These three claims—the decisive influence of a thick political surround; 
the contingency of legal constraints upon political dynamics; and the 
independent effects of institutional incentives—all concern the mechanisms 
through which the separation of powers affects policy outcomes. They gesture 
toward the value of case studies as a way to better grapple with, and 
understand, the diverse, conflictive, heterogeneous, and well-lived-in 
landscape of our national political institutions. They are a reminder that the 
separation of powers ought not to be reduced exclusively to traceries of texts or 
to palimpsests of practice with “historical gloss,”36 shorn of the unpredictable, 
heterogeneous, and dynamic system that one observes in practice.37 There is a 
value instead in disentangling the role of more granular institutional actors. 
 
34 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (“The Framers’ inherent distrust of 
governmental power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers 
among three independent branches. This design serves not only to make Government accountable 
but also to secure individual liberty.”); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) 
(plurality opinion) (“[U]nless Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows 
the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, 
serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of detentions.”); 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) (citation omitted) (noting that “[e]xecutive imprisonment” 
without judicial review is “oppressive and lawless” and that “th[e] Court has recognized the federal 
courts’ power to review applications for habeas relief in a wide variety of cases involving executive 
detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace”). 
35 This vector of polarization is distinct from (and indeed almost the mirror of) “the partisan 
genealogy of executive federalism” described in recent scholarship. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, 
Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 975 (2016). The two phenomena, though, 
are complementary. 
36 On the concept of “historical gloss,” see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical 
Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 419-20 (2012). 
37 I do not mean to suggest that scholars uniformly fail to attend to observed institutional 
practice. For a useful study of institutional practice of decisionmaking process in the national 
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The case study developed in this Article employs a mixed-methods approach 
that blends different strands of qualitative and quantitative analysis.38 
Drawing upon doctrinal exegesis, positive political science tools, and 
econometric instruments, it develops a fine-grained account of how policy 
decisions unfurled over time. Most importantly, I exploit here an archive of 
765 classified “detainee assessments”—one for all but fourteen detainees 
released by the Wikileaks organization, which documents the conclusions 
reached by the government about individual detainees, and which allows for 
a quite granular trajectory of detainee policy over time to be mapped. The 
Wikileaks archive, as well as other data sources, are explained in the Appendix. 
By using econometric as well as doctrinal and institutional tools, I hope not 
only to show that Guantánamo need not be treated as a “black hole,”39 but 
also that understandings of interbranch dynamics can be built on surer 
foundations than anecdote and a priori theory. 
My argument proceeds in three steps. Part I of the Article develops a richly 
textured historical account of policymaking concerning the Guantánamo prison 
over time, placing President Obama’s ultimately unavailing efforts at closure 
into a wider historical context. In Part II, I dive deeper by offering more precise 
estimates of the effects of bureaucratic, legislative, and judicial interventions 
upon the White House’s ambitions. By combining different analytic threads, 
my aim here is to offer a new causal account of the persistence of Guantánamo 
as a policy conundrum. Picking up threads intimated in this account, Part III 
then explores the central role of interbranch alliances, the interaction of 
political and legal checks, and the powerful effects of institutional incentives. 
While briefly touching upon the specific legal options available to an 
administration wishing to draw down the Guantánamo detentions, this Part 
concentrates on the considerations necessary for a nuanced, more accurate 
understanding of the separation of powers in the trenches. 
I. ANATOMIZING A BLACK HOLE: THE TRAJECTORY                              
OF THE GUANTÁNAMO PRISON 
In January 2002, the U.S. government began transferring roughly 640 
men, most of whom were captured in Afghanistan or Pakistan, to a U.S. 
military base on the southeastern littoral of Cuba’s Oriente Province called 
Guantánamo Bay.40 The ensuing Guantánamo detainees comprise only a 
 
security field, see Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 
38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359, 377-403 (2013). 
38 On mixed-method approaches more generally, see JOHN W. CRESWELL & VICKI L. PLANO 
CLARK, DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING MIXED METHODS RESEARCH 1-18 (2007). 
39 Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1, 13 (2004). 
40 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004). 
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scintilla of the United States’ domestic incarcerated population.41 And they 
also proved to be only a small proportion of those held in U.S. detentions 
across the Iraqi, Afghan, and other theaters of the 9/11 Wars.42 Despite their 
dearth of numerosity, the Cuban detentions quickly became a cynosure of 
political and legal controversy.43 As a result, the Guantánamo detentions are 
of interest not simply because of the legal puzzles they generated or the moral 
quandaries they raised, but also because they were a public focal point, 
crystallizing and refracting expectations, anxieties, and aspirations about 
presidential power, the Constitution, and the separation of powers.44 
This Part develops a novel, empirically grounded narrative of the prison’s 
development. I aim principally to illustrate the ebb and flow of overall 
detainee population over time, as different branches adopted multifarious 
postures toward the prison. As a methodological matter, this means collecting 
and analyzing data for the whole population of detainees. Until now, much 
leading legal scholarship on military detention has relied upon evidence often 
derived from litigation.45 But inferences drawn from litigation outcomes are a 
 
41 See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 39 (2006) (reporting 
the significant increase in the American incarceration rate over time). 
42 On the Afghan detentions, see Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87-88 (D.C. Cir. 2010); on 
the Iraqi detentions, see Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand 
Perspectives from the Other War, 2003–2010, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 549, 553 (2011). 
43 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay 
on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 353-54 (2010) (stating that the Court’s rulings 
“drew broad attention” whenever they concerned “cases involving the habeas corpus rights of citizens 
and noncitizens detained by the Executive Branch without judicial trials as terrorist suspects”). 
44 My focus in this Article is on the legal and institutional implications of the Guantánamo 
detentions. There are also vital moral questions raised by the fact that many of those detained had no 
connection to terrorism and were tortured while in custody. See LAUREL E. FLETCHER & ERIC 
STOVER, THE GUANTÁNAMO EFFECT: EXPOSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DETENTION 
AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES 62-68 (2009) (reporting a study that interviewed fifty-five former 
detainees and found thirty-one alleging abusive interrogations); see also MOHAMEDOU OULD SLAHI, 
GUANTÁNAMO DIARY 191-263 (Larry Siems ed., 2015) (describing, with redactions but still in 
harrowing detail, a litany of coercive interrogation methods used at Guantánamo against one detainee). 
45 For scholarship focusing on the courts, see, for example, Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? 
Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 805-48 (2011) [hereinafter Chesney, 
Military Detention], evaluating detention standards by analyzing post-9/11 habeas litigation; Jonathan 
Hafetz, Detention Without End?: Reexamining the Indefinite Confinement of Terrorism Suspects Through the Lens 
of Criminal Sentencing, 61 UCLA L. REV. 326, 344 (2014), addressing the “overlap between military 
detention and [criminal] prosecution”; and Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1415, 1446-48 (2012), discussing jurisdictional redundancy by examining the cases where the line between 
Article III proceedings and military detentions is not strict. There are contrasting views of the case law. 
Compare William R. Payne, Note, Cleaning Up “The Mess”: The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the Burden 
of Proof in the Guantanamo Habeas Cases, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 873, 874 (2013) (describing the 
Circuit Court’s work as “admirable”), and Adam R. Pearlman, Meaningful Review and Process Due: How 
Guantanamo Detention Is Changing the Battlefield, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 255, 274-79 (2015) (providing 
a generally positive summary on how the D.C. Circuit helped shape the government’s detention policy), 
with Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451, 1488 (2011) 
(criticizing the D.C. Circuit for failing to “take seriously Boumediene’s effect”). 
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perilous foundation for legal and institutional analysis. Only sixty-eight of 780 
detainees litigated a habeas petition to a final district court order. The selection 
of litigated cases, which is less than ten percent of the whole population, is 
unlikely to reflect the population as a whole. At a minimum, it excludes 
detainees who were released earlier and detainees who anticipated they would 
lose their habeas action.46 Stepping away from the familiar pages of the 
Federal Reporter gets us some illuminating distance on policy in the large. 
To orient the reader, I begin by roughly periodizing detention policy into 
three slices, each of which reflects a different separation-of-powers arrangement. 
I then present evidence of how policy changed across those distinct institutional 
dispensations. Finally, I ask how the rate of detainee transfers and releases 
fluctuated between different partisan administrations and institutional 
dispensations. In effect, my inquiry homes in on the puzzle of which constellation 
of interbranch dynamics is most conducive to individual liberty. 
A. The Phases of Detention Policy  
Since 2002, control over policy decisions touching on the Guantánamo 
detentions has moved through three phases. Each corresponds to a different 
separation-of-powers permutation: exclusive executive branch control; 
executive branch control with judicial supervision; and three-branch policymaking. 
1. Exclusive Executive Branch Control 
The first period of Guantánamo detention policy ran from early 2002 to the 
first part of 2008. It was characterized by an executive branch near-monopoly 
on policy. To begin with, the detentions rested only notionally on a statutory 
footing. Congress enacted what proved ultimately to be Guantánamo’s 
legislative basis seven days after the September 11, 2001 attacks—a general 
authorization of military force.47 That authorization lacked a specific textual 
 
46 Another factor that generates selection bias in litigation is the manner in which detainees 
secured lawyers. Lacking the ability to contact counsel directly, detainees often depended on relatives, 
frequently in the Middle East, or other detainees to act as “next friends” to secure representation. See, 
e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 55-57 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussing how petitioner’s mother joined 
the suit to request that a court order the government to allow counsel, among other requests); see also 
JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 44-48 (2006) 
(describing the process of identifying petitioners in early habeas cases). The haphazard quality of this 
process renders the basis for selection into litigation even more opaque. 
47 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified 
at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)) [hereinafter 2001 AUMF]. 
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reference to detention.48 A more detailed legal foundation for detention 
operations had to await a presidential executive order dated November 13, 2001.49 
The executive initially styled policy so as to minimize other branches’ 
influence. On December 28, 2001, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) issued a legal opinion concluding that federal court 
jurisdiction in habeas corpus did not extend to the Cuban base.50 Government 
lawyers vigorously defended this jurisdictional Maginot line until 2008’s 
Boumediene decision. Their resistance to judicial supervision guaranteed 
Article II control of the terms and scope of the detentions until then. The 
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel also calibrated the terms upon 
which prisoners could exit custody at the Cuban base through a March 2002 
memorandum endorsing forcible transfers of prisoners to other sovereign 
states.51 Similarly, questions of detainee treatment fell within exclusive 
executive branch control. In December 2002, then–Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld famously authorized a suite of novel tactics for 
interrogations at Guantánamo, including sleep deprivation, stress positions, 
and sexualized humiliation.52 These measures—including what is properly 
described as torture, whether that term is used in either a colloquial or a legal 
sense—neither rested upon nor subsequently secured Congress’s approval. 
Over this period, to be sure, Congress did enact legislation touching on 
the Guantánamo prison. But the ensuing statutes’ net effect was to insulate 
executive policymaking from external oversight. For example, in 2005, 
Congress eliminated federal-court jurisdiction over detention-related claims 
arising in Guantánamo, instead channeling review into a narrow appellate 
forum without factfinding authority.53 A year later, it withdrew Article III 
forums for criminal adjudication in favor of Article I military tribunals with 
 
48 Some have argued that the measure implicitly referenced detention authority. See Curtis A. 
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2047, 2094 (2005) (arguing that the 2001 AUMF should be interpreted in light of “international laws 
of war [which] permit the detention of enemy combatants without trial until the end of hostilities”). 
49 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 
C.F.R. § 918 (2001). 
50 Philbin/Yoo Memorandum, supra note 14. 
51 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. 
Counsel, Dep’t of Def., The President’s Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured 
Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations 1-2 (Mar. 13, 2002), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/03/04/memorandumpresidentpower03132002.pdf [https://perma.
cc/367Q-52H9]. 
52 Lt. Gen. Randall M. Schmidt & Brig. Gen. John T. Furlow, Investigation into FBI 
Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility 4, 18-19 (June 2005), 
https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/schmidt_furlow_report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/WS6Y-C73R]. 
53 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)) [hereinafter DTA] (eliminating habeas jurisdiction and 
allowing review only in the D.C. Circuit for a limited suite of issues). 
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tightly constrained federal-court oversight.54 A single provision in the 2005 
intervention purported to reign in coercive interrogation measures.55 But this 
prohibition was undermined by subsequent executive branch interpretation.56 
Between 2001 and 2009, no statutory text spoke to the scope of detention 
authority, the manner of processing detainees, or the triggers for release. 
2. The Emergence of Judicial Supervision 
In the second period of Guantánamo policymaking, the Supreme Court 
added a layer of judicial review via habeas actions in D.C. district courts. 
Individual detainees had filed habeas corpus petitions as early as 2002. But it 
was not until 2004 that the Supreme Court ruled on the Guantánamo 
detainees’ statutory access to the federal courts in Rasul v. Bush.57 Parrying 
Rasul, Congress enacted jurisdiction-stripping legislation in 2005 and again 
in 2006.58 It was not until 2008 that a federal appellate court reached the 
substantive merits of a detention decision.59 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit issued a ruling in Parhat v. Gates, a challenge to detention filed under 
the streamlined jurisdictional alternative to habeas created in 2005, rejecting 
the government’s claim to detain lawfully a group of Chinese nationals held at 
the Cuban base.60 But Parhat proved a false start. It was followed, a mere 
eight days later, by the Supreme Court’s Boumediene holding that detainees at 
Guantánamo benefited from the privilege of habeas corpus under the 
Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9. Boumediene invited case-by-case 
adjudication of individual liberty claims in federal district court. In effect, it 
also instructed trial judges to start limning the metes and bounds of 
substantive detention authority as a legal matter. Judge Richard J. Leon published 
the first district court decision on the merits of a habeas petition about six 
 
54 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 note (2006)) [hereinafter MCA]. 
55 DTA, supra note 53, § 1005(e). 
56 Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to John A. Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency, Application of the 
War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda 
Detainees 21-23 (July 20, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/2007_07
20_OLC_memo_warcrimesact.pdf [https://perma.cc/48UB-KFTH]. 
57 See 542 U.S. 466, 483-85 (2004) (extending statutory habeas jurisdiction to Guantánamo 
Bay detainees). 
58 See MCA, supra note 54; DTA, supra note 53. 
59 The litigation culminating in Boumediene, however, included earlier district court cases 
discussing the scope of detention authority. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 
443, 481 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that detainees stated claims for violations of Fifth Amendment due 
process rights); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 320-23 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that nonresident 
detainees outside the United States had no cognizable constitutional rights). 
60 532 F.3d 834, 853-54 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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months later, on December 30, 2008.61 This decision came almost seven years 
after the first habeas petition was filed, and more than four years after Rasul. 
The glacial pace of judicial intervention, in other words, hardly bespeaks an 
activist court champing at the bit of Article III’s furthest bounds. Rather, the 
incremental and hesitant involvement of federal courts hints at a reluctant 
“judicial passivity”62 in the teeth of a problem that might seem politically and 
practically resilient to judicial superintendence. We shall see, in due course, 
more evidence of this passivity in regard to the Guantánamo problem. 
The Boumediene litigation, of course, did not occur in a political vacuum. 
Rather, it occurred in the context of a presidential election in which both 
candidates committed to closing the Cuban prison.63 Two days after his 
inauguration, President Obama promulgated an executive order requiring “a 
prompt and thorough review of the factual and legal bases for the continued 
detention of all individuals currently held.”64 The order envisaged that 
detentions would end “as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from 
the date of this order.”65 That was January 2009. 
3. Guantánamo as a Three-Branch Problem 
The third phase of the Guantánamo detentions was marked by Congress’s 
return to the fray. To be sure, as I have already noted, Congress had not 
previously been silent; it had intervened to curb habeas review in 2005 and 
2006.66 But these statutes merely buttressed exclusive executive branch 
 
61 See Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing the merits and ruling on a 
Guantánamo detainee’s habeas corpus petition); see also Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 
2008) (assessing another habeas case on December 30, 2008). An earlier decision issued by Judge 
Ricardo Urbina did not address the scope of detention authority, in part due to concessions by the 
government responding to the want of lawful authority to detain. In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee 
Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2008), vacated, Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. 131 (2010). 
62 Daniel Meltzer invokes the term to describe the Court’s “refus[al] to take responsibility for 
shaping a workable legal system in the everyday disputes that come before the judiciary without 
great fanfare.” Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 343. 
I adapt and expand on his usage. 
63 See Kate Zernike, McCain and Obama Split on Justices’ Guantánamo Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 
13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/us/politics/13candidates.html [https://perma.cc/7ED
S-K6HV] (noting this shared goal). The candidates, nevertheless markedly diverged in their 
responses to Boumediene. See John Bentley, McCain Rips Supreme Court Decision on Guantanamo, CBS 
NEWS (June 13, 2008, 6:42 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mccain-rips-supreme-court-dec
ision-on-guantanamo/ [https://perma.cc/GA59-5M7H] (quoting McCain’s statement that Boumediene 
is “one of the worst decisions in the history of this country” and Obama as stating that Boumediene 
“is an important step toward reestablishing our credibility as a nation committed to the rule of law, 
and rejecting a false choice between fighting terrorism and respecting habeas corpus”). 
64 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4897-98 (Jan. 22, 2009); see also id. (calling for 
closure of the Guantanamo detention facilities). 
65 Id. 
66 See supra text accompanying notes 53–54. 
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control of detention operations at Guantánamo. They offered little by way of 
specific policy guidance concerning the scope of detention authority or the 
appropriate rate of releases. It was only in 2009, in the wake of Obama’s 
election, that Congress began to express preferences in respect to the law. 
From that time on, it attached riders to each of the annual omnibus military 
authorization statutes—all essential to keep funding flowing for the 
Pentagon—that regulated executive options for transfer and release. The 
precise impact of these riders varied from year to year. Some limited transfers 
of detainees from Guantánamo to the U.S. mainland; others outright banned 
such transfers.67 Most of the riders limited transfers to third countries,68 or 
installed per se bars on transfers to countries, such as Yemen, thought to be 
incapable of managing transferred detainees69 (a prohibition that, it should 
be noted, points toward legislators’ belief that transfers often would not be, 
and should not be, an end to detention). In 2012, moreover, Congress installed 
a revised, newly explicit definition of detention authority to supplement the 
sparse text of the 2001 AUMF.70 Whereas Congress had previously secured 
 
67 See Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(b), 123 Stat. 1859, 
1920 (2009) (stating that available funds may not be used to transfer Guantánamo detainees to the 
United States); see also Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 511, 125 Stat. 
786, 833-36 (2011) (limiting funds for building facilities for detainees in the United States); 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, § 532, 125 Stat. 
552, 637-38 (2011) (prohibiting funds for transferring detainees to the United States); Ike Skelton 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, §§ 1032–1034, 124 Stat. 
4137, 4351-54 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (imposing restrictions on 
transfers of Guantánamo detainees to the United States); Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 9011, 123 Stat. 3409, 3466-68 (2009) (disallowing funds for 
transferring detainees to the United States). Congress also enacted restrictions on the use of funds 
to refurbish a prison facility in downstate Illinois to house detainees. See Ike Skelton National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1034(a)–(b), 124 Stat. 4137, 
4353-54 (2011) (prohibiting the use of appropriations to create facilities to house detainees in the 
United States); see also Charlie Savage, House Panel Rejects a Plan to Shift Detainees to Illinois, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 2010, at A18 (discussing this prohibition in the context of the Obama Administration’s 
plan to buy and renovate a prison in Illinois for this purpose). 
68 See, e.g., Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(e), 123 Stat. 
1859, 1921 (2009) (allowing transfers to third countries if the President submits to a report regarding 
risk and terms of transfer fifteen days prior); see also Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1033, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351-52 (2011) (codified in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. 
L. No. 112-81, § 1028, 125 Stat. 1298, 1567-69 (2011) (delineating requirements for certifications to 
transfer detainees to foreign countries).  
69 National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§ 1027–1028; 
125 Stat. 1298, 1566-69 (2011). On the subsequent termination of transfers to Yemen, see Peter Finn, 
Return of Yemeni Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Is Suspended, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2010, 5:25 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/05/AR2010010502850.html [https://p
erma.cc/74AQ-TYE3]. 
70 Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note); see 
also Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Section 1021 of that statute, which fits on a 
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executive branch control, in short, from 2009 onward it cabined and channeled 
Article II discretion. 
In summary, the institutional history of Guantánamo policy falls into 
three periods. There have been eras of exclusive executive control, judicial 
supervision of executive policymaking, and three branch interaction. The 
precision of my periodization should not be overstated. Federal courts did not 
abruptly pivot from noninvolvement to deep engagement: they drifted into 
engagement over a period of years in a way that suggests antipathy toward 
entanglement in a controversial and difficult policy domain. Substantial 
congressional involvement might be traced back to 2005 (when the first 
jurisdiction-stripping legislation was enacted) or 2006 (when a first iteration 
of military commission legislation was passed into law). I have treated these 
measures differently from post-Boumediene regulation of transfers and 
redefinitions of the scope of detention authority.71 The latter are distinct, in 
my view, because they reflect legislators’ preferences about detention, rather 
than merely an expiating effort to shunt matters into the President’s hands.72 
Despite these complications, a general trend emerges: what began as a matter 
of exclusive executive suzerainty over time became increasingly entangled in 
judicial and congressional interventions to the point where today it seems fair 
to describe Guantánamo as the responsibility of all three branches. 
B. Detention Policy on the Ground 
As the locus of control over policymaking shifted, so too did the substance 
of that policy. A simple measure of that substance is the rate of transfers or 
releases from Guantánamo. Subject to some caveats,73 the rate of transfers 
can be taken as a rough proxy of detention policy. Most detainees were 
brought to the Cuban prison in 2002 and 2003. Hence, by 2004, transfers and 
releases were the dominant determinant of changes to the aggregate 
population. Of course, each detainee transfer raises a different set of risks and 
costs. Nevertheless, in order to understand why and how President Obama’s 
ambition of closing the prison faltered, it is still useful to isolate a single, 
simple parameter (transfer rate) and to examine how its value ebbs and flows 
as the institutional context of detention policy changes. 
I therefore present here an empirical overview of detention policy from its 
inception in 2002 to early 2016. This overview highlights the timing of pivotal 
 
single page, is Congress’ first—and, to date, only—foray into providing further clarity on that 
question [of the scope of detention authority].”). 
71 See supra text accompanying notes 53–54. 
72 See supra text accompanying notes 67–70 (citing and discussing post-Boumediene legislation 
limiting transfers). 
73 See infra text accompanying notes 101–04. 
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shifts in transfer/release policy. In turn, this temporal focus invites further 
consideration of how these shifts related to changing separation-of-powers 
dynamics. I start by presenting three different empirical analyses, each providing 
a slightly different perspective on the problem. On the basis of this accumulated 
evidence, I then offer some threshold inferences about how changes at the 
separation-of-powers level correlated with, or diverged from, changes in policy 
on the ground. 
To start with, Figures 1a and 1b capture the long arc of detention policy. 
Each figure presents changes over time in aggregate levels of detention at 
Guantánamo and the marginal probability of transfer/release. Both flag four 
watersheds of judicial and legislative involvement with vertical lines. The first 
is June 28, 2004, when the Supreme Court handed down Rasul v. Bush.74 This 
was the first colorable signal that judicial superintendence of the Guantánamo 
detentions might be in the offing. The second is June 29, 2007, the date the 
Boumediene detainees’ petition for rehearing was granted after an initial 
certiorari filing had been rejected.75 The third is June 12, 2008, when Boumediene 
was handed down.76 The majority opinion left open many important 
questions.77 But it plainly resolved any question about the existence of judicial 
review.78 The fourth is June 24, 2009, when the first legislative limit on 
transfers was enacted.79 Once again, this is surely not a precise marker of the 
exogenous shock to executive branch control. The White House no doubt 
anticipated the restrictive legislation long before it reached the President’s 
desk. Still, it provides a useful, if concededly rough, benchmark for analysis 
of such effects, whether observed before final enactment or in its wake. 
Figure 1a shows how three parameters changed over time. These parameters 
are first, the overall detainee population at Guantánamo, net of entrants and 
transfers, at a given point in time; second, the aggregate number of detainee 
entries up to a point in time; and third, the aggregate number of detainee 
releases up to a point in time. Figure 1b presents a parameter that is often 
used for understanding population change over time: the Kaplan–Meier 
survival function. The Kaplan–Meier measure is commonly used to understand 
the temporal dimensions of a treatment in medical studies, where treatment 
and control populations are characterized by different rates of survival or 
 
74 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
75 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 551 U.S 1161 (June 29, 2007). 
76 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
77 See, e.g., id. at 787 (“The extent of the showing required of the Government in these cases is 
a matter to be determined.”). 
78 See id. at 798 (“The determination by the Court of Appeals that the Suspension Clause and 
its protections are inapplicable to petitioners was in error.”). 
79 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103, 123 Stat. 1859, 1920-21 (2009). 
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death across a bounded study period.80 The shape81 of the Kaplan–Meier curve 
represents the proclivity of the government at any given instance to release 
further detainees. It thus precisely captures the government’s evolving attitude 
toward detainee transfers. 
 
Figure 1a: Population Change and Institutional Dispensations in the 
Guantánamo Detentions (2002–2015)82 
 
 
 
 
80 The Kaplan–Meier function is used in studies with censored data—i.e., where subjects are 
only observed for a certain time and the event of interest (e.g., death or recovery) might occur after 
the end of the study. It is a step function with jumps at the observed event times, where the size of 
jumps depends on the number of events (here, releases) observed at each event time ti, and also on 
the pattern of censored observations prior to ti. See E.L. Kaplan & Paul Meier, Nonparametric 
Estimation from Incomplete Observations, 53 AM. STAT. ASS’N J. 457, 458 (1958). For an example of 
the use of Kaplan–Meier curves in legal scholarship, see, for example, Jason Webb Yackee & Susan 
Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and 
Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1454-60 (2012), which utilizes the Kaplan–Meier function 
to estimate survival time in days from the proposal of a federal rule to the issuance of the final rule. 
81 I use the term “shape” here because, strictly speaking, a Kaplan–Meier curve does not have a gradient. 
As a step-function, its derivation is either zero (between observations) or undefined (at observations). 
82 The data for Figure 1a was gathered as follows: The New York Times’ archive of pages on individual 
detainees was scraped with a Python script to acquire data associated with individual data, including the 
dates of transfer in and (where available) out of custody at the Cuban base. See infra Appendix. 
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Figure 1b: Kaplan–Meier Curve for Guantánamo 
Detentions (2002–2015)83 
  
  
 The second snapshot isolates the timing of discrete decisions to add or 
subtract to the net population of the Cuban base. Then, Figures 2a and 2b 
isolate respectively the timing of government decisions to bring new 
detainees to the base and to move detainees out of custody at the base. Each 
bar represents the number of releases in a three-month period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 The Kaplan–Meier functions presented were created using data aggregated from Wikileaks 
and the individual-level data of the New York Times. 
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Figure 2a: Dates of Detainees’ Transfer into Custody at Guantánamo 
 
 
Figure 2b: Detainees’ Transfer Out of Custody at Guantánamo 
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This data, as I have already cautioned, should be taken with a pinch of 
salt. The dates captured in Figures 1 and 2 do not necessarily reflect either 
the absolute beginnings or definitive ends of detention. At the front end, 
many detainees were in the custody of the United States or one of its allies 
prior to their arrival at Guantánamo. In the Afghan theater, the process of 
triaging detainees to the Cuban facility was institutionalized. From 2002, a 
dedicated Detainee Review Board comprising ten officials rendered decisions 
about whether individuals seized in that theater should be held in Afghanistan 
or transferred to the Cuban base.84 Of course, such triaging is not instantaneous. 
Detainees are thus necessarily in U.S. custody for some time before transfer 
from the theater of battle. 
At the back end, the decision to move an individual out of custody does 
not quite equate to a decision that a detainee should not or cannot be held. 
The government’s consistent practice during both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations was to designate a person released from Guantánamo as “no 
longer [an] enemy combatant[].”85 This is, I suppose, by definition not someone 
who had been erroneously detained or someone whose detention could never 
be justified as a matter of law. Obviously, such nomenclature has the advantage 
of never having to concede error. Perhaps as a collateral benefit (from the 
government’s perspective), it invites the further detention of an individual by 
a receiving state. Indeed, some detainees were transferred to the custody of 
another sovereign and moved immediately into further detention (and in some 
instances harsh treatment).86 Saudi Arabia, for example, created the Prince 
Muhammad bin Nayif Center for Counseling and Care, a custodial facility at 
which at least 120 former Guantánamo detainees have been held.87 Other 
 
84 See Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to 
Legitimacy, 2010 ARMY LAW. 9, 9, 16 (2010) (“As a detainee’s case was presented, the members of 
the [Detainee Review Board] would form a consensus regarding whether the detainee met the 
criteria of an enemy combatant . . . . If the detainee was determined to be an enemy combatant, the 
next question was whether the detainee met the criteria to be sent to GTMO.”). 
85 See Qassim v. Bush, 382 F. Supp. 2d. 126, 127-28, 127 n.3 (D.D.C. 2005) (describing the 
operative nomenclature of release). 
86 See Ken Silverstein, Pentagon Memo on Torture-Motivated Transfer Cited, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 
8, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2005/dec/08/nation/na-torture8 [https://perma.cc/L9UV-
A8M6] (noting that the United States has delivered detainees to countries that are believed to still 
practice torture). 
87 See Charles E. Berger, A Rehab Model for Gitmo Detainees, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/20/opinion/la-oe-berger-closing-gitmo-yemen-20131120 [https://p
erma.cc/83RN-EL6N] (reporting that 120 Saudis formerly detained at Guantánamo were later held 
in Saudi Arabia); see also Ellen Knickmeyer, Saudi Center Aims for ‘Life After Jihad,’ WALL ST. J.: 
MIDDLE EAST (Apr. 24, 2013, 6:08 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/04/24/saudi-rehab-
center-aims-to-shape-life-after-jihad/ [https://perma.cc/5XLA-43XX] (describing conditions in that 
rehabilitation facility). Of the first 146 detainees released, one report asserts that only seventeen 
were transferred to the continuing custody of their own governments. Robert M. Chesney, Leaving 
Guantánamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 661-62 (2006). 
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states notorious for their harsh and arbitrary penal systems, such as Gadhafi-era 
Libya, also received detainees and proceeded to detain them further under 
onerous conditions.88 Yet there is no public data on these periods of custody. 
As a result, the information presented here is the best available account of 
detention policy in a specific location. 
A third snapshot provides a tighter temporal focus on the period from 
January 2007 to December 2009. During this three-year window, the 
executive’s control over Guantánamo policy eroded with the addition of retail 
judicial supervision and then congressional intervention.89 It was thus a 
pivotal moment for President Obama’s ambition, as well as a key opportunity 
to understand the policy-level effects of the separation of powers. Mindful of 
the heterogeneity of the prison population, it is useful to begin a closer 
assessment of the evolution of detention policy at this key point by 
distinguishing between detainees in terms of their perceived dangerousness. 
Each of the classified detainee assessments released by Wikileaks contains an 
evaluation of a detainee’s “risk” on a four-tier scale of none, low, medium, and 
high.90 Whatever their underlying accuracy, these classifications plausibly 
reflect the government’s own internal assessments of the security-related risk 
presented by a detainee. They also contain important information on the 
perceived relative riskiness of different detainees. To provide a context in 
which the subsequent analyses can be better understood, Table 1a breaks down 
the distribution of risk values by nationality across the whole detainee population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 See Ron Nordland & Scott Shane, Libyan, Once a Detainee, Is Now a U.S. Ally of Sorts, N.Y. 
TIMES: THE GUANTÁNAMO FILES (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/gua
ntanamo-files-libyan-detainee-now-us-ally-of-sorts.html [https://perma.cc/4KNA-QKHY] (reporting on the 
transfer of Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamuda bin Qumu, who was transferred to Libya in 2007). 
89 See supra Section I.A. 
90 For more details, see infra Appendix. 
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Table 1a: Risk and Nationality Correlations 
 
 None Low Medium High 
Missing 
Data
Total 
Afghanistan 52 39 75 45 8 219 
Saudi Arabia 4 1 59 68 2 134 
Yemen 0 3 36 76 0 115 
Pakistan 21 7 29 14 1 72 
Algeria 0 1 8 17 0 26 
China 0 2 19 1 0 22 
Other Citizenship 10 12 51 106 13 192 
Total 87 65 277 327 24 780 
 
My analysis below uses those risk values, but it is important to flag two 
reasons for caution. First, a careful reading of the 765 assessments released 
by Wikileaks suggests that the risk assessments relied upon a plurality of 
sources, including interrogations of the detainee being evaluated,91 other 
detainees’ inculpatory statements, physical evidence obtained during the 
capture of detainees, and other nations’ intelligence agencies. Although the 
accuracy of information from these sources may vary greatly, the assessments 
do not reflect overt weighting or discounting of evidence. In particular, the 
assessments are consistently silent as to when evidence was obtained by either 
American92 or foreign93 interrogators through coercion or torture. 
Second, there is sometimes a large disconnect between the narrative 
account of a detainee’s history and an ultimate risk assessment. For example, 
the detainee assessment for Abd al Rahim Janko concludes that he may have 
been a spy recruited by the United Arab Emirates to penetrate al Qaeda; that 
he was certainly imprisoned and tortured by al Qaeda for two years; and that 
he had been “substantially exploited” by the time the assessment was written. 
Nevertheless, the assessment finds he “remains an enemy combatant,” a 
“medium” risk to the “US, its interests, and allies,” and a “[high] threat from 
 
91 Indeed, most assessments contain a section describing the detainee’s own version of the 
events leading to his detention. Table 1a uses data from the New York Times on detainees for whom 
no assessment is available. 
92 See, e.g., William Glaberson, Detainee Was Tortured, a Bush Official Confirms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 
2009, at A22 (describing interrogations of Mohammed al-Qahtani at Guantánamo in 2002 and 2003). 
93 See, e.g., David J.R. Frakt, Prisoners of Congress: The Constitutional and Political Clash over 
Detainees and the Closure of Guantanamo, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 179, 210-13 (2012) (describing the use 
of evidence supplied by Binyam Mohammed, who was interrogated under torture in Moroccan 
custody before being moved to Guantánamo). 
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a detention perspective.”94 It is hard to reconcile this conclusion with the 
government’s own account of Janko’s history. Indeed, Janko later sought 
judicial review, and in 2009 the district court ordered his release based on the 
“inescapable” conclusion that he was no longer an enemy combatant.95 This 
suggests that even when the facts in an assessment are uncontested, the 
document’s ultimate taxonomical conclusion may not logically follow. 
With these caveats in mind, Table 1b breaks down the three-year period 
into six-month increments to highlight how release policy modulated over 
time. For each six-month period, I report the number of detainees released. 
I also show how the composition of released pools of detainees changed over 
time in terms of perceived riskiness. I do not include figures for 2010 because 
those quarters would contain a surfeit of empty cells. This Table thus provides 
a snapshot into how the volume and composition of outflow from the Cuban 
base changed during a crucial period. This then sets the stage for the more 
granular analysis of the ‘why’ of detention policy in the next subsection. 
 
Table 1b: The Elements of Detainee Release Policy Between 2007 and 2009 
 
 1/1/2007–
6/30/2007 
7/1/2007–
12/31/2007 
1/1/2008–
6/30/2008 
7/1/2008–
12/31/2008 
1/1/2009–
6/30/2009 
7/1/2009–
12/31/2009 
Detainees 
released  
38 84 14 22 12 37 
Change (%)  
from initial 
population  
-8.84 -23.27 -4.69 -8.33 -5.37 -13.54 
Percent of Detainees in Each Risk Value Category 
No risk 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Low risk 0.84 0.76 0.79 0.85 0.91 0 
Medium risk 27.56 23.57 22.83 22.13 22.27 22.16 
High risk 71.51 76.43 76.38 77.02 77.27 77.84 
 
94 See Detainee Assessment for Abd al Rahim Janko 2 (on file with author); see also 
Memorandum from D.M. Thomas, Jr., Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, to Commander, U.S. Southern 
Command, Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SY-000489DP (S) 
(June 30, 2008), https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/pdf/sy/us9sy-000489dp.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW2G-
24H6] (reporting the detainee assessment brief for Abd al Rahim Janko). 
95 Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125-30 (D.D.C. 2009). Janko was not the only 
detainee allegedly held as a spy by the Taliban before his transfer to the Cuban base. See Tim Golden, 
Expecting U.S. Help, Sent to Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/10/15/us/15gitmo.html [https://perma.cc/6X5N-NNJK] (detailing the 2011 detention of 
former–Taliban prisoner Abdul Rahim Al Ginco in Guantánamo). 
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C. The Implications of Detention Policy’s Trajectory 
With these analyses in hand, it is appropriate to consider what inferences 
can be drawn about the effect separation-of-powers shifts had on granular 
policy decisions (here, the rate of transfers or releases) on the ground. I draw 
four somewhat disparate inferences from this population-level data related to 
the separation of powers, partisan change, and underlying policy-based constraints 
in shaping detention policy. Although heterogeneous, these inferences 
provide some insight into different causal elements of policy changes. 
First, Guantánamo policy was characterized by a rapid intake of prisoners 
followed by a long, drawn-out process of releases. More than 740 of the 780 
detainees known to have passed through Guantánamo were brought to the 
Cuban base in the camp’s first two years of operation.96 But by the end of 
2004, the Bush Administration had largely ceased using Guantánamo as a 
facility for newly seized detainees.97 The one exception to this policy occurred 
in 2006, when a group of twelve so-called “high value detainees” were moved 
to Guantánamo from secret CIA facilities known as black sites.98 This late 
burst of activity, however, is best understood as a shuffling of existing 
custodial arrangements catalyzed by the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision to 
extend minimal international humanitarian law coverage to all detainees.99 It 
is not evidence of Guantánamo’s use to house new captures after 2004. In 
effect, the in-flow to Guantánamo had ceased at least four years before partisan 
change came to the White House. This is somewhat in tension with celebratory 
accounts of the Obama Administration as an agent of policy change.100 
Rather, after 2004, the central policy choice facing both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations was instead whether or when to release existing detainees. 
Second, neither partisan change in the White House nor the instigation of 
post-Boumediene judicial review had an immediate catalytic effect on the rate 
of transfers and releases. Contrary to liberal criticism, the data shows that the 
Bush Administration took a relatively aggressive stance toward detainee-release 
policy. In three of the four years of Bush’s second term, upwards of one hundred 
detainees were released. At least initially, the Obama Administration followed 
the Bush Administration’s approach by persevering in a relatively robust 
 
96 See Figure 1a, supra. 
97 See Figure 1a, supra. 
98 See Morris D. Davis, Historical Perspective on Guantánamo Bay: The Arrival of the High Value 
Detainees, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 115, 119 (2009) (detailing the transfer of detainees from the 
CIA to the DOD in Guantánamo). 
99 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006) (holding that Common Article 3 of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions applies to military operations against al Qaeda). 
100 See Lederman, supra note 27. In addition, Lederman gives the Obama Administration credit 
for formalizing changes to interrogation policy that had been, in fact, made on the ground several 
years earlier by the Bush Administration. Id. 
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release policy.101 This once more suggests that—notwithstanding presidential 
campaign promises—the partisan transition from a Republican to a Democratic 
White House was characterized by continuity rather than change.102 
Moreover, it is very hard to discern any instantaneous effect of judicial or 
congressional intervention upon detention policy. The key watersheds of 
judicial and legislative change, that is, are not associated with sharp changes 
in the rate of transfers. Instead, Figures 1a and 1b illustrate a more subtle and 
gradual change in the rate of transfers, which gradually diminishes over 2009 
and falls to zero in 2010. Hence, if anything, the beginning of the Obama 
presidency marked a slowdown in efforts to disperse the detainee population, 
although not quite a sudden halt. 
Third, Figure 2b and Table 1b together permit more precise identification 
of one important and puzzling inflection point in detention policy. Only in 
the first quarter of 2010—almost one year into President Obama’s tenure in 
the Oval Office—did the rate of transfers and releases drop precipitously to 
almost zero. This collapse in departures from Guantánamo is plainly attributable 
to the Obama Administration—not the Bush Administration. Furthermore, 
it occurred some time after judicial and legislative intervention. 
This collapse also presents a puzzle that is critical to my analysis: Why 
did the flow of releases and transfers collapse at that time? This question is at 
the heart of the puzzle identified at the Article’s outset, and is a focal point 
for much of what follows. 
Fourth, and related to the last point, the data presented above allows us to 
rule out one potential theory about the policy change. This alternative theory 
would proceed as follows: prior to early 2010, the government faced a pool of 
detainees who, by its own determination, presented a low risk of recidivism. 
In 2010, following years of low-risk detainees being transferred or released, 
that pool of lower-risk detainees dried up. The marginal detainee was 
perceived as far more risky. Hence, the rate of transfers necessarily shifted 
into a lower gear, despite the Obama Administration’s contrary intentions. 
Yet this theory does not stand up to scrutiny. In particular, Table 1b 
suggests that the collapse in releases and transfers cannot be attributed to 
changes in the perceived characteristics of the marginal detainee next in line 
 
101 See Figure 1a, supra. 
102 This continuity is stressed by many. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S 
POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY 35 (2015) [hereinafter SAVAGE, POWER WARS] (“[A] range of people across 
the ideological spectrum would voice, with increasing intensity, what became a defining accusation 
not just of the moment, but of the entire presidency: Obama was acting like Bush.”); see also James P. 
Pfiffner, The Constitutional Legacy of George W. Bush, 45 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 727, 728, 733-38 
(2015) (“As senator, Obama often criticized Bush on constitutional and policy grounds. But when he 
became president, although he curbed some of President Bush’s excesses, he adopted similar policies and 
extended some of them regarding indefinite detention, electronic surveillance, and signing statements.”). 
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for release over time. Consider the bottom half of Table 1b, which illustrates 
the relative composition of the released detainees by their assigned risk values 
in their classified detainee assessments. These rows show that from the 
beginning of 2007 onward, high-risk individuals comprised an overwhelming 
majority of the released detainees. By 2006, almost all the no-risk and low-risk 
detainees had already been transferred out.103 Thereafter, the proportions of 
medium- and high-risk detainees in each batch of transferred or released 
detainees remained quite stable. Rather, across all periods, the modal 
transferee had been classified by the government as presenting a “high-risk.” 
Although it is at least possible other unobserved detainee characteristics 
might have caused a sudden contraction of releases in 2010, a threshold 
examination of the government’s own data belies the suggestion that there 
was a shift in the characteristics of the marginal detainee that explains the 
collapsed release rate in 2010. 
Anecdotal evidence also confirms that the shift in release patterns in early 
2010 did not result from a change in detainee characteristics. Soon after 
entering the White House, President Obama established an interagency 
taskforce to reanalyze evidence respecting each detainee and to recommend 
appropriate individual dispositions. In its final report, issued in mid-2009, 
the Obama Task Force identified 126 of the 240 detainees then in custody as 
“approved for transfer.”104 The Task Force indicated that “for most of the 
detainees approved for transfer, there were varying degrees of evidence 
indicating that they were low-level foreign fighters affiliated with al-Qaida or 
other groups operating in Afghanistan.”105 But almost six years later, in 
December 2015, forty-eight of the 107 detainees still in custody were cleared 
for transfer.106 While a decision to transfer is not an admission of erroneous 
detention, as previously noted,107 the persistence of significant numbers of 
individuals identified as amenable to release in late December 2015 once more 
implies that shifts in the rate of transfers cannot be attributed to a dearth of 
eligible candidates. 
 
103 See Table 1b, supra. 
104 DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 2-3 
(2010) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
105 Id. at 16. 
106 Charlie Savage, 17 Guantánamo Prisoner Transfers Said to Be Pending, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2015, at A25. The tally of 107 detainees is derived from the data presented in Figure 1. Accord 
Timeline, N.Y. TIMES: THE GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET (Oct. 20, 2016), http://projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo [https://perma.cc/YE84-2TDV]. 
107 Clearances for transfer, however, are treated as “protected” information that cannot be 
disclosed, or discussed by, detainees’ counsel. See, e.g., Ameziane v. Obama, 699 F.3d 488, 498 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (explaining that even foreign governments must obtain this information through official 
U.S. government channels and, as a result, counsel for detainees were barred by law from pointing 
out that, even if there was a legal justification for their client’s detention, the government itself 
identified no compelling policy justification to that end). 
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In summary, an analysis of population-level data concerning the Guantánamo 
detentions provides an important threshold insight about the policy effects 
of the separation of powers. Surprisingly, partisan change within the 
executive was associated with fewer, rather than more, releases. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, the involvement of multiple branches was not associated with 
any easing of release policy. And the collapse of the detainee outflow in 2010 
cannot be explained by changes in the marginal detainee’s characteristics. 
Understanding why President Obama’s agenda failed must be determined 
through a more granular examination of interbranch dynamics in the critical 
period between 2009 and 2010. 
II. DETENTION POLICY WITHIN AND BETWEEN THE BRANCHES 
This Part analyzes in detail the behavior of each branch in order to evaluate 
how each one influenced the marginal rate of releases from Guantánamo 
between 2009 and 2010. The ultimate aim of this analysis is to illuminate the 
effect of interbranch dynamics on presidential power. Three lines of inquiry 
are developed. These concern, respectively, the roles of the executive (and, in 
particular, the military bureaucracy responsible for detention policy), 
Congress, and the judiciary. 
The central claims advanced in this Part can be summarized briefly at the 
outset. I demonstrate that the military bureaucracy engaged in a rational 
triaging of detainees with transfers and releases through early 2010. Partisan 
change in the White House precipitated a departure from this trajectory, even 
though, as Part I suggested, the substance of detainee policy and relative 
detainee characteristics next in line for transfer remained largely unchanged. 
The ensuing collapse in transfers is also poorly explained by the diplomatic 
difficulty of obtaining agreement from a potential transferee country. Rather, 
that collapse was propelled by an alliance between the military bureaucracy 
and Congress—one initiated, importantly, by the former rather than the latter. 
On the one hand, the bureaucracy catalyzed legislators’ policy entrepreneurship 
by stoking public fears of detainee recidivism through strategic epistemic 
disclosures. On the other hand, Congress responded to military bureaucratic 
concern about detainee recidivism by legislating platforms for further 
resistance within the executive. Elites within Congress and the bureaucracy 
at the same time fueled public concern about recidivism. Finally, the Article 
III courts consistently resisted any large checking function. Rather, they drew 
up a substantive law of detention more capacious than what was sought by 
Department of Justice litigators or implemented by military bureaucrats. 
This account suggests that interbranch dynamics can impede a high-profile 
presidential agenda—albeit not in the way the Boumediene Court and 
sympathetic commentators seemed to anticipate. It further highlights the need 
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to account for not only the legal effects of the separation of powers—which here 
are meager—but also to consider closely the specific institutional channels 
through which interbranch dynamics unfold. In particular, my analysis suggests 
that Article II cannot usefully be viewed as creating a unitary entity. Rather, 
it has engendered an internally heterogeneous institution comprised of factions 
capable of allying with other branches to successfully resist presidential 
agendas. It demonstrates that interbranch conflict, though not inherent to the 
separation of powers, can emerge organically from intrabranch politicking. 
Correlatively, my analysis points toward the limits of social action as a 
catalyst of constitutional and legal change. To the extent habeas litigation 
provided the most apparent lever for civil society to extract policy change, 
insiders in the government were able to defang external critics. As a result, 
change and continuity in this period flowed from dynamics internal to the 
state rather than the external political surround.108 
A. The Executive and the Rate of Detainee Transfers 
Judicial and congressional influences on detention policy arose against a 
background of unilateral executive decisions. Understanding their effects 
requires a baseline account of that executive decisionmaking. To that end, this 
subsection explores a series of alternative explanations for the dynamics 
mapped in Part I. I begin by rejecting two potential explanations. First, I 
present an empirical analysis of how military decisionmakers’ transfer 
decisions were shaped by concerns about recidivism risk and diplomatic 
constraints—two forms of “private” information that might explain how and 
why the rate of transfers changed over time. This empirical analysis strongly 
suggests a baseline rationality in transfer and release decisions that informed 
policy through 2010. Given my baseline findings about bureaucratic rationality 
and efficiency, it is implausible to explain the Guantánamo prison’s persistence 
by suggesting that military commanders responsible for the Cuban base’s 
operation consistently dragged their heels. Moreover, I consider and reject 
the possibility that the decline in transfers under President Obama was driven 
by diplomatic constraints, in the sense of growing difficulties in finding 
countries that would accept transferred detainees. Something more is needed 
to explain the volte-face of 2009 and 2010. 
Finally, I draw on both theoretical and secondary sources to posit a more 
promising explanation. A pivotal explanatory factor appears to be a sharp 
uptick in resistance to transfers from the military bureaucracy. This attitudinal 
shift within the bureaucracy was precipitated not by a shift in underlying 
 
108 In contrast, social forces may have been more effective earlier in the evolution of Guantánamo 
policy. See supra text accompanying notes 17–22. 
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operational policy. Rather, the most plausible explanation links it to partisan 
rotation at the executive branch’s summit. This internal shift provides a first 
element of the larger account I aim to assemble in this Article. 
1. Determinants of Executive Release Decisions 
A central argument for executive control of policymaking, and national 
security policy decisions more generally, is the executive’s comparative 
institutional advantage in gathering and analyzing information.109 Arguments 
from epistemic superiority assume that the executive not only has access to 
information that other branches lack, but also that it employs such information 
in an unbiased and effective fashion to make discrete policy decisions. 
Whether separation-of-powers constraints on executive initiatives are 
warranted depends on whether such presumptions are accurate or misleading. 
In the detention context, the executive has privileged access to two kinds 
of information not generally available to other branches or external actors. 
First, it has information about the risk a given detainee poses based on his past 
actions, his statements during custody, and his behavior in custody. Second, it 
possesses information obtained via diplomatic channels about the willingness, 
or lack thereof, of other nations to receive a potential transferred detainee and 
engage in whatever further custodial or surveillance measures U.S. officials 
believe to be appropriate. The classified detainee assessments reflect, in part, 
the executive’s epistemic stocks, since they contain nationality data (which 
relates to the possibility of transfer) and risk values. So the question arises: 
Did the executive use this information to pursue a rational transfer policy? 
Figures 3a and 3b provide snapshots, respectively, of how recidivism risk 
and diplomatic constraints influenced detention decisions. Both figures 
report results from the same ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. 
The population analyzed in this regression comprises all detainees who have 
been released through 2015; it excludes detainees remaining in custody at the 
close of the study period (December 2015).110 The dependent variable (i.e., 
what is being explained) is the time in detention until release for the subset 
of the population who have, in fact, been released. The OLS regression 
specification that was used measures the correlation between a former 
detainee’s prior time in detention and dummy variables for risk assessments 
 
109 For arguments from comparative epistemic competence, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, 
Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 62, summarizing “noteworthy” judicial opinions offering 
“broad pronouncements about the need to defer to the executive” on matters of national security, 
and Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1204 
(2007), arguing that the executive is “in the best position” to weigh competing interests, thus 
warranting significant deference to executive decisions. 
110 Analyses of the complete population do not generate meaningfully different results. 
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and nationality. For ease of interpretation, I do not present the full regression 
specification or results here. Rather, Figures 3a and 3b present the marginal 
effect of each covariate on the duration of time before release in percentage 
terms. Stated in plain English, the dot in each line presents the average 
percentage change in the duration of detention when a specific trait is 
attached to a detainee, holding all other traits constant.111 The bars around 
each dot represent the ninety-five percent confidence interval for that estimate.112 
A confidence interval containing zero (marked with a vertical line on Figures 
3a and 3b) implies that the effect of that trait is statistically insignificant. 
 
Figure 3a: Marginal Effect of Risk Assessments on the Duration  
of Time Before Release (in percentage terms) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 I use a baseline of no-risk and Afghan nationality. I use Afghan nationality as a baseline 
because it is the most frequently encountered nationality, and Afghan detainees tended to be released 
quicker than other nationalities. 
112 There is, in effect, only a one-in-twenty chance that the true effect of a trait lies outside 
those bounds. 
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Figure 3b: Marginal Effect of Detainee Nationality on the Duration 
of Time Before Release (in percentage terms) 
 
 
 
Consider each analysis in turn. Figure 3a shows how the assignment of 
low-, medium-, and high-risk values within a detainee’s assessment correlates 
with the expected duration of detention. In each case, the effect of moving a 
detainee from no-risk (holding all else constant) is statistically significant. 
The assignment of medium- and high-risk values to a detainee, indeed, both 
have quite large effects on extending custody: both are associated with more 
than a doubling of the time before release. This suggests—not surprisingly—that 
the government’s internal evaluations of security risk had a large effect on its 
decisions to release or detain individual detainees. 
Figure 3b in turn suggests that risk evaluations are not the only determinants 
of release—nationality matters too.113 The largest statistically significant 
effects are associated with Chinese nationality (which in practice comprises a 
group of ethnic Uighurs) and Yemenis. Other nationalities do not evince as 
large effects on detention duration. Although leading journalistic accounts of 
detention stress the difficulties in resettlement posed by detainees of these 
 
113 Together, risk values and nationality on release suggests that the former predicts about sixty 
percent of the variance in outcomes, while the latter predicts about thirty-five percent of the variance. 
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nationalities above all else,114 the Yemeni and Uighur detainees comprise but 
a small fraction (fifteen percent and three percent, respectively) of the overall 
detainee population. All but seven of the Uighurs, moreover, had been 
transferred from the Cuban base before the end of 2009.115 For the remaining 
eighty-two percent of the detainee population, nationality seems to matter 
much less, if at all, to the duration of detention. 
It is possible to dig a bit deeper on the contours of bureaucratic rationality. 
In that vein, Figure 4 decomposes the detainee assessments produced each 
year based on the organizational affiliations identified in those assessments.116 
I use data on three categories of affiliations: Taliban; al Qaeda and its affiliates; 
and no affiliation at all.117 
 
Figure 4: Detainee Assessment Production and the 
Mix of Affiliations (2002–2009) 
 
 
114 See SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 104, 300 (describing the White House’s reluctance 
to transfer Yemeni detainees in 2010 due to troubling security conditions in their home country). 
115 David Johnston, 6 Uighurs Leave Guantánamo for Palau, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at A22. 
116 This information was obtained by parallel machine-coding and human-coding all 765 
assessments for the affiliations and actions assigned therein to the individual detainee. For more 
details, see infra Appendix. 
117 To put these categories in perspective, seventy-six assessments identified a Taliban affiliation; 
402 identified an al Qaeda affiliation; and 146 identified an affiliation with another organization 
covered by the AUMF. In contrast, 205 assessments contained no affiliation at all. 
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Figure 4 provides some evidence of risk-based triaging of detainees for 
bureaucratic processing between 2002 and 2009. It seems reasonable to 
presume that al Qaeda was generally viewed as a more dangerous affiliation 
than a Taliban affiliation, and that either affiliation signaled a greater risk than 
the absence of any affiliation. Applying that presumption to Figure 4 suggests 
that, prior to either judicial or legislative involvement, the military prioritized 
the triage of detainees who presented the best case for release. Individuals 
with no discerned affiliation to al Qaeda or the Taliban were moved out of 
custody first.118 Those associated with al Qaeda and its affiliates were kept in 
custody longer. 
The data presented in Figures 3a, 3b, and 4 point toward two conclusions 
about the quality of executive action even prior to legislative or judicial 
intervention. First, military decisionmaking on detention was characterized 
by a baseline rationality evident both in the way individuals were triaged for 
processing and also based on overall patterns of observed releases.119 Such 
rationing may have reflected an effort to better allocate detention-related 
resources by weeding out detainees without a compelling case for continued 
custody. Further, this rationing also reflects the significant fiscal burden of 
detention. Each year an individual is in detention at the Cuban base costs the 
government roughly $800,000.120 Between 2011 and 2013, during a period of 
fiscal austerity across the federal government, the Cuban detentions cost 
taxpayers $1.42 billion.121 In short, even a bureaucracy with no interest in the 
identification of false positives may have felt constrained to transfer or release 
detainees who posed no risk. 
Second, this data undermines yet another alternative explanation for the 
drop in the transfer rate identified in Part I.C. Recall that I have considered 
and rejected the hypothesis that transfers fell in frequency because of a 
change in the marginal detainee’s recidivism-related risk. An alternative 
possibility is that the shift observed in 2009 and 2010 flowed from a change 
in the diplomatic costs of transfer. Diplomatic frictions might arise because 
 
118 Of note, 169 assessments identify no affiliation and no action by the detainee that could warrant 
detention. These detainees were still held between 137 and 2925 days, for an average of 733 days. 
119 Cf. THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY 5-6 (1991) (identifying 
“techno-bureaucratic rationality” as a method of rationality “that recognzied the limitations [posed 
by] inadequate data, unquantifiable values, mixed societal goals, and potential realities”). 
120 See Carol Rosenberg, Guantánamo: The Most Expensive Prison on Earth, MIAMI HERALD 
(Nov. 8, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantan
amo/article1938974.html [https://perma.cc/4EJU-RZEN] (explaining that the average annual cost 
of $800,000 for each of the 171 detainees makes Guantánamo the most expensive prison in the world). 
121 See Ken Gude, Guantanamo: America’s $5 Billion Folly, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 
3, 2013, 8:57 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2013/12/03/80270/gua
ntanamo-americas-5-billion-folly-2/ [https://perma.cc/Z4NH-ULZE] (describing the total cost of 
Guantánamo over a three-year period). 
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countries to which detainees would be transferred based on their nationality 
(e.g., Pakistan, Afghanistan) are either unwilling to receive their nationals or 
are perceived by the United States as unable to take appropriate precautions. 
The data, however, does not support this hypothesis. There are two 
nationalities—Yemeni and Chinese (i.e., Uighur)—for which nationality does 
large work in explaining changes in the timing of release. But, as I have noted, 
neither Yemenis nor Uighurs comprised a large fraction of the residual 
detainee population at the beginning of 2009. By that time, all but seven of 
the Uighurs had been transferred from the Cuban base.122 Of the remaining 
population, only thirty had Yemeni nationality, which implicated severe 
diplomatic constraints because of their nationality and the perceived 
deterioration in the Yemeni security situation.123 
Another explanation related to changing costs of transfer might be 
hypothesized. This alternative explanation would focus on the possibility that 
transfers in 2009 and 2010 required the cooperation of third countries—i.e., 
countries besides the United States that did not have nationals at Guantánamo, 
which might have cooled to the prospect of housing Guantánamo detainees 
in late 2009 to 2010. Traces of this dynamic appear in press accounts of efforts 
to relocate Uighur detainees at Guantánamo. But there are reasons to doubt 
that it supplies a persuasive explanation for the more global slow-down in 
transfers. To start, it is puzzling that third countries would increase diplomatic 
resistance to transfers in the wake of the unilateralist President Bush’s departure 
and the arrival of the more multilateralist President Obama. It seems more 
plausible to think that failures in diplomacy flowed from shifts in U.S. 
behavior—such as increased internecine conflict within the bureaucracy, or a 
waning of diplomatic efforts—than to external changes. Finally, recall that 
Figures 1a and 1b showed that the rate of transfers picks up slowly in 2014. It 
is hard to understand why third countries’ views on Guantánamo would 
calcify in 2009 (as the soon-to-be-Nobel-winning President Obama came to 
office) and then soften in 2014 (absent any external stimulus). 
In summary, neither changes in the riskiness of the marginal detainee nor rising 
diplomatic costs well explains the collapse in transfers in 2009 and 2010. The 
empirical data, instead, is consistent with a body of anecdotal evidence—presented 
below—that attributes significance to the military bureaucracy’s attitude toward 
President Obama’s project of closing Guantánamo. 
 
122 See supra text accompanying notes 113–15. 
123 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 104, at 18 (recognizing the difficulties of transfers to 
Yemen given the country’s unstable security situation). 
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2. Bureaucratic Incentives in Times of Partisan Change 
The empirical portrait developed so far presents a puzzle: if transfer 
policy reflected a risk-based triaging, constrained by diplomatic concerns in a 
handful of cases, and neither risk nor diplomatic barriers explain the decline 
in transfers, what can explain the collapse in observed transfers from 
Guantánamo? I develop a tentative answer to that question here by going 
beyond the limited stock of empirical data to explore the shifting tenor of 
bureaucratic behavior during the political transition between the Bush and 
Obama Administrations. 
A body of evidence points toward a shift in bureaucratic dynamics within the 
executive branch after the partisan transition of 2009, which played a critical 
role in slowing the rate of transfers. According to multiple independently 
sourced news reports during that period, the diplomats tasked by the Obama 
White House with arranging and expediting transfers encountered new 
internal resistance. “Since Obama took office in 2009,” those officials encountered 
a pattern of delays and obstructions by the military bureaucracy that hindered 
transfers.124 That bureaucracy, as Connie Bruck has elaborated in a detailed 
journalistic account, was driven by a belief that the prison was “an asset too 
important to lose.”125 The special envoy responsible for negotiating such 
transfers between 2009 and 2012 sought and was reassigned to another 
position “because the Pentagon was not permitting any [transfers].”126 His 
successor from 2013 to 2015 also reported that his diplomatic efforts remained 
focused on those cleared for release in 2009, at the very beginning of the 
Obama Administration.127 
In some instances, it appears the resistance to certain transfers did not 
rest on any colorable policy justification. For example, the high-profile 
transfer of detainee Shaker Aamer was arranged with the United Kingdom in 
2013 but remained in limbo for more than two years because the Pentagon 
blocked “the return of Aamer and two longtime Guantánamo Bay detainees.”128 
Similar efforts to release a Mauritanian detainee, Ahmed Ould Abdel Aziz, 
 
124 See Charles Levinson & David Rohde, Special Report: Pentagon Thwarts Obama’s Effort to 
Close Guantanamo, REUTERS (Dec. 29, 2015, 5:19 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gitm
o-release-special-report-idUSKBN0UB1B020151229 [https://perma.cc/3347-WYUL] (noting how officials 
at the Pentagon used bureaucracy to interfere with President Obama’s aspiration to close Guantánamo). 
125 Bruck, supra note 28, at 36. 
126 SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 495. 
127 Janet Reitman, Inside Gitmo: America’s Shame, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.
rollingstone.com/politics/news/inside-gitmo-americas-shame-20151230 [https://perma.cc/5T4F-NEG4]. 
128 Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon Blocking Guantánamo Deals to Return Shaker Aamer and Other 
Cleared Detainees, GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2015, 1:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/
aug/13/pentagon-blocking-guantanamo-transfer-shaker-aamer [https://perma.cc/79TH-QBSC]. 
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were blocked by military bureaucrats wielding a “shifting array of objections.”129 
Ultimately, in November 2013, the President had to personally promise to 
“help” diplomats in “bureaucratic fights” to get transfers moving again.130 In 
short, conflict between agencies undermined the President’s agenda.131 And 
while the available evidence does not permit more fine-grained identification 
of which entities within the sprawling military apparatus engendered this 
resistance, it at least provides a threshold reason for identifying the military 
bureaucracy writ large as a source of resistance to Guantánamo’s closure. 
President Obama faced bureaucratic resistance from within the military 
with respect to a number of other counterterrorism policies. Anecdotal evidence 
also identifies bureaucratic resistance as a friction on his efforts to manage 
the military campaign in Afghanistan.132 Interestingly, the leading account of 
this campaign isolates leaks as a key tool employed by bureaucrats to 
undermine the President.133 Similarly, security studies scholars Conor Keane 
and Steve Wood have identified disabling bureaucratic conflict in other parts 
of the counterterrorism mission at roughly the same moment that transfers 
from Guantánamo came to a halt.134 In their penetrating empirical study, 
Keane and Wood show that the military’s post-conflict reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan were undermined by conflict between “several practically incompatible 
conceptions predominating within disparate agency silos.”135 In addition to 
documenting pervasive coordination problems, Keane and Wood underscore 
the persistence of a “war fighting rather than a whole-of-government strategy,” 
which led to unsustainable and often counterproductive reconstruction efforts.136 
In a similar vein, Keane has charted the conflict between military and civilian 
agencies over counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, with Pentagon officials 
 
129 Bruck, supra note 28, at 43. 
130 SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 511-12. Tellingly, Savage also asserts that the 
reappointment of a transfer envoy “blindsided” relevant Pentagon officials. Id. 
131 In the international affairs literature, scholars have posited that “differences in bureaucratic 
culture” may have undermined the possibility of a coherent policy agenda. Daniel W. Drezner, Ideas, 
Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 733, 737 (2000). For the 
classical account of the relation between interagency conflict and foreign policy, see generally 
GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971). 
132 See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, OBAMA’S WARS 192-95 (2010) (describing Obama’s frustration 
that the “White House was losing control of the public narrative” on the Afghan campaign due to 
military officials’ leaks). 
133 Id. 
134 Conor Keane & Steve Wood, Bureaucratic Politics, Role Conflict, and the Internal Dynamics of 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 42 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y. 99, 103 (2016). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 105. 
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treating what was to become the Taliban’s principal income source as “an 
unwelcome diversion from eliminating the remnants of al-Qaeda’s leadership.”137 
The possibility of bureaucratic resistance as a constraint on presidential 
power is also consistent with both historical and theoretical accounts of an 
entrenched and occasionally recalcitrant national security bureaucracy that 
has developed in path-dependent ways—occasionally at odds with the 
preferences of its executive branch overseers.138 These accounts diagnose the 
divergence in preferences between the White House and the military in terms 
of a principal–agent problem that afflicts the regulatory state more generally.139 
Samuel Huntington famously sketched a model of civilian and military 
leadership driven by conflicting imperatives, by an internal competition for 
control, and by diverse interactions with each other and with society.140 He 
also anticipated the possibility that elements of the military bureaucracy 
dissatisfied with presidential leadership might try to obtain a more favorable 
audience in Congress.141 As I shall develop below, it is precisely this sort of 
“divide and conquer” strategy that elements of the military bureaucracy 
appear to have played here. 
To be sure, the two-principal problem is endemic across the regulatory 
state. But it is plausible to posit that the degree of agency slack in the military 
and national security contexts is especially acute. Military leaders have their 
own sources of public prestige—and thus can more effectively resist presidential 
initiatives by appealing directly to the public.142 As the example of detention 
amply shows, military bureaucracies also have access to distinctive epistemic 
resources that political actors lack. As a result, “[b]ureaucratically sophisticated 
mid-level officers inside the Pentagon are able to effect the adoption of their 
 
137 Conor Keane, The Impact of Bureaucratic Conflict on US Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan, 
12 FOREIGN POL’Y ANALYSIS 295, 302 (2016). 
138 See generally AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JSC, 
AND NSC (1999) (identifying the path-dependent historical development of key national security 
agencies as an explanation for their limited capacities and reach). 
139 See Huq, Structural Constitutionalism, supra note 12, at 911-16 (describing bureaucratic constraints 
on presidential control of national security matters); see also Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in 
American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1816 (2012) (“Agencies 
are disciplined not solely by the constraints of rationality, legal doctrine, and political power, but 
also by the social and institutional environments in which they are embedded.”). See generally Kagan, 
supra note 10, at 2299 (noting that “agency resistance to presidential preferences [in] . . . the form 
of inertia” has been recognized as a basic fact of the federal regulatory state). 
140 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND 
POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 80-97 (1957) (outlining how civilian control can be 
defined vis-à-vis its essential role with the military). 
141 See id. at 182-83; see also id. at 415-16 (criticizing the National Security Act of 1949 for 
allowing direct bureaucratic access to Congress). 
142 See, e.g., Russell F. Weigley, The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control From 
McClellan to Powell, 57 J. MIL. HIST., Oct. 1993, at 28 (referring to General Powell writing a New York 
Times op-ed piece and directly appealing to the public about his opposition to the Bosnian intervention). 
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policy judgments in the Executive Branch and Congress ‘against the wishes 
of civilian leaders to the contrary.’”143 Additionally, the effective domain of 
military-bureaucratic independence has expanded over time. Writing in 2002, 
the distinguished military historian Richard Kohn worried that “the American 
military has grown in influence to the point of being able to impose its own 
perspective on many policies and decisions.”144 At least in the detention 
context, Kohn’s words seem prescient. 
3. The Causes of Bureaucratic Resistance 
Neither the aforementioned news sources nor these accounts of 
contemporaneous internecine institutional conflicts that disabled a 
counterterrorism mission explain the reasons for the sudden spike in 
bureaucratic “intransigence.”145 This section offers hypotheses about why 
bureaucratic attitudes toward Guantánamo shifted so abruptly. Given the 
available evidentiary record, it is not possible to adjudicate fully between 
these hypotheses, even though the key role of certain elements within the 
military bureaucracy seems clear. Moreover, it is important to flag once more 
that the available data does not conduce to more fine-grained parsing of 
exactly which elements within the Pentagon bureaucracy played a pivotal role 
in shifting bureaucratic attitudes. With these caveats, it is still possible to 
isolate three hypotheses about the specific causal mechanism at work. 
First, it is striking that the rupture in bureaucratic behavior described 
here arose in the wake of partisan change in the White House, rather than in 
response to some immediate change in policy (i.e., the presidentially required 
rate of releases).146 I focus here on partisan change within the executive in 
part because the anecdotal evidence points in that direction, and in part 
because the shift in bureaucratic behavior appears unrelated to other changes 
to the separation-of-powers environment.147 Further, as I explore below, the 
evidence suggests that this internal change led to shifts in legislative behavior 
rather than vice versa.148 As Part I demonstrated, the Bush and Obama 
 
143 Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
797, 798 (2012). 
144 Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today, 55 
NAVAL WAR C. REV., Summer 2002, at 9; see also PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, 
OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 58-68 (2003) (describing principal–agent 
dynamics in the military context). 
145 See Ackerman, supra note 128. Bruck identifies the Defense Department’s concern with 
casualty risk as the reason for its recalcitrance. Bruck, supra note 28. But this does not explain why 
the Pentagon’s resistance to transfer changed with Obama’s entry into office. 
146 Cf. Kohn, supra note 144, at 33 (documenting military resistance to institutional reform 
during the Bush and Clinton Administrations). 
147 See supra Section I.A. 
148 See infra text accompanying notes 168–74. 
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Administrations pursued substantially similar policies, with the former 
overseeing a higher rate of detainee releases. It seems unlikely, therefore, that 
simple “ideological opposition”149 at the discrete policy level alone explains 
the bureaucratic opposition. After all, military officials were being tasked with 
roughly the same task of identifying detainees for release both before and after 
the 2008 election.150 Instead, one way of interpreting the time trends illustrated 
in Figure 1a is that partisan change at the presidential leadership level was 
associated with different levels of cooperation within agencies even holding 
roughly constant the pro-release orientation of policy both before and after 2008. If 
the substance of detention policy seems not to be a dispositive influence, this 
leaves open the possibility that the identity of the commander-in-chief may 
have influenced the degree of bureaucratic resistance to detainee transfers. 
The available data does not directly explain why the identity of the 
President might have altered bureaucratic preferences, even though granular 
policymaking did not evince change in the expected direction. Two 
mechanisms, which may be complementary rather than mutually exclusive, 
merit serious consideration. The first possibility is that relevant military 
bureaucrats anticipated ex ante a lower degree of across-the-board cooperation 
and support from a Democratic rather than a Republican President given the 
Republican Party’s historical association with more robust support for the 
armed services.151 That the senior ranks of the military are also “more 
conservative” than their historical predecessors152 could only have exacerbated 
worries about the divergence of interest that partisan change would bring. 
Anticipating conflict with the White House—say, over staffing, funding, or 
prosecutions in alleged torture cases—military bureaucrats might treat the 
President’s detention-related agenda item as a valuable bargaining chip, not 
to be frittered away lightly. 
Another possibility builds on the “Nixon goes to China” effect described 
by political scientist Robert Goodin.153 Goodin pointed out that when “an 
action is somehow out of character for a particular politician, then, for that 
very reason there are fewer external obstacles to that politician’s performing 
 
149 See Reitman, supra note 127 (quoting an unnamed Administration official to the effect that 
“there are people working on this issue within the government who are ideologically opposed to 
closing the facility”). 
150 See supra Figure 1a (showing that the number of releases remained consistent before and 
after the 2008 election). 
151 See Michael T. Koch & Skyler Cranmer, Testing the “Dick Cheney” Hypothesis: Do Governments 
of the Left Attract More Terrorism than Governments of the Right?, 24 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 
311, 312 (2007) (noting that Republicans tend to be associated with greater support for the military). 
152 Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, July 1997, at 66, 70. 
153 Robert E. Goodin, Voting Through the Looking Glass, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 420, 421 (1983). 
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it.”154 Although Goodin did not explain why this might happen, one possible 
causal mechanism turns on credibility. A politician taking a counterintuitive 
position can more credibly claim to be pursuing a position based on its 
intrinsic merits rather than ideological grounds. On this logic, it was the very 
fact that President Obama might have been expected to take liberal positions 
on Guantánamo that rendered his embrace of those positions less credible 
and less persuasive than President Bush’s. President Obama’s credibility 
problem, moreover, may have been exacerbated by the fact that his 2008 
agenda took the categorical position that Guantánamo had to be emptied 
completely.155 Coming from a Democratic President, an unqualified declaration 
that the military had lost control over a policy’s pace and structure may have 
been especially galling to elements within the Pentagon.156 
This highlights a rather ironic possibility: had Obama muffled or obscured 
his intended position on the Guantánamo detentions—had he lauded the 
Bush Administration’s approach and signaled his intention to hew to that 
course—it is possible that he would have faced less internal resistance from 
the military bureaucracy in pursuing the same goal that he in fact explicitly 
endorsed. There is some evidence of this at the retail level. The case of Shaker 
Aamer, for example, demonstrates that the very fact that a specific case was 
high profile might engender more—rather than less—resistance from 
bureaucratic actors.157 By taking a salient position, President Obama may have 
engendered greater internal friction. This dynamic contrasts with recent 
studies of administrative agency resistance, where the salience of an issue 
seems to increase presidential power.158 The dynamic of detention policy 
 
154 Id. 
155 See supra text accompanying notes 3–4. 
156 I have focused here on Obama’s partisan identity. What, though, of his race? For example, 
“dozens of studies show that out-group antagonisms—measured by racial resentment, anti-Black 
stereotypes [and] . . . anti-Muslim attitudes, and even living in areas with many racist google 
searches—were [significant] . . . predictors of opposition to Obama in 2008.” Michael Tesler, The 
Conditions Ripe for Racial Spillover Effects, 36 ADVANCES POL. PSYCHOL. 101, 101 (2015). Moreover, 
the President’s race influences judgments on specific policies. Opposition to a healthcare policy 
innovation rises substantially in experimental studies when it is associated with President Obama 
rather than President Clinton. Michael Tesler, The Spillover of Racial Attitudes into Health Care: How 
President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 690-91 
(2012). We lack studies of bureaucratic personnel necessary to test the hypothesis that bureaucratic 
opposition to President Obama’s Guantánamo policies was in part a reaction to his race. And the 
likelihood that post hoc interviews with agency officials would yield falsifiable results is vanishingly 
small. Hence, no firm evidence exists to confirm or reject this possibility. All that can be said here 
is that the homology between these race effects associated with Obama and the dynamics of 
Guantánamo policymaking over time is rather striking. 
157 See Ackerman, supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
158 See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 
1761 (2013) (“[Agency] [s]elf-insulation may thus be most prevalent for the broad set of regulatory 
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points to the alternative possibility that an issue’s salience can undermine a 
President’s ability to steer the bureaucracy. 
The second possible explanation for the bureaucratic turn focuses on the 
preferences of specific Cabinet-level officials. For example, some evidence 
suggests that the Secretary of Defense’s resistance to personally certifying the 
legality of transfers, as required under legislative restrictions on detainee transfers, 
has played a role in generating delays.159 At the same time, the wide range of 
delaying tactics that has been observed at several levels of the bureaucracy—e.g., 
resisting the release of medical records necessary for a transfer by citing the 
privacy interests of the still-detained custodial subject—suggests that the 
preferences of specific individual officials cannot supply a full explanation for 
the bureaucratic attitude.160 
Finally, military resistance to transferring Guantánamo detainees arose at a 
time when the prosecution of detainees in Article III courts was becoming a 
more remote possibility. Although one detainee from the Cuban base had 
been transferred to the United States mainland for criminal trial,161 other 
proposed transfers foundered due to bipartisan opposition.162 The elimination 
of an Article III trial as a practical option might have raised the expected cost 
 
actions that are not clearly salient or high profile; actions that are already high profile are likely to 
come to the attention of the White House through other means.”). 
159 See Richard Bernstein, A Detainee Freed, but Not Released, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/us/24iht-letter.html [https://perma.cc/A7V7-PCBA] (documenting 
delays in the release of a detainee even after a judge found his continued detention at Guantánamo 
unlawful); Adam Goldman, Once Deemed Too Dangerous to Release, Saudi Detainee at Guantanamo Bay 
Prison Has Been Repatriated, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/saudi-detainee-at-guantanamo-bay-prison-has-been-repatriated/2015/09/22/b28c2
8cc-6156-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html [https://perma.cc/8ZKF-B6ND] (noting that Defense 
Secretary Ashton B. Carter has been criticized for the pace at which he approves detainee transfers); 
Tim Mak & Nancy A. Youssef, The Pentagon Is Keeping Half of Gitmo Locked Up—Against the White 
House’s Wishes, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/09/he-
s-keeping-half-of-gitmo-locked-up-against-the-white-house-s-wishes.html [https://perma.cc/A795-6D
XV] (observing that then–Secretary of Defense Carter was under political pressure to approve 
detainee transfers and reduce the number of detainees held at Guantánamo Bay); see also SAVAGE, 
POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 516-17 (commenting that detainee transfers were also delayed 
during former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s time in office). 
160 See Reitman, supra note 127 (citing an unnamed official as stating that “there are a thousand 
ways that you can thwart policy through bureaucratic cunning or inaction, like when transfer packages 
just sit there on the defense secretary’s desk and don’t move. Or that the people in the building don’t 
get it to him”). 
161 See Peter Finn, Terror Suspect Ghailani Brought from Guantanamo Bay to U.S. for Trial, WASH. 
POST (June 10, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/09/AR200
9060900401.html [https://perma.cc/9PYL-RFFY] (noting that Ahmed Ghailani, a Guantánamo 
detainee, was flown to New York to face a federal trial). 
162 See Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/us/05gitmo.html [https://perma.cc/F4BQ-HMNS] (observing that 
Congress imposed restrictions that “banned the military from using its funds to transfer detainees 
to domestic soil, even for trials”). 
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of closing Guantánamo—a policy that would necessarily have entailed the 
dispersion beyond U.S. control of some detainees perceived as being extremely 
dangerous. Rather than hazard this outcome, elements of the military 
bureaucracy may have applied the brakes. 
4. Conclusion 
The evidence presented here suggests that bureaucratic processing, 
triaging, and transferring detainees from the Cuban base was characterized 
initially by a measure of rationality. Those individuals who presented the least 
threat seemed to have been prioritized for release, at least where diplomatically 
feasible. That rationality, however, foundered after President Obama came 
into office—but not because the marginal detainee suddenly became too risky 
to release or because of a sharp rise in the diplomatic difficulties of release. I 
have offered evidence of that bureaucratic turn, and, more tentatively, suggested 
a number of distinct explanations for this turn. The most persuasive, in my 
view, hinges on a breakdown in intrabranch bargaining and President Obama’s 
distinctive credibility problem with the military.163 
Finally, the account developed here gestures toward the possibility—to be 
amplified in subsequent sections—that the ultimate effect of bureaucratic 
resistance to presidential agendas will be a function of the behavior of other 
branches. For instance, bureaucratic resistance to Guantánamo transfers took 
advantage of the procedures that Congress had legislated for such actions.164 
This suggests that understanding the checking effect of the separation of 
powers requires attention to the interaction between the internal elements of 
each branch with coordinate actors in other branches. It is this possibility of 
unexpected interbranch alliances that I explore next. 
B. The Causes and Consequences of Legislative Intervention 
Between 2002 and 2009, Congress imposed few constraints on detention 
policy.165 Its main innovations either reinforced executive branch autonomy 
(i.e., by eliminating federal court jurisdiction to hear challenges to executive 
decisions) or created new, lower-cost options for processing detainees for 
more credible long-term detentions (i.e., by setting statutory foundations for 
military commissions).166 But in June 2009, legislators changed tack. Congress 
 
163 It is not clear whether qualitative research would do better: several of the theories I have 
developed are unlikely to be confirmed by participants (e.g., the bargaining-chip theory and the race 
theory). Hence, it is not clear if any definitive answer is possible. 
164 See supra Section I.A.3 (discussing the institutional history of Guantánamo policy). 
165 See supra Section I.A.3. 
166 See supra Section I.A.3. 
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for the first time interposed itself into the heartland of Guantánamo policy 
regarding when and how detainees could be transferred or released.167 Why? 
And to what effect? 
This subsection explores the causes and consequences of Congress’s 2009 
and 2010 statutory interventions as a way of better understanding why and 
how legislative interventions constrain presidential policy options. I focus on 
these legislative interventions because they coincide in time with the dramatic 
shift in transfer rates identified in Part I. Using a mix of empirical and doctrinal 
evidence, I first argue that legislative intervention cannot be ascribed to an 
exogenous policy shock: there was no singular incident or series of incidents 
involving a former detainee that catalyzed recidivism-related concerns. 
Rather, the change in legislative attitudes toward detainee transfers is best 
explained by an intragovernmental dynamic. This dynamic is squarely at odds 
with the traditional separation-of-powers story, in which the legislature acts 
as a brake on executive initiatives. Instead, it seems that public concern and, 
in the end, statutory intervention to limit transfers and releases were the 
result of an interbranch alliance between the military bureaucracy and 
Congress. A disconsolate bureaucracy, in short, effectively turned Congress 
against the White House. 
Yet another piece of this dynamic merits emphasis up front. When 
Congress responded to an uptick in public concern about recidivism risk, its 
intervention did not depend on the force of law for its efficacy. Instead, the 
ensuing regulation vested the military bureaucracy with discretion to resist 
presidential initiatives by imposing political frictions on discrete release 
decisions. It was thus an internal dynamic nested within bureaucratic politics, 
rather than the sheer force of law, that hindered the White House. Just as the 
causes of separation-of-powers constraints on presidential power cannot be 
understood by looking exclusively at the actions of the branches as discrete, 
monolithic entities, so too the consequences of those constraints cannot be 
gauged without decomposing the branches into their discrete components. 
1. The Roots of Legislative Intervention 
Decisions whether or not to transfer or release detainees from 
Guantánamo became a “hot-button” question for Congress in 2009.168 Why? 
As Part I demonstrated, releases had been occurring at a vigorous pace for at 
least three years by then; if anything, the rate of releases and transfers fell 
under the new presidential dispensation. Standard accounts posit that 
 
167 See infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
168 See Payne, supra note 45, at 883 (stating that post-Boumediene legislation has focused on issues 
such as detainee transfer authority, rather than substantive changes or clarifications to habeas proceedings). 
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legislative attention was driven by a worry about detainee “recidivism.”169 
Concern on that score “soar[ed]” between 2008 and 2010.170 To understand 
the role of separation-of-powers dynamics in checking presidential power, it 
is necessary first to reject the hypothesis that it was these extrinsic concerns 
motivated by an exogenous shock—i.e., a vivid attack involving a recidivist 
from Guantánamo—that derailed the White House’s agenda. Having rejected 
this extrinsic explanation for policy change, I then demonstrate that a 
bureaucratic–legislative alliance catalyzed public concern about recidivism 
and, in turn, restrictive legislation from June 2009 onward. I focus on the key role 
of strategic bureaucratic disclosure in shaping perceptions of recidivism-related 
threats. Finally, I discuss the pivotal function of elite policy entrepreneurs, in 
both Congress and the executive branch, in shaping public sentiments. 
To assess the causes of legislative intervention on transfer policy, it is useful 
to explore first the relative timing of legislative and public concern about 
recidivism-related risk. To that end, Figure 5 reports the frequency of invocations 
of Guantánamo recidivism in both major newspapers (as compiled in Westlaw’s 
Major Newspapers Database) and the Congressional Record between 2004 and 
2015. It is important to note that the latter search does not capture hearing 
transcripts. Between April and June 2011, the House Committee on Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations convened three public hearings 
and one closed hearing on Guantánamo recidivism.171 Because it is not clear 
how to aggregate a tally that relies on mentions in the Congressional Record 
and a tally of committee hearings, Figure 5 only reports the former. 
 
 
169 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (discussing the standard narrative regarding 
recidivism). 
170 See Thomas Joscelyn, Gitmo Recidivism Rate Soars, WKLY. STANDARD (Dec. 7, 2010, 4:12 
PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/gitmo-recidivism-rate-soars_521965.html [https://per
ma.cc/FPY5-W6PU] (noting that in 2010 the U.S. government considered twenty-five percent of 
all transferred former detainees to be confirmed or suspected recidivists). 
171 See HOUSE ARMED SERVS. COMM., Leaving Guantanamo: Policies, Pressures, and Detainees 
Returning to the Fight 2 (Jan. 2012), https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.
house.gov/themes/rep_armed_services/largedocs/leaving_guantanamo_web_3_27.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/G5D8-RW7Q] (discussing the steps taken by the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee 
during its “in-depth, comprehensive bipartisan investigation of procedures to dispatch detainees 
from the Guantanamo Bay detention facility (GTMO) over the past decade”). 
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Figure 5: Frequency of Invocation of Guantánamo Recidivism in Major 
Newspapers and the Congressional Record (2004–2014) 
 
The data presented in Figure 5, read in light of the available extrinsic 
evidence of congressional motivations, does not support the hypothesis that 
Congress responded to an exogenous shock, such as a terrorism-related event, 
in moving aggressively to mitigate perceived recidivism risk. Rather, it suggests 
that the public demand to which the June 2009 uptick in coverage responded 
was a product of endogenous dynamics, i.e., the bureaucratic–legislative alliance 
seeking to constrain the President.172 
As Figure 5 shows, scant legislative or public concern about detainee 
recidivism existed until late 2008. This was so despite some earlier reports of 
 
172 Some observers cite a December 2009 incident on an international flight that almost 
exploded over Chicago as catalyzing a shift in the White House’s preferences. See, e.g., SAVAGE, 
POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 11-17 (recounting the details of a foiled airplane bombing and the 
Obama Administration’s initial stance on the “war on terror”). I do not think that event can be relied 
on to explain the dynamics observed here for two reasons. First, it simply comes too late to explain 
the spike in congressional attention documented in this Article. Even the increase in public attention 
to the recidivism issue precedes rather than follows the incident. Second, the December 2009 
incident did not involve a former Guantánamo detainee, but a Nigerian tasked by al Qaeda. At best, 
an explanation that focused on this incident would have to explain why this incident, or all other 
successful and foiled terrorism plots, led to a change in views on Guantánamo. The incident itself 
pointed to a new geographic source of terrorism. It requires an effort of imagination and political 
entrepreneurship to link it to Guantánamo. But then, it is necessary to explain why and how that 
effort came about. 
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former detainees engaging in insurgency or violence.173 The 2007 to 2009 news 
reports extracted from Westlaw, as well as government statements about 
recidivism, moreover, do not tend to single out a particular incident involving 
a former detainee returning to the fight that could have sparked the increase 
in legislative and public concern. The most likely catalyzing incident that 
occurred in this period—a suicide attack in Baghdad allegedly executed by a 
former Guantánamo detainee174—is not extensively cited in either news 
reports175 or legislative or executive branch statements.176 The range of alleged 
recidivism, even involving violence, is also quite heterogeneous. Some recidivists, 
for example, are identified by the government as affiliated with forces fighting 
foes of the United States, such as Syria, rather than attacking either American 
or allied interests.177 
Instead of focusing on specific instances of recidivism, early news reports and 
legislative statements are dominated by references to the recidivism statistics 
produced by the military bureaucracy.178 The large role played by bureaucratic 
statistics suggests that legislative and public perceptions of recidivism were, 
at a minimum, mediated through the positions advanced by the military 
bureaucracy.179 Beginning in July 2006, the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) began issuing informal periodic statements about detainee reengagement 
or recidivism.180 From 2007 onward, the frequency of these official statements 
 
173 See, e.g., C.J. Chivers, Russian Freed from Guantánamo is Killed by Police Near Chechnya, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 28, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/world/europe/28russia.html [https://
perma.cc/Y5X4-J8MU] (describing evidence of recidivism dating back to 2005). 
174 See Alissa J. Rubin, Bomber’s Final Messages Exhort Fighters Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES (May 
9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/middleeast/09mosul.html [https://perma.cc/E
AP4-USLH] (describing the possibility that the prolonged detention of certain prisoners at Guantánamo 
was the cause of their subsequent radicalization). 
175 Indeed, the detainee alleged to have perpetrated the bombing, Abdallah Salih al-Ajmi, is 
not mentioned in the other reports about recidivism in the data set. 
176 For a useful collection of such statements, see Mark P. Denbeaux et al., Recividism Revisionism: 
An Analysis of the Government’s Representations of Alleged “Recidivism” of the Guantánamo 
Detainees 11-17 (June 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/Public
IntGovServ/CSJ/upload/GTMO_Final_Final_Recidivist_6-5-09-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/R89T-Q443]. 
177 See Ex-Guantanamo Prisoner Killed in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 18, 2013, 8:16 PM), http://am
erica.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/18/ex-guantanamo-prisonerkilledinsyria.html [https://perma.cc/
WW49-JKW6] (noting that a former detainee died fighting for an antigovernment rebel group in Syria). 
178 A key question, therefore, in allocating causal roles within the military bureaucracy is the 
source of these leaks. Publicly available information does not disclose these sources. 
179 For evidence of the effect of governmental frames on public perceptions of terrorism 
threats, see Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, & Robert Y. Shapiro, Post-9/11 Terrorism Threats, 
News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United States, 1 INT’L J. CONFLICT & VIOLENCE 105, 110-11 
(2007) (documenting effects of government statements on perceptions of terrorism threat). 
180 See, e.g., DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, TRANSNATIONAL: GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES 
RETURNING TO TERRORISM UPDATE (July 10, 2006), http://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/
FOIA/5%20USC%20%C2%A7%20552%28A%29%282%29%28D%29%20Records/Detainee%20Recid
ivism%20Reports/TRANSNATIONAL%20GUANTANAMO%20BAY%20DETAINEES%20RET
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increased. Their contents were framed, moreover, in increasingly alarmist 
terms. Their drumbeat was amplified by other government agencies.  
The first two formal Pentagon statements about detainee recidivism were 
promulgated in December 2007 and May 2008.181 Thereafter, the military 
bureaucracy issued formal reports in January 2009, April 2009, October 2010, 
December 2011, and July 2012.182 In short, the acceleration of bureaucratic 
reporting on recidivism is tightly correlated to the arc of legislative attention 
to the issue. 
Further, both the content and the form of military-bureaucratic statements 
on recidivism shifted dramatically in this period. Consider first the changing 
content of bureaucratic statements. The recidivism rate reported by the DNI 
increased from thirty-six confirmed or suspected cases in May 2008 to 
eighteen confirmed and forty-three suspected cases in January 2009, and then 
further up to twenty-seven confirmed and forty-seven suspected recidivists 
in April 2009.183 The reported rate of recidivism changed from three percent 
at one point in 2008 to eleven percent in 2009 to twenty-seven percent in 
2012.184 In addition, the form and style of military-bureaucratic statements on 
recidivism evolved between 2008 and 2009. On my reading, their tone 
sharpened, increasingly conveying a sense of urgency. Consider one example: 
information about the sharpest uptick in alleged recidivism was disseminated 
not through a formal release, but instead through a March 2009 leak to news 
media organizations of an enlarged list of purportedly classified recidivism 
data.185 This “unreleased report” became front-page news, under banner 
headlines proclaiming that “1 in 7” of the formerly detained “are engaged in 
 
URNING%20TO%20TERRORIS.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX4P-MJLP] (reporting that a small 
percentage of former Guantánamo detainees have returned to terrorism). A variety of terms were 
employed by governmental spokespersons, seemingly interchangeably, for the same concept. See 
THE REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT’S TASK FORCE ON DETAINEE TREATMENT 295 
(2013), http://detaineetaskforce.org/read/ [https://perma.cc/9EAX-Q4DB] [hereinafter DETAINEE 
TREATMENT REPORT] (noting the interchangeable use of the terms “re-engaging [in terrorism],” 
“re-engaging in terrorist or insurgent activities” and “anti-coalition militant activities”). 
181 See Katherine Tiedemann & Peter Bergen, Guantanamo: Who Really ‘Returned to the 
Battlefield’? NEW AM. (July 20, 2009), https://www.newamerica.org/fellows/guantanamo-who-
really-returned-to-the-battlefield-2009 [https://perma.cc/3T3M-RU7L]. 
182 See DETAINEE TREATMENT REPORT, supra note 180, at 297-98 (listing the number of 
released detainees confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorism). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 298. 
185 See Fact Sheet: Former Guantanamo Detainee Terrorism Trends, ABC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/guantanamo_recidivism_list_090526.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9HNN-SCA2] (providing names and personal details of former detainees confirmed or suspected 
of reengaging in terrorism). 
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terrorism or militant activity.”186 This phrasing likely had more emotional 
punch than talk of an eleven-percent recidivism rate. Yet, however framed, 
this statistic was too high—even by the military’s own interpretation. Two 
weeks after running a front-page report featuring the purported “1 in 7” 
recidivism rate, the New York Times clarified that the report conflated the 
Pentagon’s categories of suspected and confirmed cases.187 But it is hopelessly 
optimistic to think this clarification, buried far within the newspaper, had any 
discernable effect on public opinion. 
Further, the use of a leak—rather than a more regularized form of 
disclosure—is instructive: the news media leaks reflect greater salience since 
the information is by definition new and noteworthy.188 Mid-level bureaucrats 
often use leaks as a weapon189 to thwart the ambitions of elected supervisors. 
Consistent with this political economy, early reports of the March 2009 
recidivism leak focused on the ammunition it supplied to “critics . . . of 
President Obama’s plan to shut down the prison.”190 One leading critic of that 
plan, former Vice President Dick Cheney, immediately seized upon the 
leaked “1 in 7” statistic as a partisan cudgel.191 Critiques of the Obama position 
on detainee transfers, quite naturally, did not flag the military bureaucracy’s 
own caveats and cautions about such statistics. Nor, unsurprisingly, did these 
critics—or even the military bureaucracy itself—acknowledge the growing 
body of evidence suggesting that even the confirmed instances of recidivism 
were in fact much more ambiguous in quality.192 And of course, none reflected 
 
186 See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Later Terror Link Cited in 1 in 7 Freed Detainees, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/us/politics/21gitmo.html [https://perma.cc/
M6XT-KJMQ]. 
187 See id. (admitting that the original report mistakenly assumed—without proof—that “all the 
former prisoners had been engaged in terrorism before their detention,” and also failed to distinguish 
between the twenty-seven confirmed post-detention terrorists/militants and the forty-seven suspected 
post-detention terrorists/militants). 
188 See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones 
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 574 (2013) (“Leaks are often taken to be 
unique sources of insight into the inner workings of power.”). But cf. LEON V. SIGAL, REPORTERS 
AND OFFICIALS 120-21 (1973) (finding that between 1949 and 1969, 2.3% of the front-page stories in 
the New York Times and Washington Post about national or foreign news relied primarily on leaks for 
the information reported). 
189 See SIGAL, supra note 188, at 140 (noting that leaks and other press tactics “can be employed 
to get officials into the game, or keep them on the sidelines”). 
190 Bumiller, supra note 186. 
191 Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Commentary: How Many Gitmo Prisoners Return to 
Fight, CNN (July 21, 2009, 9:40 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/20/bergen.guantan
amo/index.html [https://perma.cc/S245-6MBF]; see also Jim Rutenberg, A ‘Freer’ Cheney Makes Case 
(With Dual Focus), N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/us/politics/
22cheney.html [https://perma.cc/8QKC-EXWK]. 
192 Criticism of the military’s recidivism numbers rested on two grounds. First, a review of 
publicly available evidence of recidivism in 2009 found a rate of “about half” that reported by the 
DNI. Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 191. Subsequent updates of this study continued to find rates 
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on how unlikely it would have been if no instances of violence against the 
United States had occurred: after all, this was a population of several hundred 
men who had been swept up without legal process, detained for months or 
years, subjected to coercive interrogation and torture, and then released 
without explanation or apology. Even if none of the detainees had any initial 
connections to terrorist groups, their subsequent animosity against the United 
States might well be anticipated. 
And this was not the only leak. Legislators also received information 
directly from the military bureaucracy, which they then used to embarrass 
and contradict the White House. In July 2010, for example, Senator Kit Bond, 
the Republican vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, revealed in 
a Senate hearing that the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency “did not 
concur” in certain detainee releases endorsed by the White House.193 
Leveraging putatively classified information that had leaked from the 
national security bureaucracy, a partisan foe of the White House thus made 
political capital out of internal bureaucratic strife. 
This timing, framing, and partiality of pivotal disclosures about recidivism 
suggests an attempt by the military bureaucracy to influence national policy 
in a fashion antithetical to the White House’s interests and agenda. This 
ambition is consistent with, and corroborated by, the military bureaucracy’s 
resistance to diplomatic efforts to facilitate detainee transfers.194 These 
dynamics suggest that congressional intervention into detention policy was 
precipitated as much by forces endogenous to the three branches, including 
 
substantially lower than the figure proffered by the DNI. See Peter Bergen et al., How Many Gitmo 
Alumni Take Up Arms?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 11, 2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/11/how-
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of released detainees were confirmed or suspected recidivists). The striking and persistent 
divergence between independent and government assessments of recidivism rates raises a serious 
question of how government data should be evaluated. Second, the term “recidivism” was borrowed 
from the criminal law and imported into the national security context. See Jonathan Hafetz, Detention 
Without End?: Reexamining the Indefinite Confinement of Terrorism Suspects Through the Lens of Criminal 
Sentencing, 61 UCLA L. REV. 326, 344 (2014) (stating that recidivism is a concept borrowed from 
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never been found guilty of a specific offense. Thus, to use the term recidivism is to assume that the 
false positive rate for initial seizures and transfers to custody at the base was zero. This seems 
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connection to terrorism until they were confined in close quarters to many members of al Qaeda 
and the Taliban, in addition to being subject to what at best were onerous conditions of detention. 
See, e.g., Rajiv Chandrasekaran, From Captive to Suicide Bomber, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2009), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/21/AR2009022101234_pf.html [https://p
erma.cc/WD7Z-EDA5]. The possibility that Guantánamo had a criminogenic effect is erased by the 
use of the term “recidivism.” 
193 SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 312-13. 
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discontent within the bureaucracy and partisan opposition to a new President. 
The “thick political surround,” in short, was a catalytic part of the interbranch 
dynamic usually labeled as our separation of powers.195 
This tight functional nexus between Congress and the military bureaucracy 
reflects a deeper set of institutional relationships. These are plausibly understood 
as grounded upon the long-term political economy of military spending and 
the ensuing network of connections between legislators and the military. As 
the political scientist Rebecca Thorpe has demonstrated, many representatives 
from the House are elected by districts heavily reliant on military expenditures.196 
They hence tend to support military initiatives notwithstanding “partisan and 
ideological divisions.”197 Robust, and even bipartisan, support for the military 
bureaucracy—and a concomitant sensitivity to its policy concerns—rests on a 
foundation of convergent economic and electoral interests. While these economic 
interests might not be directly engaged by detainee policy, they help illuminate 
the tight nexus between the military bureaucracy and the legislature. 
Moreover, there is an intriguing relationship between elite expressions of 
concern about recidivism and more general public awareness. In contrast to 
legislative concern, the broader public’s awareness of recidivism (at least 
insofar as it can be measured by the frequency of media hits) begins in 2009 
and peaks in 2011.198 It was seemingly catalyzed by the March 2009 leak and 
the resulting media coverage it sparked. Public awareness lagged roughly two 
years behind the congressional cycle of attention. Mobilization among political 
elites on the recidivism question, in other words, seems to have anticipated 
public concern. This is consistent with an emergent political science literature 
finding elite cuing effects on public opinion.199 
The findings presented here, however, are distinctive in one regard. Much 
of the literature of elite cuing effects focuses on interplay between legislators 
(or other elected actors) and public opinion. The causal arrow hypothesized 
here, though, runs from the military bureaucracy through Congress to the 
general public. In other words, executive actors within the military engaged 
in highly effective policy entrepreneurship through leaks and other forms of 
backroom communications in ways that hypothetically exacerbated rifts in 
the political landscape. These rifts do not exactly track partisan lines. 
 
195 For a fuller exposition of this concept, see Huq & Michaels, supra note 25, at 381. 
196 See REBECCA U. THORPE, THE AMERICAN WARFARE STATE: THE DOMESTIC 
POLITICS OF MILITARY SPENDING 95 (2014) (characterizing such representatives as prioritizing 
military spending more than representatives from more economically diverse districts). 
197 Id. 
198 See supra Figure 5. 
199 For a recent, methodologically rigorous study examining the relationship between elite 
consensus and public opinion within the context of European integration, see Matthew Gabel & 
Kenneth Scheve, Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental 
Variables, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1013, 1013-14 (2007). 
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Nevertheless, the partisan coloration of the fight between Congress and the 
presidency is hard to miss. Political polarization, which has been identified as a 
motivating cause of bureaucratic authority,200 here is a consequence of mid-level 
administrative freelancing. 
That politics—as opposed to events—drives security-related policies 
should not be a surprise. To the contrary, the gap between the security threat 
on the ground and the level of public concern has been well documented in 
other domains where public safety is at stake. In one of the most incisive 
political-economy accounts of the criminal justice system offered to date, 
Katherine Beckett demonstrated that public concern about crime was not driven 
by shifting crime rates, but rather by political entrepreneurship on crime.201 
Crime rates nationally were rising “for almost a decade before it was defined as a 
problem in the machinery of politics.”202 And public concern about crime has 
endured long past the sharp drop in crime rates first recorded in the mid-1990s.203 
The disconnect between external threat levels and public perceptions of threat 
has also been documented on a smaller scale in Stuart Hall’s study of “the 
moral panic” over muggings in the United Kingdom. In that case, the public’s 
fear could be traced back to changes in police procedures—and not exogenous 
policy shocks.204 These findings in other contexts of security policy suggest 
that the existence of elevated crime rates is not a sufficient, and perhaps not 
even a necessary, condition for public concern about criminal-victimization 
risk. Analogously, in this national security context, public concern about 
recidivism risk (at least as reflected in media coverage) follows rather than 
leads political elites’ mobilization on those questions. It also does not depend 
on the actual magnitude of that threat. To the contrary, given the contested 
and fragile empirical foundations of the government’s own assessments,205 
 
200 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 35, at 971-74 (describing the partisan roots of executive 
authority with respect to certain forms of policymaking). 
201 See KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY 15 (2000) (noting that public concern about 
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204 See STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND 
ORDER 16-28 (1978) (using the theoretical device of a “moral panic” to frame and explore the social 
construction of crime perceptions). 
205 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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and the surprising paucity of specific incidents of recidivism targeting U.S. 
interests, it is quite possible to conclude that the extent of the recidivism 
concern was not always accurately presented by bureaucratic statements on 
the subject. Accuracy, perhaps unsurprisingly, is not a necessary precondition 
of effective elite mobilization. 
To summarize, the available evidence suggests that Guantánamo recidivism 
became an object of legislative attention not because of an external shock (such 
as an extraordinary terrorism attack) or public concern about the detainees. 
Rather, political elites within both Article I and Article II authority expended 
valuable political and professional capital—through leaks, through the 
framing of recidivism in the gravest terms possible, through high-profile public 
speeches, and through the allocation of scarce congressional resources—to 
make recidivism into an issue. Just as bureaucratic resistance was enabled by 
legislative intervention, members of Congress deployed information from the 
military bureaucracy to undermine a President who they viewed with antipathy. 
Legislative constraints on Guantánamo transfers are hence best understood as 
endogenous products of an interbranch alliance of bureaucrats and legislators 
against the President. 
2. The Substance of Legislative Intervention 
When Congress finally interposed itself in 2009 and 2011 on the flow of 
detainee transfers, it might have been expected that the resulting enactments 
would fully exploit the force of law to impede the President’s agenda. It is 
conventional wisdom that the checking function of the separation of powers 
is associated with the binding effect of laws restricting executive discretion.206 
In a similar vein, but in more general terms, Frederick Schauer has recently 
argued that coercive law is needed to restrain even well-intentioned 
officials.207 But a close analysis of the pivotal first and second waves of 
transfer-related legislation, enacted respectively in 2009 and 2011, suggest 
coercive prohibitions were not dispositive in this case. Instead, the statutes 
precipitated by military-bureaucratic and legislative mobilization on recidivism 
did not of their own force constrain the White House. Most importantly, 
these initial measures did not absolutely bar all transfers. Rather, they left 
surprisingly ample room for the executive to continue pursuing the goal of 
dispersing the whole detainee population. Contrary to standard accounts,208 
 
206 Cf. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (explaining that “[t]he ‘check’ the judiciary provides to maintain our 
separation of powers is enforcement of the rule of law through judicial review”). 
207 SCHAUER, supra note 32, at 109. 
208 See supra note 45 for studies relying solely on the limited particularized evidence gleaned 
through litigation to analyze the detainee population as a whole. 
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therefore, the collapse of transfers from Guantánamo was not the product of 
Congress enacting restrictive legislation. Congress instead instigated an 
internal politics, rather than using a rule with the force of law, to constrain 
presidential action. 
To see this, it is necessary to examine in some detail the initial legislative 
restrictions imposed on detainee transfers. Congress enacted the first 
iteration of transfer restrictions in June 2009.209 This regime had several 
components. It allowed transfers into the United States for criminal 
prosecution, though it required the President to provide Congress with “a 
plan regarding . . . proposed disposition” of the detainee.210 Transfers to other 
countries were also allowed, provided that the Pentagon reported the identity, 
risk, and plans for handling a detainee.211 Each of these reporting requirements 
elicited information that was already within the possession of the military 
bureaucracy, but not of Congress. The military bureaucracy was probably not 
even required to expend any additional effort in gathering the information 
about detainees: it seems safe to assume it was already gathering information 
about receiving nations. All the 2009 legislation required was disclosure of 
this information; it did not identify any specific transfers as prohibited.212 As 
a result, it is by no means clear from the face of the June 2009 limitations that 
the executive branch could not have continued the pace of detainee transfers 
previously maintained by the Bush Administration. 
More onerous restrictions on detainee transfer and release were not 
enacted until after the rate of transfers and releases had already dropped to 
zero. But even under the subsequent legislative dispensation, the military 
bureaucracy preserved substantial de facto discretion. The second set of 
transfer restrictions, enacted on January 7, 2011, differed along several margins 
from their June 2009 antecedent.213 Most, but not all, changes were explicitly 
motivated by a sharpened concern about post-transfer recidivism. On the one 
hand, transfers to the United States were categorically barred.214 On the other, 
the certification requirements were waived for all transfers “to effectuate an 
order affecting the disposition of [an] individual that is issued by a court or 
competent tribunal of the United States having lawful jurisdiction.”215 Hence, 
 
209 See Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, §§ 14103(c)–(e), 123 Stat. 
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population at Guantánamo. Id. § 319. 
211 Id. § 14103(e). 
212 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
213 See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, 
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the legislation explicitly recognized a safety valve for detainee transfers—albeit 
one mediated through the third branch of government. This exception alleviated 
the difficult constitutional question that might arise if a judicially ordered 
transfer were expressly blocked by legislation falling short of a suspension of 
the habeas writ. It also implied that both bureaucratic and congressional resistance 
to transfers could be diminished if another branch took responsibility for that 
decision. From January 2011 onward, therefore, judicial review provided a 
mechanism to alleviate even the disclosure-based transaction costs of release. 
Yet in all other ways, the 2011 transfer legislation installed a more onerous 
latticework of constraint. This statutory hardening of the prison’s walls found 
explicit justification in recidivism concerns. In a provision labeled “Recidivism,” 
the January 2011 statute barred transfers to nations “if there is a confirmed 
case of any individual who was detained at [Guantánamo] . . . who was 
transferred [there] . . . and subsequently engaged in any terrorist activity.”216 
The certification requirements imposed on the Secretary of Defense as a 
condition precedent to a transfer, moreover, were more reticulated and precise 
than their 2009 antecedents. Under the 2011 statute, the Secretary of Defense 
had to certify, among other things, that a receiving nation “has agreed to take 
effective steps to ensure that the individual cannot take action to threaten the 
United States, its citizens, or its allies in the future”217 and also “has taken 
such steps as the Secretary determines are necessary to ensure that the 
individual cannot engage or re-engage in any terrorist activity.”218 
Notwithstanding these onerous demands, the January 2011 restrictions 
may still have had more bark than bite. Most importantly, Congress once 
again depended on the bureaucracy for information relevant to compliance. 
Unlike other regulatory domains, Guantánamo policy lacks “fire-alarm” interest 
groups that can alert Congress to false positives among those released.219 It 
seems likely, that is, that only the military, rather than any private interest 
group, would have accurate and timely information about recidivism in the 
first instance. Further, the actions of potential recipient states are generally 
unobserved by Congress or the public. Evaluation of whether those actions 
are sufficiently rested again quite explicitly with the Secretary of Defense. Failures, 
 
216 Id. § 1033(c)(1). 
217 Id. § 1033(b)(4). 
218 Id. § 1033(b)(5). By explicitly envisaging a situation in which a detainee has not engaged in 
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219 See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
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alarm” oversight mechanisms in the national security context, see Huq, Structural Constitutionalism, 
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in the form of high-profile recidivism, could be ascribed straightforwardly to a 
receiving nation’s breach of good faith or negligence. Finally, although this 
statute required recidivism reporting, it relied exclusively upon the military 
bureaucracy to calculate and report raw numbers of confirmed or suspected 
recidivists. In short, the force of the 2011 restrictions depended once more not 
on the credible threat of future sanctions,220 but rather on the extent to which 
officials had internalized either a legalistic mentality or a common set of 
incentives or objectives. External interest groups, moreover, are not plausibly 
seen as a dispositive friction on executive discretion given their dearth of 
information about recidivism trends.221 For these reasons, it is not quite 
enough to say that certification requirements were effective because they 
imposed personal responsibility on the Secretary of Defense alone: there 
must be a reason to believe that a personalized form of responsibility was in 
fact capable of bite.222 
In the political context in which they were enacted, these disclosure 
mandates are best understood as efforts to impose political costs on the 
President’s agenda. Detainee transfers, that is, forced the executive into 
exposing information that could be embarrassing or be used to attack him or 
his agenda in the political sphere. Indeed, it is telling that these disclosure 
mandates were asymmetrical in effect. Congress has never imposed any 
disclosure provisions in relation to other controversial aspects of Guantánamo 
operations that might undermine the case for enlarged detention. For 
example, it has elicited no definitive accounting of the number of detainees 
who were subjected to coercive interrogation methods or torture; no 
accounting of the physical or psychological cost of coercion and indefinite 
detention;223 no official examination of the rate of false positives among the 
 
220 But cf. SCHAUER, supra note 32, at 52 (exploring the possibility that “if those who take the 
very fact of law as a reason for action . . . are few,” then law’s effectiveness depends on coercion). 
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222 Bruck accepts at face value former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s hyperbolic claim that 
the “provision required that I sign my life away.” Bruck, supra note 28, at 42. However sincerely felt, 
such resistance relies on something more than the reasonably anticipated effect of the certification. 
223 See Matt Apuzzo, Sheri Fink, & James Risen, How U.S. Torture Left a Legacy of Damaged 
Minds, N.Y. TIMES. (Oct. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/world/cia-torture-guanta
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detainees; and no tally of whether or how countries that receive detainees have 
mistreated or abused them. Congress, that is, has demonstrated a persistent 
unwillingness to consider—let alone act upon by disclosure mandates—the 
plethora of seemingly pressing moral issues raised by the detentions. Instead, 
it has shone the disinfecting light of transparency solely where it is most likely 
to entrench deprivations of human liberty. 
* * * 
In summary, close inspection of the substance of the 2009 and 2011 
legislative constraints on detainee transfers corroborates and extends the 
finding of a bureaucratic alliance with Congress. In this account, the collapse 
in transfers from Guantánamo depended upon implicit cooperation between 
the military bureaucracy and Congress, both in the production and the 
operation of legislative bindings. The contrary assumption that Congress 
alone extinguished the flow of releases via restrictive legislation motivated by 
changes in the external security environment does not survive close scrutiny. 
C. The Role of Judicial Supervision 
In contrast to legislative attention to the Guantánamo detentions, judicial 
review after Boumediene might have been expected to abet the presidential 
agenda of dispersing the detainee population. Conventional wisdom across 
the ideological spectrum predicts that judicial review tends to narrow 
executive discretion by enforcing “the rule of law.”224 This entails, at a 
minimum, judicial invalidation of the executive’s ultra vires actions. Courts 
are thought especially well-placed to identify false positives in the detention 
context. The judiciary is often thought to be less risk-averse than the political 
branches, and hence more willing to recognize errors and end a detainee’s 
custody where the underlying evidence is weak.225 In the detention context, 
moreover, recall that Congress in 2011 created a statutory exception to its 
limitations on detainee transfers for court-ordered releases.226 To the extent 
certification preconditions on transfers imposed weighty frictions on release, 
 
namo-bay.html [https://perma.cc/56MW-YHKQ] (describing the enduring effects of imprisonment, 
inter alia, on Younous Chekkouri, a Moroccan detainee at Guantánamo). 
224 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring 
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judicial review could have offered a useful and relatively uncontroversial 
safety valve. If the executive branch sought to maximize the rate of transfers, 
it could have declined to litigate cases or even conceded error, triggering the 
statutory exception for court-ordered releases. For both constitutional and 
statutory reasons, it would therefore seem that the engagement of Article III 
as an element of the separation of powers ought to be associated with an 
elevated pace of transfers. 
Close attention to empirical evidence, institutional behavior, and the substance 
of judicial interventions, however, points toward a quite different story. I 
decompose and analyze the effect of judicial intervention along two margins. 
First, courts are responsible for adjudicating individual cases, which can 
yield orders of release. My empirical analysis finds that among the handful 
of detainees with habeas petitions adjudicated to final judgment, a favorable 
outcome is indeed positively associated with release. But that group is a very 
small slice of the detainee population. Almost half of all detainees did not 
seek judicial review. And almost four-fifths of those who did failed to litigate 
their petitions to final judgment. 
Second, the effect of judicial review is not confined to retail adjudication. 
Courts also play a role in declaring the law. If courts interpret statutory 
authority to detain more narrowly than the executive branch does, they might 
generate pressure to thin the detainee population even absent litigation. A 
rational government, that is, will forego the expense of litigation when the 
law changes to render a judicial defeat likely. But this did not happen. An 
empirically informed comparison of the law produced by the federal courts 
in habeas cases with (1) the government’s litigation positions and (2) its de 
facto practice reveals that courts were more risk-averse than either the 
bureaucracy or its lawyers. With the possible exception of a small handful of 
detainees released after favorable judgments, the overwhelming majority of 
the detainee population was hindered—not aided—by Article III involvement. 
1. The Impact of Discrete Adjudication 
To understand the impact of post-Boumediene habeas review, it is necessary 
to know how many detainees filed habeas petitions, how many litigated those 
petitions to final judgment, and how many of those who did so secured a 
favorable disposition. This Article is the first to present comprehensive data 
on any of these questions. 
Individual adjudication of detainees’ challenges to the lawfulness of their 
custody became possible on June 12, 2008, when Boumediene v. Bush issued.227 
 
227 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). One case had already been decided under a 
different statutory scheme, although the litigants in that case went on to file habeas petitions. See 
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Detainees, however, had been filing habeas petitions since 2002. I have 
identified 408 Guantánamo detainees who filed habeas petitions before or 
after Boumediene through an examination of the federal court’s PACER 
database.228 These petitions vary widely in the extent to which they were 
litigated. Ten of the identified dockets have only one or two entries (i.e., 
filings by either the petitioner, the government, or an amicus). Thirty-one 
have more than 2000 entries. This suggests that the petitioners exerted widely 
varying degrees of effort when litigating their cases. 
Any tangible effect from this litigation cannot be ascribed to government 
lawyers’ efforts to facilitate transfers. Examining government briefs in several 
typical cases litigated to final judgment, I have not identified a single instance 
in which government lawyers made outcome-relevant concessions to enable a 
release,229 unless forced to do so by contrary law.230 This would have required 
the government to make an affirmative filing conceding error, since the mere 
failure to file a return in a habeas proceeding does not generally trigger a 
default judgment.231 Instead, when government litigators found their legal 
theory for detention at odds with a White House position, they simply 
changed their theory of the case.232 To the extent cases were litigated to final 
judgment, the Justice Department never slackened in its zealous advocacy in 
favor of robust carceral authority.233 Consistent with this evidence, one 
former State Department official described the government’s approach to 
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wake of the D.C. Circuit’s determination in Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2008), that 
the group to which they were affiliated had no connection to al Qaeda. Even in In re Guantanamo 
Bay Detainee Litigation, government lawyers insisted that authority to detain still existed as part of 
the government’s power to “wind up” detentions. 581 F. Supp. 2d at 36. 
231 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mattox v. Scott, 507 F.2d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 1974) (explaining 
that releasing a habeas corpus petitioner in response to the government’s “failure to make a timely 
return” would inappropriately place the burden “upon the community at large”); Watmuff v. Perini, 
427 F.2d 527, 528 (6th Cir. 1970) (stating that a detainee’s contention that he was “entitled to default 
judgment and immediate release” because the government’s return to a show cause order was filed 
late was “without merit”). 
232 SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 149-52. 
233 Id. at 301. 
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detention litigation by explaining that the Department of Justice trial lawyers 
“internalized” the defensive posture advanced between 2002 and 2008 and so 
were inclined to “defend [positions] zealously if at all possible.”234 
Nor did rotation in the White House elicit meaningful mitigation of the 
government’s position. In January 2009, Judge John D. Bates of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the Obama Justice 
Department to clarify its new position on detention authority.235 According 
to news reports, Bates’s demand precipitated a rapid process of internal 
deliberation within the executive branch and the White House.236 The 
government hewed largely to the same standard of detention authority used by 
the Bush Administration.237 Its definition plainly encompassed members and 
supporters of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated groups, but it added the new 
qualification that independent support must be “substantial” to trigger eligibility 
for detention to the definition proposed by the Bush Justice Department.238 
This shift did not require a different result in any case then (or subsequently) 
under judicial consideration.239 One district court judge even witheringly 
described it as “a distinction of purely metaphysical difference.”240 Yet the 
“substantial support” threshold generated heated intramural debate. Rejecting 
the State Department’s narrow view of that language, the Pentagon argued 
that it encompassed “mere supporters . . . picked up far away from enemy 
 
234 Ingber, supra note 37, at 384-85; accord J. Wells Dixon, President Obama’s Failure to Transfer 
Detainees from Guantánamo (stating that the Obama Administration continued prosecuting the 
detainee cases “as vigorously as the prior administration”), in OBAMA’S GUANTÁNAMO, supra note 
7, at 48-49 . 
235 See Order at 3, Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 05-2378) (“[I]t 
is hereby [ordered] that by not later than March 13, 2009, respondents shall submit any refinement 
of their position on the appropriate definition of ‘enemy combatant.’”). 
236 DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE 
OBAMA PRESIDENCY 58-60 (2012). 
237 See Chesney, Military Detention, supra note 45, at 830-31 (stating that the Obama standard 
made some minor changes in nomenclature, but generally adhered to the substantive requirements 
of the “Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) standard” employed by the Bush 
Administration). The Obama Administration also eschewed reliance on evidence gained by torture. 
See SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 102, at 152. It is not clear the Bush Administration ever 
attempted to introduce such evidence in court. 
238 Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative 
to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(No. 05-0763). 
239 See Noah Feldman, Opinion, A Prison of Words, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/03/19/opinion/19feldman.html [https://perma.cc/24UJ-7LAM] (noting that 
the government’s refined position on its detention authority, requiring a showing of “substantial 
support” for terrorism, “is potentially broad enough to continue detaining everyone whom the 
Bush administration put in Guantánamo in the first place”). 
240 Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70 (D.D.C. 2009). 
598 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 535 
forces.” 241 This debate ended in an interagency compromise allowing detention 
beyond the battlefield when a person performed “functions that made them 
effectively part of the terrorist organization.”242 The debate is relevant here 
because it underscores once more the role of internal military-bureaucratic 
resistance in forestalling leniency toward detainees.243 
Regardless of the government’s legal position, judicial review might still 
have nudged the arc of transfer policy via orders directing release or 
anticipatory transfers or releases by the government to alleviate or avoid the 
costs of judicial review. I focus here on the more easily measured direct 
effect.244 To determine this, I compiled from Westlaw a database of reported 
and unreported judicial decisions resolving individual detainees’ petitions. 
This dataset includes sixty-seven reported and one unreported decision.245 
Within the subpopulation of petitioners who litigated their cases to final 
judgment, detainees prevailed in thirty-three (forty-nine percent) of those 
cases. At its upper bound, judicial review could have influenced 4.23% of the 
total number of 780 detentions at Guantánamo.246 
The magnitude of the effect of judicial review can be ascertained more 
precisely by an econometric analysis of the determinants of release within the 
pool of sixty-eight litigated cases. That is, conditional upon having filed and 
litigated a habeas petition, it is possible to estimate whether a judicial grant 
of relief changed the odds of actual release from the Cuban base. In asking 
this question, it is also useful to consider whether the government’s own risk 
evaluations, in addition to (or in contrast to) judicial determinations, 
influence the likelihood of release. Table 2 presents the results from an ordinal 
 
241 Charlie Savage, Obama Team Is Divided on Anti-Terror Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/us/politics/29force.html [https://perma.cc/38GE-CZBP]. 
242 Id.; accord Chesney, Military Detention, supra note 45, at 842 (recounting a disagreement 
between Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson and State Department Legal Advisor 
Harold Koh about the nature of support required to detain, which resulted in the government’s 
litigation position that “functional members of al Qaeda” could be detained). 
243 Ingber suggests that the Obama Administration’s ultimate position on detention authority 
might have been different had it not been for the habeas litigation. See Ingber, supra note 37, at 387-88 
(suggesting that the “extremely defensive context of defense of individual clients” limited the 
President’s flexibility in assessing the rights of Guantánamo detainees). I am skeptical. The evidence 
assembled here suggests the internal balance of power would still have favored the military 
bureaucracy’s perspective. 
244 Indirect effects are hard to identify because of an omitted variable problem. My data does 
show that a large number of detainees who did not litigate their petition extensively nonetheless 
obtained release. This is at least consistent with an indirect effect. But it may also be that filing, but 
not litigating, a habeas petition and early release (cutting short the litigation) are both predicted by 
a variable I cannot observe—such as a dearth of evidence in the government’s possession justifying 
detention, or the underlying absence of any such evidence in the first instance. 
245 The unreported case is Idris v. Obama, No. 05-1555 (RCL) (Oct. 4, 2013) (on file with author). 
246 Cf. Huq, What Good, supra note 22, at 428 (reporting an upper bound of 3.75%). 
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logistic regression of sixty-six detainees with litigated cases,247 where the 
dependent variable is the fact of a transfer out of custody. This specification 
includes controls for whether there was a judicial order of release (“detainee 
prevails”), and whether the detainee was assigned a high-risk status (as opposed 
to a medium- or lower-risk status). 
 
Table 2: Ordinal Logistic Regression of Transfer 
Decisions Among Litigated Cases 
 
 Transfer Likelihood 
Detainee Prevails 3.952 
 (3.63)** 
High risk -0.905 
 (1.13) 
Constant -0.077 
 (0.11) 
N 
Pseudo R2 
66 
0.4160
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01  
 
Table 2 suggests that within the circumscribed domain of judicial review, a 
court’s decision that detention was unlawful played a statistically (and practically) 
significant role in predicting release. When included in the same specification, 
the government’s risk evaluations did not have a statistically significant effect. 
These would have been expected to be negative. Intriguingly, this suggests that 
the government’s own risk assessments did not predict which detainees would 
be released by judicial order. The results thus demonstrate a gap between the 
executive’s and the judiciary’s standards for detention. 
In summary, post-Boumediene discrete adjudications of individual petitions 
did not play a large role in changing the rate of transfers for three reasons. 
First, government litigators did not leverage statutory exceptions to accelerate 
transfers. Second, only about half (fifty-two percent) of detainees filed habeas 
petitions, either before or after Boumediene. Third, of those who filed petitions, 
less than one in five (sixteen percent) managed to litigate their petition to a final 
judgment. It was only once a detainee had passed the substantial obstacles of 
filing and litigating a petition that discrete adjudication of the legal merits of 
 
247 Two cases are omitted because they involved detainees classified as low-risk, and would 
have distorted the binary variable used as a control here. 
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detention seemed to make any difference at all. At this point, however, that 
difference appears real. 
2. The Impact of the Courts’ Law-Declaration Function 
Courts do not only decide discrete cases and controversies. They also 
articulate authoritative interpretations of statutory and constitutional law. 
This law-declaration function is a second—and independent—vector of 
judicial power. Courts exert influence via their clarification and creation of 
new law; their influence is conceptually and practically independent of their 
remedial function.248 To estimate its effect, this subsection contrasts the 
doctrinal products of habeas litigation with both government litigation 
positions and de facto bureaucratic practice. 
Recall that the 2001 AUMF was silent on the precise scope of related 
detention authority or the procedures necessary to ascertain whether a 
specific individual may be detained.249 It has effectively delegated to 
executive branch officials and federal judges the task of developing 
substantive and procedural rules.250 Executive and judicial positions on these 
questions are expected to differ. The nature of this divergence is an empirical 
question. The data I have assembled allow two distinct comparisons between the 
revealed preferences of the executive and judicial branches. Both suggest that 
the federal courts staked out positions more hostile to detainees’ liberty 
interests than those taken by government lawyers or military bureaucrats. 
To begin with, post-Boumediene habeas litigation generated legal precedent 
that was more favorable to the executive than even the positions sought by 
the Justice Department. As a procedural matter, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals allowed the government to use a preponderance of the evidence 
 
248 In other work, I have criticized the Court’s pervasive failure to provide an adequate level of 
constitutional remedies. See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Judicial Remedies, 65 
DUKE L.J. 1, 12-40 (2015) [hereinafter Huq, Judicial Independence] (arguing that violations of constitutional 
rights are systematically disregarded because of a lack of constitutional remedies). The contrast 
developed here between comparative remedial scarcity, see supra Table 2, and robust, statist law 
declaration is consistent with the analysis of constitutional law more generally developed in that work. 
249 See 2001 AUMF, § 2(a) (authorizing the President to use all “necessary and appropriate 
force” to prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 
(plurality opinion) (noting that “the AUMF does not use specific language of detention”). 
250 Congress often delegates authority to coordinate branches on controversial and divisive 
policy questions, such as the scope of military detention policy, by using ambiguous language. See 
DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST 
POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 197 (1999) (stating that 
policy areas shrouded in uncertainty are more often delegated). 
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standard;251 installed a “presumption of regularity” for government documents;252 
and reversed district court habeas grants for taking an insufficiently holistic 
view of the government’s evidence.253 The Court of Appeals also repeatedly 
invited government litigators to seek a lower burden of proof than the 
preponderance standard upon which they relied in their briefs.254 
On substantive-law questions, the Appeals Court again favored expansive 
government direction. District courts had demanded that the government 
demonstrate that a detainee was part of an AUMF-covered organization’s 
“command structure” to render detention lawful.255 In effect, this forced the 
government to tie a detainee to one of the terrorist organizations covered by 
the AUMF. The Circuit Court rejected this test as too narrow, directing 
instead that the government show either that a detainee was “a ‘part of ’ [or . . .] 
sufficiently involved with” a covered organization.256 The Circuit Court also 
underscored that the government can satisfy the “part of” element of this 
definition by an accumulation of otherwise innocuous facts.257 Evidence of 
affiliation was not necessary.258 
Appellate judges also repeatedly offered suggestions about how detention 
authority could be inflated. For instance, more than one appellate judgment 
intimated that the test for lawful detention might be satisfied solely on a 
 
251 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding no indication that a 
preponderance standard is unconstitutional); see also Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 403 n.3 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (stating that the preponderance of evidence standard is constitutionally sufficient). 
252 See Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that official intelligence 
documents were entitled to a presumption of regularity). 
253 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that the district 
court wrongly looked at each piece of evidence in isolation rather than evaluating the government’s 
evidence in totality). The Court, however, has held that a failure to find whether a detainee belonged 
to one terrorist group or another (e.g., al Qaeda or the Taliban) is not a reversible error. See Suleiman 
v. Obama, 670 F.3d 1311, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
254 See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[O]ur analysis here does not 
establish that preponderance of the evidence is the constitutionally-required minimum evidentiary 
standard.”); see also Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878 & n.4 (noting that American citizens are likely entitled 
to greater procedures than noncitizens seized abroad during the war on terror). In addition, the 
court has attached a “presumption of regularity” to government documents that precludes accuracy 
challenges in many cases. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 748-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
255 See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The key inquiry, then, 
is . . . whether the individual functions or participates within or under the command structure of 
the organization . . . .”); see also Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(asserting that “[s]ympathizers, propagandists, and financiers” who do not “receive and execute orders 
within [the terrorist group’s] command structure” “cannot be considered part of the enemy’s ‘armed 
forces’ and therefore cannot be detained militarily unless they take direct part in the hostilities”). 
256 Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2011); accord Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 
10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (detailing the analysis used to find that Awad was “part of” al Qaeda). 
257 See Hussain v. Obama, 718 F.3d 964, 969-70 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding possession of a 
Taliban-supplied weapon near the Afghan lines, residence at a Jama’at al-Tablighi mosque, and 
inconsistent responses to interrogators to be sufficient evidence), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1621 (2014). 
258 Id. 
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showing that an individual had stayed at a Taliban or al Qaeda guesthouse.259 
This position appears more generous than the definition limned by the 
Department of Justice in its litigation documents. The weighty significance 
assigned by federal judges to this particular fact is especially striking because 
residence at such a guesthouse is the most frequently occurring trait identified 
in the detainee assessments (n=414).260 Courts hence identified, and argued 
for the dispositive significance of, the one trait with the largest marginal 
inflationary effect on the state’s legal authority to detain. 
Given their willingness to treat guesthouse residence as per se factual 
justification for detention, federal judges evinced a notable incuriosity about 
what exactly counts as a terrorist guesthouse. The D.C. Circuit instead 
peremptorily suggested that “[i]t is highly unlikely that a visitor to Afghanistan 
would end up at an al Qaeda guesthouse by mistake, either by the guest or by 
the host.”261 That court also asserted that guesthouses were “heavily fortified 
terrorist den[s].”262 Neither conclusion, though, reflects factual evidence 
about specific facilities.263 Indeed, there is remarkably little record evidence 
about what ranks as a terrorist guesthouse, and how that designation was 
assigned or verified.264 In some instances, guesthouses were identified and 
 
259 See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2 (holding that evidence of al-Bihani visiting al Qaeda 
guesthouses was sufficient justification for his detention); see also Alsabri v. Obama, 684 F.3d 1298, 
1302 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[S]taying at [al Qaeda] houses can be ‘powerful’ evidence that a detainee was 
part of al Qaeda and/or the Taliban.”); Suleiman v. Obama, 670 F.3d 1311, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(finding that a voluntary decision to move into an al Qaeda guesthouse used as a staging area for 
recruits going to a military training camp is strong evidence that the individual was a recruit); 
Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 6 n. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that proof “that a petitioner trained 
at an al Qaeda camp or stayed at an al Qaeda guesthouse ‘overwhelmingly’ would carry the 
government’s burden” of justifying detention); Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1075 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (noting that staying at an al-Qaeda guesthouse or training camp constitutes 
“overwhelming” evidence “that the United States had authority to detain that person”); Uthman, 637 
F.3d at 406 (calling the fact of capture at an al Qaeda guesthouse “overwhelming” evidence that a 
detainee is a member of that organization). 
260 By way of comparison, membership in al Qaeda is flagged in 402 assessments. 
261 Uthman, 637 F.3d at 406. 
262 Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
263 In some cases, the government relied on expert testimony from a political scientist specializing 
in the Arabian Peninsula. See al-Adahi v. Obama, 698 F. Supp. 2d 48, 60 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing the 
declaration of Dr. Sheila Carapico). Studies of al Qaeda presence in Pakistan in the early 2000s, to the 
contrary, suggest that al Qaeda “did not have a dedicated infrastructure to recruit Pakistanis for Al 
Qaeda operations,” but rather “use[d] informal networks with Pakistani organizations to obtain 
logistical support.” C. Christine Fair, Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and 
Other Organizations, 27 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 489, 494-95 (2004). 
264 The Department of Defense’s “Threat Matrix,” a document used by analysts at the Cuban 
base to reach determinations about individual detainees, does not define the term “guesthouse,” 
although that term is used in several locations. In its opening pages, it talks about “suspected 
compound[s] or safe house[s],” which are identified using a “tip-off” or based on “suspicion about 
the occupants.” Dep’t of Def., JFT-GTMO Matrix of Threat Indicators for Enemy Combatants 2-3, 
8-9 (on file with author). This might be read to suggest that a site is designated as a terrorist 
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raided by Pakistani, rather than American, forces.265 This raises the possibility 
that lawful detention could hinge upon factual assertions made by a foreign 
intelligence service, assertions that a federal judge would be in no position to 
analyze or verify. Of course, those assertions may or may not be true in 
discrete cases. The relevant point here is that federal judges evinced no 
concern with precisely defining what counts as a “guesthouse” or figuring out 
how the specific allegation of guesthouse residence could be proved or 
disproved, even as they pressed for indefinite detention authority pivoting on 
that one allegation alone. 
A second way to evaluate the federal courts’ position in relation to the 
executive’s is to compare expressed judicial preferences with the expressed 
preferences of the military bureaucracy. Courts have treated detention as a 
binary: either a person can be detained, or they cannot, “pursuant to . . . relevant 
law.”266 In contrast, the military bureaucracy is not confined to binary 
decisions (although, in fact, it never conceded the illegality of any individual’s 
detention).267 It can also hold individuals for more or less time, making 
thereby nonbinary, granular distinctions on the intensive margin of detention 
authority. The duration of detention, even in early 2016 with ninety-three 
detainees still in custody, varied widely.268 It ranged from only 137 days to 
more than 5000 days.269 As of December 2015, the mean length of detention for 
all detainees was 2180 days, and the standard deviation was 1525 days.270 It is 
possible to use the variance in this intensive margin to evaluate how the revealed 
preferences of the military bureaucracy compare with the law on the books. 
To understand the relation between judicial and executive practice, I 
constructed an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that tested the 
 
guesthouse because of suspicions about the specific individuals identified therein. If a court later 
uses the guesthouse designation to confirm that a detainee is a member of a proscribed organization, 
a circularity might arise in the underlying logic of detention: suspicions about individuals conduce 
to the designation of a guesthouse, which in turn “confirms” that suspicions about such individuals 
are well-founded. 
265 See Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that Pakistani police 
officers raided the guesthouse to arrest the appellant). 
266 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008). 
267 The Obama Administration reviewed all detainees still in custody at the beginning of 2009, 
and determined that 126 of the 240 were “approved for transfer.” TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 104, 
at 9-10. The Task Force that reached this decision indicated that “for most of the detainees approved 
for transfer, there were varying degrees of evidence indicating that they were low-level foreign 
fighters affiliated with al-Qaida or other groups operating in Afghanistan.” Id. at 16. A decision to 
transfer, in short, did not constitute an admission of erroneous detention in the first instance. 
Clearances for transfer, moreover, are treated as “protected” information that cannot be disclosed, 
or discussed by, detainees’ counsel. Ameziane v. Obama, 699 F.3d 488, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
268 See Aziz Huq, The Predicates of Military Detention at Guantánamo: The Role of Individual Acts 
and Affiliations, 13 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 567, 580 fig.3 (2016). 
269 See id. at 581 tbl.2. 
270 See id. 
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relationship between the duration of detention for the subpopulation of 
detainees who have been released on the one hand, and a range of factors 
identified as justifications for detention in the detainee assessments or in 
judicial opinions.271 Figure 6 presents the marginal effects of governmental 
attributions of six behavior-related traits found in the detainee assessments: 
residence at a guesthouse; attendance at a terrorist training camp; participation 
in hostilities; allegiance to a radical mosque; making explicit threats against 
the United States; and having a classified “SCI filing” noted in an assessment. 
The last trait is a potential indicator of more serious allegations. 
The point in each line presents the average percentage change in the duration 
of detention observed when a specific trait is attached to a detainee. The bars 
around each of the dots represent the ninety-five percent confidence interval 
for that estimate. A confidence interval containing zero implies that the hypothesis 
that the durational effect of attributing a given trait to a detainee is zero 
cannot be rejected.272 
 
  
 
271 The analysis presented here is only one way of analyzing the relationship between detention 
duration and underlying factual predicates. In a related empirical Article, I employ a wider range of 
more sophisticated instruments. Most importantly, I use a Cox’s Survival Analysis corrected for 
nonproportional hazards with scaled Schoenfeld residuals to explore these relationships. I use OLS 
here not only because it supplements the analyses used in the latter Article, but also because it is a 
method that allows for a crisp visual depiction. The survival analysis does generate different 
estimates for some independent variables. In particular, it detects an effect of training on detention 
duration that the OLS method fails to capture. The relative effect associated with different independent 
variables, however, is roughly parallel. 
272 See ALAN AGRESTI & BARBARA FINLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 110 (4th ed. 2009) (describing a confidence interval as an interval of numbers within 
which the parameter is hypothesized to fall). 
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Figure 6: The Marginal Effects of Selected Behavioral Findings in Detainee Assessments 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows that, within the population of detainees who have been 
transferred, only one-of-six behavior-related traits flagged in detainee 
assessments have statistically significant effects on detention duration that are 
distinguishable from a null finding273—the finding that an individual stayed 
at a guesthouse. There is no evidence from the OLC specification employed 
here that other traits identified in the assessments had any effect on detention 
duration, including attending a terrorist training camp, participating in 
hostilities, visiting a radical mosque, making threats against the United States 
during captivity, and the existence of classified evidence that would be 
presented in what is called an SCI filing. 
How does this compare to the law on the books? Federal courts have 
relied, as I have noted, on guesthouse attendance to find detention lawful.274 
But they have also leaned heavily on factors that have had no significant de 
facto effect on the duration of detention. For example, district courts—who 
 
273 For a discussion of the importance of seeking both statistical and practical significance defined 
in these terms, see Justin H. Gross, Testing What Matters (If You Must Test at All): A Context-Driven 
Approach to Substantive and Statistical Significance, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 775, 779-80 (2015). 
274 See supra text accompanying notes 261–64. 
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have typically taken a less minatory view of habeas petitions than the Court 
of Appeals275—have cited attendance at a training camp to endorse the legality of 
a detention.276 Because training-camp allegations appear in 236 of 765 detainee 
assessments released by Wikileaks, in one-in-three potential cases, the 
government can invoke in federal court a legally sufficient basis for detention 
that its own institutional practices may not have employed, and that certainly 
was not dispositive in the fashion that federal courts have suggested.277 
In sum, whereas a close study of discrete adjudication shows that courts 
directly helped liberate a very small number of detainees, analysis of their 
law-declaration function suggests that federal judges refused to spur 
indirectly a higher rate of transfers by contracting the space of lawful 
detention authority. To the contrary, the law as embodied in formal rules of 
decision elaborated by Article III judges has turned out to be considerably 
more punitive than either the posture of government litigators or the practice 
of the military bureaucracy. As a model of the “duty to supervise,” in short, 
post-Boumediene habeas may leave something to be desired.278 
3. Understanding the (Non-)Effect of Judicial Review 
Why did federal courts take positions friendlier to state power than the 
executive branch itself? We can better understand the limited checking function 
of the federal courts in the detention context by nesting the operation of 
judicial review within a larger separation-of-powers context along two margins. 
The first reason for chastened expectations of judicial review turns on 
timing. Judicial decisions in habeas petitions are necessarily after-the-fact. 
When a court is called upon to evaluate the legality of state coercion, and in 
particular detention, this often occurs only after the executive has made 
decisions about (1) who to target for detention, (2) on the basis of what evidence, 
and (3) who within the custodial population to release in order to obviate 
 
275 My analysis of Westlaw’s relevant databases shows that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
has reversed or remanded all nine district-court grants of habeas it has considered, while affirming 
all but two of nineteen district-court denials it has considered. 
276 See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 698 F. Supp. 2d 48, 61-62 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that a detainee’s 
attendance at a training camp makes it more likely than not that he knew he was associating with al 
Qaeda); accord Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542, 546 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
277 Aziz Huq, Recidivism Mentions in Major Papers and Congressional Record (unpublished 
data set) (on file with author). The radical mosque trait appears in thirty-three assessments, while 
explicit threat allegations appear in fourteen assessments. Id. Hence, neither is numerically as 
significant as training camp allegations. The one instance in which the government invoked 
attendance at a radical mosque (in London) as justification for detention received a district-court 
rebuke. Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2009). 
278 See Metzger, Constitutional Duty, supra note 31, at 1924-25 (citing Boumediene as a possible 
example of judicial execution of the duty to supervise). 
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judicial review.279 This sequencing empowers the executive to select which 
fact patterns will be litigated from the larger population. By molding the 
distribution of observed cases, the executive furthers several goals, not the 
least of which is shaping judges’ perceptions of executive branch conduct. 
In this regard, recall that Figure 4 suggested that post-Boumediene habeas 
courts confronted a significantly riskier selection of detainees than the 
population as a whole. This nonrandom array of detainees results from the 
early release of less risky detainees—and hence need not be ascribed to 
improper motives. Nevertheless, it introduces a form of “path-dependency” 
into the resulting litigation.280 Legal precedent is shaped by fact patterns in 
which the underlying impetus toward continued custody is strongly felt. Judges’ 
perceptions of the costs and benefits of different legal standards are inflected 
by the heightened salience of false positives, rather than false negatives. 
In addition, the executive’s discretionary control of federal court case flow 
works as a means of preventing the disclosure of the bureaucracy’s evidentiary 
or analytic errors (or worse). Stated most crudely, the government can select 
individuals for release to ensure that flawed or illegal governmental practices 
remain undisclosed. For example, consider the possibility that the intelligence 
services relied on informants of imperfect quality to identify al Qaeda safehouses 
and guesthouses.281 Revelation of this error might undermine courts’ and 
legislators’ confidence in other factual predicates, or more generally sap 
judges’ willingness to treat government evidence as accurate and authentic.282 
Or consider the (hardly far-fetched) possibility that litigation of a habeas suit 
would reveal as-yet-unrevealed torture or cruel treatment.283 Although habeas 
 
279 Judicial review is ex ante in the context of arrest warrants and (sometimes) in the context 
of pretrial detention. 
280 In the political science literature, this has been defined as the quality of “exhibit[ing] 
increasing returns or positive feedback. Each step along a particular path produces consequences 
which make that path more attractive for the next round. As such effects begin to accumulate, they 
generate a powerful virtuous (or vicious) cycle of self-reinforcing activity.” Paul Pierson, Increasing 
Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 253 (2000). Path dependency 
can arise when a population is sorted even when the principle of selection is random. See Oona A. 
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law 
System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 609-10 (2001). 
281 See supra text accompanying notes 261–65 (discussing the fragility of the guesthouse finding 
in many cases). 
282 Cf. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (assigning a presumption of 
regularity to government records produced on the battlefield). 
283 A 2009 study that interviewed fifty-five former detainees found thirty-one alleged abusive 
interrogations. LAUREL E. FLETCHER & ERIC STOVER, THE GUANTÁNAMO EFFECT: EXPOSING 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES 62-68 (2009); see 
also MOHAMEDOU OULD SLAHI, GUANTÁNAMO DIARY 202-63 (Larry Siems ed., 2015) (describing, 
with redactions, but still in harrowing detail, a litany of coercive interrogation methods used at 
Guantánamo against one detainee). While Slahi’s treatment was exceptionally harsh, it is worth 
noting that physical abuse appears to have been pervasive. When detainees arrived at the base, many 
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litigation has brought some coercive treatment to light,284 other egregious 
instances of coercive interrogation may remain unaired.285 Strategic deployment 
of the release power can limit public criticism and maintain institutional 
legitimacy in such cases.286 
Although the magnitude of these effects here remains unknown, the basic 
dynamic can be observed in other contexts. Consider criminal prosecutors’ 
power to condition plea bargains on the waiver of appeal rights, a power 
exercised in some two-thirds of federal criminal cases.287 Empirical studies 
have demonstrated that prosecutors use appellate waivers to prevent certain 
legal and constitutional challenges from being litigated.288 Ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims, for example, are typically amenable to challenge only via 
collateral review processes that are often extinguished by waiver.289 
The second reason for chastened expectations for judicial review turns on 
the courts’ institutional character. The Framers imagined that abuses by the 
federal government would be constrained by the separation of powers because 
each branch would have an institutional motive to resist ultra vires actions by 
coordinate branches.290 Institutional interests enabled by the separation of 
 
report being “punched and kicked” and then subjected to medical processing “whose harshness and 
humiliation was hard to forget.” GREENBERG, supra note 2, at 79. 
284 Several habeas cases involve allegations of torture found to be credible by district court 
judges. See, e.g., Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-9 (D.D.C. 2010), aff ’d sub nom. Al-Madhwani 
v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (documenting a case in which the government’s 
primary evidence of twenty-three reports and summaries of interrogations were not reliable because 
they were obtained through coercive means). 
285 There are nine detainees at Guantánamo who have died in custody, several at their own 
hands. The Detainees, N.Y. TIMES: THE GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET (Nov. 18, 2016), http://projects.ny
times.com/guantanamo/detainees [https://perma.cc/CW37-B2HR]. At least in these cases, there 
will never be an accounting of how the detainees were treated. 
286 An extension of this point is that strategic delay in habeas litigation may serve the same 
reputation-preserving goal. For example, the habeas petition filed by Abu Zubaydah, a known 
subject of coercive interrogations, has languished on a district court docket for over six years without 
explanation. Raymond Bonner, The Strange Case of the Forgotten Gitmo Detainee, POLITICO (May 12, 
2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/abu-zubaydah-tortured-waterboarded-cia-d
c-circuit-court-guantanamo-117833.html [https://perma.cc/92A3-HTV5]. 
287 See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 
DUKE L.J. 209, 212 (2005) (describing findings from a study of 971 plea bargains reached in Fiscal Year 
2003 and finding that in nearly two-thirds of cases settled by plea agreements, the defendant waived 
his or her right to review); accord Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 127, 211 (1995) (describing appellate waivers as common in the context of plea bargains). 
288 See King & O’Neill, supra note 287, at 249-50 (noting that “once a defendant waives his 
right to appeal the sentence, that waiver blocks any claim that the sentence violated his rights under 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments”). 
289 Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 546-47, 580-81 (2014). 
Sentencing courts, aware of their own constitutional flaws, may also strategically sentence defendants 
to shorter terms to avoid appellate review. See id. at 580-81. 
290 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 257 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008) 
(“[T]hose who administer each department [possess] the necessary constitutional means and 
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powers, however, may not incentivize interbranch checking. This is true of 
Article III as much as the other branches.291 
The institutional interests of the Article III judiciary are plausibly 
understood to include the maximization of prestige and the minimization of 
the institutional costs of litigation, which include the burden of adjudicating 
politically contentious cases with potential public blowback.292 But these interests 
can create institutional incentives to avoid responsibility for controversial 
policy decisions, thereby enlarging a coordinate branch’s effectual authority. 
In my view, the evidence suggests that risk-averse federal judges perceived 
post-Boumediene habeas as an onerous assignment of low prestige with large 
attendant risk of public backlash. One suggestive piece of evidence on this 
score is the absence of ideological division in habeas cases. This datum 
contradicts criticisms proffered by liberal commentators, who explain the 
government-friendly results in detention cases by blaming “ideologically 
extreme” judges.293 With only a small number of exceptions, the major 
appellate decisions on the procedural treatment of habeas petitions and the 
substantive law of detention have been unanimous. Dissents in favor of detainees 
have been rare.294 This suggests that the judicial response to post-Boumediene 
litigation should not be reduced to facile ideological terms. Indeed, in a much-noted 
concurrence, Judge Laurence Silberman explicitly pointed to institutional 
concerns that extend to liberal and conservative jurists alike; he expressed his 
“doubt [that] any of [his] colleagues [would] vote to grant a petition if he or 
she believe[d] that it [were] somewhat likely that the petitioner [was] an al 
Qaeda adherent or an active supporter.”295 The breadth of this statement—covering 
liberal and conservative jurists alike—and the absence of any rebuttal by liberal 
judges in subsequent opinions suggests that Judge Silberman’s comments indeed 
fairly characterize Article III actors’ convergent institutional incentives. 
Prestige concerns also plausibly explain the Supreme Court’s failure to 
intervene in post-Boumediene habeas litigation, even though the decision to 
 
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”); see also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 771 (2012) (extolling the virtues of rivalrous separation of powers). 
291 See Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 248, at 40-67 (analyzing the connection between 
Article III institutional interests and the doctrinal limits upon constitutional remedies). 
292 See id. Federal judges and Justices have long expressed antipathy to adjudicative obligations 
that would tarnish the luster and prestige of Article III courts. See Judith Resnik, Trial As Error, 
Jurisdiction As Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 972 (2000) 
(tracing back arguments of preserving the prestige of Article III courts to Chief Justice Taft). 
293 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 551, 
594-95 (2013) (“The D.C. Circuit . . . has stubbornly resisted the recognition of detainee rights . . . .”); 
Vladeck, supra note 45, at 1488 (arguing that detainee cases show a “fundamental unwillingness by the 
D.C. Circuit” to follow the Court’s analysis in Boumediene). 
294 Probably the most important dissenting opinion is Justice Tatel’s in Latif v. Obama. See 
Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 746, 770-90 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
295 Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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grant certiorari in one of the post-Boumediene cases demanded less than the 
five votes needed for the Boumediene majority.296 Having obtained a measure 
of public commendation for its ruling in Boumediene, the Court could delegate 
to inferior courts the more hazardous and mundane business of granular 
adjudication. That is, since judicial prestige was advanced by the “great 
victory”297 of a constitutional ruling on the Suspension Clause, the Court 
only stood to lose from further engagement. 
Finally, judges may be particularly leery of narrowing government power 
in detention cases because of spillover effects that could be blamed on Article III 
actors. The AUMF defines the bounds of legal force not just for detention, 
but also for other species of military power, such as targeted killings.298 
Scholars had by this time already highlighted the filial relations of targeting 
and detention law.299 Although the first targeted killing of al Qaeda suspects 
occurred in 2002, the program’s acceleration and expansion primarily occurred 
in 2008 and 2009, just as post-Boumediene habeas petitions were starting to be 
litigated.300 Jurists may have been conscious that their decisions in the 
detention context would have unanticipated consequences for other 
programs, such as the use of targeted killing. That possibility of unanticipated 
spillovers with ambiguous welfare effects during a period of flux and 
experimentation in national security policy may have generated additional 
constraint on risk-averse federal judges. 
In sum, even if the judiciary’s institutional interests are engaged, they 
yield no guarantee that courts’ intervention will constrain the political 
branches. To the contrary, the Guantánamo example suggests that Article 
III’s institutional bent can lead, unexpectedly, to an increase in the effectual 
scope of executive branch discretion. 
D. Conclusion 
This Part has developed a granular account of how the separation of 
powers constrains presidential initiatives by closely parsing bureaucratic, 
 
296 See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
297 Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/2008/08/14/why-it-was-a-great-victory/ [https://perma.cc/S8HV-3F67]. 
298 See Chesney, Military Detention, supra note 45, at 773-74 (documenting that although targeted 
killing decisions “ordinarily are not directly subject to judicial review,” they can fall under the 
“notional scope of detention authority”). 
299 For the leading work on this point, see Matthew C. Waxman, Detention As Targeting: 
Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1385 (2008), 
arguing that “detention decisions can be understood analogically as targeting decisions, sharing many 
of the same policy and moral issues.” 
300 See Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 685 (2014) 
(describing the changing pace of the targeted killing program). 
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legislative, and judicial incentives and instruments. It has, in other words, 
attempted to describe the separation of powers from the ground up, rather 
than from the top down. 
In the aggregate, my account suggests that President Obama’s ambition 
of closing Guantánamo confronted disabling frictions as a result of a dynamic 
entanglement between military bureaucracy and legislators. Each abetted the 
other in generating barriers against an aggressive rate of transfers. The 
military bureaucracy impeded diplomatic efforts to expedite transfers and 
winnow the detainee population. It also strategically disseminated claims of 
rising recidivism rates in a fashion timed and framed to disrupt maximally 
the White House’s ambition. Legislators in turn seized on bureaucratic 
estimates of recidivism, notwithstanding their facial ambiguities and potential 
flaws, to prime the pump of public anxiety. Ensuing statutory curtailments of 
the executive’s transfer authority, in turn, worked by vesting larger discretion 
in the military bureaucracy to resist presidential pressure. 
By contrast, standard accounts of President Obama’s failure tend to focus 
on recidivism-related security risk and political opposition in Congress.301 
Neither of these explanations supplies the full story. It is not the case that the 
flow of transfers from the Cuban base slowed and ceased because of a dearth of 
plausible transferees. Ultimately, there may be a group of detainees who cannot 
be transferred, and for whom some sort of trial or alternative disposition is 
necessary. But transfers ended before this dilemma was even reached. Instead, 
political opposition to Guantánamo transfers, and concomitant perceptions of 
recidivism-related risk, were shaped and channeled by a bureaucratic–legislative 
alliance out of institutional and partisan incentives. The absence of any judicial 
spur to transfers, by contrast, reflects the path dependency of judicial review 
upon prior executive branch choices, and also the parochial institutional 
concerns of the Article III judiciary. In short, the separation of powers 
matters—but in unanticipated ways. 
III. WHAT CONSTRAINS PRESIDENTIAL POWER?                                 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS REVISITED 
The persistence of Guantánamo is a case study in the constraint of 
presidential ambition. In its particulars, it might be ranked either as a 
constitutional success, or as a species of tragedy. On the one hand, Congress’s 
use of appropriations riders to reign in executive power reflects Justice Story’s 
prediction that Congress “must have[] a controlling influence over the executive 
power, since it holds at its own command all the resources, by which a chief 
 
301 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
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magistrate could make himself formidable.”302 Alternatively, one might conclude 
that courts’ use of the “Great Writ” of habeas corpus to write a jurisprudence 
of statist authorizations for detention is cause for dismay. Reactions will 
diverge, I suspect, based on readers’ priors as to whether the Guantánamo 
detentions were warranted, not so much as a matter of law, but more as a 
matter of political morality. 
I offer no answer here to that difficult moral question (although I have a 
view on the matter). My more modest aim in this Part is to ask whether the 
dynamics identified in Parts I and II have broader implications for our theoretical 
understanding of the separation of powers as an element of constitutional 
design. Only afterward will I ask whether they also have implications for 
possible pathways to President Obama’s initial goal of ending detention 
operations at Guantánamo. The analysis is developed here without any 
assumption that readers will support that goal, but rather is conducted in the 
spirit of positive inquiry into how Presidents can achieve their democratically 
credentialed policy agendas. 
The central theoretical contribution of this Article comprises three 
discrete observations about the mechanics of the separation of powers. First, 
the separation of powers, insofar as it works to bind presidential authority, 
does not necessarily operate in a mechanical fashion between branches 
operating as unitary entities. Instead, more granularly, it can rely on actors 
both within and outside the government that comprise elements of a thick 
political surround. Second, the effect of law within the separation of powers 
can turn on political dynamics, rather than the coercive force of statutory 
prohibitions and commands. This has two further implications: important 
constraints on the presidency are produced first by interbranch politics and, 
further, that those legal constraints can depend primarily on the expected 
political cost of violation. Third, notwithstanding recent work that 
emphasizes partisan considerations over institutional ones in the separation 
of powers, institutional incentives at the branch and the sub-branch level play 
a large role in generating interbranch constraints. Together, these three points 
do not amount to a new theory of the separation of powers; rather, they 
gesture toward the value of more retail analysis that looks beyond the labels 
of branch and at the constituent actors, motives, and localized politics around 
a given policy question. Only by taking account of those micropolitics can 
sensible predictions be reached about which of the separation of power’s 
plural and contradictory goals will play out in practice. 
 
302 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 531, at 
372 (2d ed. 1851); see also Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 142-53 (1994) (discussing the Framers’ insistence on checks and balances). 
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I develop each of these retail-mechanism-related points in turn. Then, I 
draw some more general conclusions for the normative projects often hitched 
to the separation of powers. Finally, I return to the specific question of what 
path forward could lead to the closure of the Guantánamo detention facility. 
A. Beyond Branches: The Role of the Thick Political Surround 
One larger theoretical implication of the analysis in Parts I and II 
concerns the range of actors relevant to interbranch dynamics. The separation 
of powers is often analyzed as a “three-branch problem.” 303 Yet the constraining 
effect of the separation of powers cannot be understood without attention to 
actors within the branches. In separate work, Jon Michaels and I have called 
attention to the important causal role played by a “teeming ecosystem of 
institutional, organizational, and individual actors within as well as outside of 
government” that comprises what we term the “thick political surround.”304 
Depending on which elements of this thick political surround are engaged, 
the separation of powers can have different results in practice. 
The account developed in Parts I and II draws attention to the fact that neither 
the executive nor Congress act as a unified whole. In the political science 
argot, both are a “they”—not an “it.”305 For example, the analysis in Part II 
suggested that the State Department and the Pentagon pursued distinct, and 
sometimes conflicting, policy priorities regarding the Guantánamo detentions.306 
Similarly, close observers of intrabranch dynamics have insisted on the 
independent preferences and motivations of trial-level attorneys tasked with 
responding to habeas petitions.307 Nor are the federal courts a unified entity. 
Critics of the post-Boumediene habeas jurisprudence may err in blaming 
“extremist” judges.308 But it is still striking that trial and appellate judges had 
such divergent responses to the Guantánamo habeas petitions. Had the 
Department of Justice not chosen to appeal its losses, and instead used trial-level 
defeats as a platform for statutorily enabled releases,309 the trajectory of the 
net detainee population might have been quite different. In short, each branch 
 
303 William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 831, 898 (2001). 
304 See Huq & Michaels, supra note 25, at 381. 
305 For an application to Congress, see generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not 
an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992), which argues that 
legislative intent of a “collective body” is a contradiction; for extension to the national security 
executive, see Huq, Structural Constitutionalism, supra note 12, at 904-05. 
306 See supra text accompanying notes 124–31. 
307 See Ingber, supra note 37, at 384-86 (noting that personalities of individuals, as well as 
bureaucratic dynamics, play a role). 
308 See supra text accompanying note 293. 
309 See supra text accompanying note 215. 
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acts not as a unified whole but through component entities. As in any other 
principal–agent relationship, there is a consequent possibility of slippage 
between what “the branch” wants (however that may be determined) and what 
a constituent element wants. 
All of this has implications for the separation of powers.310 Reifying the 
“branches” as homogenous, unitary entities and ignoring the variegated ecosystem 
of institutional factions hiding within and around them invites serious 
misdiagnosis of the causes and consequences of interbranch interactions. The 
choice of which institutional faction engages in an interbranch transaction 
can alter the nature and the consequences of that interaction. Congressional 
responses to Guantánamo’s persistence likely hinged upon which faction 
within the executive was better able to mobilize legislative attention. The 
downstream adjudicative treatment of an action can also be influenced by the 
exact path that a challenge takes through the Article III hierarchy. 
The pivotal role of an internal ecosystem of institutional players that I 
highlight here both complements and complicates a recent and growing 
literature celebrating “internal” separation of powers.311 Gillian Metzger, in a 
leading exemplar of the genre, cites Boumediene as a decision that gave the 
executive “an incentive to craft internal administrative procedures that address 
the constitutional weakness the majority identified in the current system.”312 
The account of bureaucratic responses to increasing pressure to wind down 
the Guantánamo detentions developed in Part II confirms Metzger’s 
hypothesis that dynamics internal to the executive are a necessary component 
of any understanding of the separation of powers. The same account, contra 
Metzger’s claim, also suggests that bureaucratic responses to those pressures 
can generate policy outcomes at odds with the ends anticipated by internal 
separation-of-powers proponents. 
But whereas the internal separation-of-powers literature has celebrated 
the recreation of checks and balances within the executive branch as a 
substitute for the weakness of external interbranch checks,313 the account 
offered here suggests that bureaucratic actors are salient not because of 
 
310 Judicial doctrine on the separation of powers is surprisingly sensitive to the diverse 
institutional preferences and motivations of both internal and external actors. In separate work, I 
show how much of the anarchic quality of separation-of-powers jurisprudence can be glossed 
sympathetically as an effort to tame this institutional heterogeneity. See generally Huq & Michaels, 
supra note 25. 
311 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006). 
312 Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
479, 498 (2010). 
313 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 311, at 2335-42 (discussing the White House Office of Legal 
Counsel’s interactions with the Attorney General on John Yoo’s torture memos as an example of 
intrabranch checks). 
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internal dynamics but only because of their outward-facing influence on 
Congress and the judiciary. They are complements to, not substitutes for, 
interactions among the three branches. Intrabranch checks, I have suggested, 
are partially caused by and mediated through bureaucratic forces. Hence, 
legislative resistance to presidential pressure to close Guantánamo hinged on 
information produced by the bureaucracy. More tentatively, I have also 
hypothesized that bureaucratic entrepreneurship on the recidivism question 
may have increased the divisiveness of the larger political landscape. As much 
as being a product of partisan deadlock in Congress, therefore, bureaucratic 
policymaking authority was a contributing factor to partisan polarization. 
The role of Congress as a constraint on the President, moreover, is yet 
more complex still. Legislative barriers to transfers depended upon the 
executive for their efficacy. These statutes elaborated new opportunities for 
bureaucratic foot-dragging and resistance to the presidential agenda. A close 
parallel here is the legislator–prosecutor alliance identified by William Stuntz as 
the source of “pathological” criminal-law politics.314 Similarly, the opportunities 
for judicial intervention, and the relative salience of its costs and benefits, 
were a function of the military bureaucracy’s choices. Interbranch constraints 
on presidential power, in short, are best understood as flowing from a matrix 
of actors stretching across all three branches and implicating more than just 
the three textually specified actors enumerated in Articles I through III of 
the Constitution.315 
In short, the analysis here points to the value of moving beyond the unit of 
the “branch” to more granular determinants of interbranch relations. In addition, 
it suggests that the idiom of the “internal separation of powers” is hopelessly 
disconnected from the actual vectors of institutional behavior. The question 
I have not answered is how far to drill down with this analysis: I have 
demonstrated that it is feasible to decompose branches into relatively coarse 
particles, such as “the Justice Department,” and “the military bureaucracy.” I 
have not gone farther because the evidentiary record that would enable an even 
more precise analysis of specific individuals or offices within executive 
departments simply does not exist. But that is not to say that others cannot 
gain traction with more granular data. Ultimately, the unit of analysis employed 
 
314 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510 
(2001) (noting the “tacit cooperation” between prosecutors and legislators that is a historic foundation 
of American criminal law). 
315 In my estimation, external elements of the thick political surround may have been 
responsible for framing Guantánamo as an important public-policy problem, and even motivating 
the robust early rate of releases. See Huq, What Good, supra note 22, at 422-23. However, I see less 
evidence that external actors shaped post-Boumediene policy. But see Deeks, supra note 22, at 844-48 
(offering examples of Obama detention policy that may have been shaped by a concern to head off 
subsequent litigation). This suggests that different policy environments—characterized by different 
status quos, and different perceived priorities—can empower and emasculate different actors. 
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in institutional analysis will depend on the purposes of the analyst, the 
available evidentiary record, and the potential toeholds for reform. Nevertheless, 
I suspect that the shift in focus from branches to intrabranch actors will prove 
an enduring one in legal scholarship with a positive, descriptive ambition. 
B. The Interaction of Law and Politics in the Separation of Powers 
My analysis suggests that the operational vector of the separation of powers 
may be political, rather than legalistic, in character. The force of law—understood 
as affirmative prohibitions on certain actions—proved at best a secondary 
constraint on President Obama’s agenda. It was instead politics—first internal 
to the executive branch, and then externally in and around Congress—that 
fatally entangled his ambitions. By “politics” here, I do not mean simply 
electoral politics.316 I mean the term in its broader sense. So understood, the 
term picks out the dense public network of evaluative claims, assertions, and 
counterarguments in which we jockey over what the state should do. Officials 
reside in politics so conceived. Absent some pathology, whether personal or 
institutional, that environment infuses their judgment and shapes the rewards 
and penalties of political action. 
Hence, it was first of all an intramural political falling out between the 
Pentagon and the White House that generated the legislative environment in 
which restrictions upon detainee transfers could be perceived not merely as 
prudent but necessary, even at the risk of courting a presidential veto.317 And 
further, the effect of transfer restrictions enacted in 2009 and 2011 did not 
depend on coercive law. Rather than blunt prohibitions, these “restrictions” 
worked by imposing certain disclosures on the executive before making a 
transfer; no countervailing transparency mandates revealed the costs of 
continued detentions, erroneous or otherwise. Because these disclosures 
required nothing more than publication of information already in the 
executive’s possession, they are best understood as efforts to impose political 
costs on detainee transfers by providing ammunition for the White House’s 
internal and external foes. In short, the dynamics observed here confirm 
Frederick Schauer’s hypothesis that “the question of legal compliance is 
 
316 Other scholars do reduce constraints on the presidency to a crude function of electoral 
reward or punishment. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE 
UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4-10 (2010) (asserting that the “major constraints 
on the executive . . . do not arise from law or from the separation-of-powers framework . . . but from 
politics and public opinion”). That conception, however, is far too reductive and, even in its 
accounting of electoral effects, too imprecise to be useful. For a response and critique that 
underscores the role of institutional norms and preferences for legality, see Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the 
Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777 (2012). 
317 President Obama threatened in 2012 to veto certain transfer restrictions, but backed down 
without carrying out the threat. See supra note 221. 
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answered in the realm of politics, rhetoric, and the other determinants of 
public [and official] opinion,” and not by coercion or the force of law.318 
Political costs and benefits, Parts I and II suggest, are not a product of 
external factors alone: they can arise endogenously from internal control 
within or between the branches. 
This analysis also has bite with respect to our understanding of courts’ role. 
As Justice Thomas recently described the standard account of the judiciary’s 
position within the separation of powers, “[t]he ‘check’ the judiciary provides 
to maintain our separation of powers is enforcement of the rule of law through 
judicial review.”319 This pivots courts’ role on the measurement and 
implementation of formal legal prohibitions or mandates. But a consideration 
of post-Boumediene habeas cases points in another direction. This litigation 
supplied a negligible push toward release in individual cases, while at the same 
time producing a body of law asymmetrically indifferent to the risk of false 
positives. In contrast, politics internal to the executive branch generated leaked 
disclosures of recidivism emphasizing (and arguably exaggerating) their costs. 
Political entrepreneurs in Congress then leapt upon the disclosures, leveraging 
them (and further exaggerating them) to gin up public opposition and new 
platforms for bureaucratic resistance. An exclusive focus on law—understood 
as positive enactments that prohibit or mandate action—as the channel for 
interbranch dynamics thus misses much of causal importance. 
C. The Motivational Foundations of Interbranch Relations 
A third implication of this study relates to the motivational foundations of 
the separation of powers. It casts some doubt on an important body of recent 
work on the pervasive role of partisan incentives in separation-of-powers 
controversies. In a widely cited Article, Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes 
argued that “almost from the outset,” political parties and partisan motivations 
“overwhelmed” the Madisonian conception of the separation of powers.320 
Other commentators have echoed their skepticism of the possibility that 
officials, at work in any of the three branches, will discard ideology and 
partisan allegiances to prioritize the mission of their institution.321 In a 
similar vein, empirical scholars of the judicial branch have flagged ideology, 
 
318 Frederick Schauer, Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining “Law,” 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1165, 1177 (2013). 
319 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
320 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 33, at 2313. 
321 See, e.g., David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548, 602 (2009) (“[W]hen 
one political party captures all of the levers of power, then the American system of separation of 
powers fails.”). 
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rather than institutional affiliation, as the most powerful determinant of 
judicial behavior.322 Ideology and partisanship are now assumed to be the 
dominant motivating forces at work among and between the branches. 
The persistence of Guantánamo, however, cannot be explained by ideological 
or partisan conflicts alone. As Part I demonstrated, bureaucratic resistance 
arose in 2009 and 2010 even though there was a deep operational continuity 
between the Bush and Obama Administrations.323 In policy terms, there was 
no ideological divide to engender resistance. Nor does a narrow focus on 
partisan incentives illuminate why national security bureaucrats contrived to 
undermine the White House. Rather, I have posited a number of more subtle 
internal dynamics in which bureaucratic actors are moved to protect their own 
visions of appropriate policy or to shore up their own local institutional 
prerogatives. This is evidence of what Daniel Carpenter and George Krause 
describe as “organizational socialization and shared identities” within federal 
agencies and departments directly shaping policy from the bottom up.324 
Partly informed by Carpenter’s powerful historical accounts of how bureaucrats 
have crafted their own agencies’ missions,325 Carpenter and Krause emphasize 
that bureaucrats, no less than their elected principals, may cultivate 
freestanding sources of institutional support and public legitimacy.326 Among 
those pillars of bureaucratic sustenance is the ability of officials “to induce” 
congressional majorities to legislate in accord with bureaucratic preferences.327 
Protecting local institutional priorities—such as Pentagon control over 
detainee releases or the priority of counterterrorism over counternarcotics in 
Afghanistan328—can undermine a wider strategic agenda pursued by the 
White House, such as closing Guantánamo. 
Similarly, partisan affiliation does not fully explain the observed degree 
of legislative resistance. Congressional opposition to President Obama’s 
 
322 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64-65 (1993) (presenting an “attitudinal model” of Supreme Court 
decisionmaking which posits that Justices vote largely based on their “ideological attitudes and values”); 
Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model (asserting that Supreme Court Justices make decisions based 
partly on “personal policy preferences”), in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 296 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995). 
323 See supra text accompanying notes 104–07. 
324 Daniel Carpenter & George A. Krause, Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics, 25 
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 5, 13 (2014); see also JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, 
SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 3 (1999) 
(summarizing historical research that shows the influence of “the bureaucrat’s own preferences, peer 
bureaucrats, supervisors, and the bureaucrat’s clients” on agency work decisions). 
325 See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, 
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, 255-89 (2001). 
326 Carpenter & Krause, supra note 324, at 12-13. 
327 Daniel Carpenter, The Political Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy: A Response to Kernell, 
15 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 113, 113 (2001). 
328 See supra text accompanying note 137. 
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agenda instead has evinced a consistently bipartisan character. A crucial 2009 
vote on funding to close the Cuban base’s detention operations was derailed 
by six leading Democratic Senators,329 notwithstanding the contemporaneous 
support among Democratic voters for the President’s agenda.330 My account 
thus suggests that partisanship is not a necessary condition of interbranch 
constraint. Instead, legislators’ interests can align with those of an internal 
governmental constituency, such as the military.331 The institutional interests 
of the bureaucracy exert a gravitational pull on legislative action that defies 
intraparty identification. Separation of parties, in short, is not the whole story. 
Equally, when the Boumediene Court extended the reach of the Suspension 
Clause to Guantánamo, tasking district courts with a role in retail habeas 
litigation, it forcefully underscored the federal bench’s role in serving as a 
beneficial separation-of-powers check on executive discretion and a protector 
of individual liberty.332 In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy contrasted a judiciary 
“disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure 
its own independence” with an executive branch in which these beneficial 
traits “are not inherent.”333 In contrast to Justice Kennedy’s prediction, federal 
courts adjudicating post-Boumediene habeas petitions systematically assigned 
greater weight to false positives over false negatives.334 They were influenced 
by the flow of factual scenarios presented to them as a downstream result of 
executive branch decisions. Even apart from that path-dependent effect, 
federal judges’ behavior also reflected their own institutional interest in 
evading public blame for controversial decisions. In so doing, they perhaps 
 
329 See David M. Herszenhorn, Funds to Close Guantánamo Denied, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/us/politics/21detain.html [https://perma.cc/6HWH-J9P7] (noting that 
the “six Democrats who voted against the measure include some of their party’s most prominent 
voices on military affairs and criminal justice issues”). 
330 See Alec Tyson, Should Guantanamo Be Open or Closed? Either Way Democrats Have Stuck 
with Obama, PEW RES. CTRS. (May 29, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/29/
should-guantanamo-be-open-or-closed-either-way-democrats-have-stuck-with-obama/ [https://per
ma.cc/25QG-JW46] (reporting a survey finding that fifty-nine percent of Democratic voters 
supported Obama’s goal in late 2009). 
331 See THORPE, supra note 196, at 93-108 (demonstrating the fiscal basis of many relations between the 
military and Congress). 
332 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (“The Framers’ inherent distrust of governmental 
power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers among three independent 
branches. This design serves not only to make Government accountable but also to secure individual 
liberty.”); accord Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[U]nless Congress 
acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary 
role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an important judicial check on 
the Executive’s discretion in the realm of detentions.”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) 
(since “[e]xecutive imprisonment” without judicial review is “oppressive and lawless,” “this Court 
has recognized the federal courts’ power to review applications for habeas relief in a wide variety of 
cases involving executive detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace” (citation omitted)). 
333 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783. 
334 See supra text accompanying notes 275–77. 
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inadvertently enlarged the executive’s sphere of discretion. Attention to the 
institutional incentives of the federal judiciary, in short, helps us understand 
the gap between Boumediene’s soaring rhetoric and the more ambiguous legacy 
of judicial intervention on the ground. 
D. The Microfoundations of the Separation of Powers:                          
Normative Implications 
The three elements identified here—the thick institutional surround, the 
entangling of law and politics, and the prevalence of institutional incentives—help 
illuminate a basic puzzle in the practical operation of the separation of 
powers. That puzzle emerges from the normative and causal pluralism of the 
separation of powers. The latter concept can be invoked as a way of achieving 
different, and mutually inconsistent, ends. For example, in 2011, a unanimous 
Court stated that the separation of powers “protect[s] each branch of 
government from incursion by the others” and thereby also “protect[s] the 
individual.”335 But it is also a commonplace notion that the separation of 
powers operates to check presidential initiatives.336 The tension here is 
palpable. When a presidential initiative aims to promote individual liberty 
notwithstanding the other branches’ failure to act, separation-of-powers 
devices will tend to thwart both goals. Worse, the separation of powers will 
often impede libertarian policy goals. For at least a century, political scientists 
have observed that the division of governmental power between the 
legislative and executive branches tends to raise the costs of large policy 
shifts.337 All else being equal, the President acting alone will thus have an 
easier time promoting liberty than the President acting with necessary concurrence 
from Congress and the courts. The mere fact that separation-of-powers constraints 
on the executive have been triggered, in short, tells us little about the likely 
final policy outcome. Without knowing more about the micropolitics of the 
specific interbranch dynamic at issue, it is difficult to know what will result 
from engaging with the separation of powers. 
A recent example illustrates this simple point: the recent interbranch 
dynamic over the federal refusal to recognize same-sex marriages under 
 
335 Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011). 
336 See supra text accompanying note 302. 
337 For the locus classicus of this observation, see WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 54-81 (Transaction Publishers 2002) (1908). It has recently 
been argued that the separation of powers would not necessarily have this effect where the President 
would, in the absence of a legislative veto, be constrained by electoral punishment. See Jide O. 
Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, 
and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 643-45 (2010). This theory requires not only 
exceptionally epistemically well-endowed voters—it also assumes electoral sensitivity on the margin 
to presidential actions on a particular policy question. Neither condition is likely satisfied here. 
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Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). After two federal courts 
held that Section 2 of DOMA was unconstitutional, Attorney General Eric 
Holder decided to renounce any defense of that provision.338 The House of 
Representatives, through its Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, responded by 
hiring private counsel to defend the statute.339 In the Supreme Court, 
legislators’ counsel offered “sharp adversarial presentation of the issues.”340 
Although that adversarial presentation ultimately failed, legislative resistance 
to same-sex marriage illustrates one of the manifold ways in which the 
separation of powers enables resistance to executive efforts to promote 
individual liberty. Without understanding the entangled legal-political 
pressures on the Attorney General to defend Section 2 of DOMA, and 
without accounting for the internal fragmentation of Congress, the effect of 
the separation of powers on DOMA’s demise would be hard to understand. 
Or consider the effect of the separation of powers on the quality of political 
deliberation. Constitutional scholars have persuasively described the Court on 
occasion as shifting policymaking from exclusively within the executive onto 
the field of interbranch contestation as a means of promoting better outcomes. 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, for example, the Court invalidated a military 
commission system that was the result of an executive order promulgated by the 
White House, rather than a product of Pentagon expertise.341 Jody Freeman 
and Adrian Vermeule have plausibly argued that the Hamdan ruling was in 
part animated by the perceived inadequacy of an intrabranch policymaking 
dynamic in which agencies possessing relevant expertise played no role.342 
Similarly, the Court decided to hear the Boumediene case, after having first 
denied the detainees’ petition for certiorari, only when presented with 
evidence of dysfunctional intrabranch process.343 In other domains of law, 
purely internal decisional processes are viewed with like skepticism. In 
 
338 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to the Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker 
of the House, Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/Febru
ary/11-ag-223.html [https://perma.cc/DH53-8RA3]. 
339 Unopposed Motion of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of 
Representatives to Intervene for a Limited Purpose, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10 CIV 8435), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Ho
use-intervene-mtn-Windsor-4-18-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DGX-NY8X]. 
340 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013). 
341 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006); see also Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Noncitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2000) (reporting the President’s 
military order that established military tribunals). 
342 Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 
SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52. 
343 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 417, 448-49 (2012) 
(exploring the circumstances of the certiorari grant in Boumediene in more detail). 
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evaluating non–Article III adjudicative fora in recent cases, for example, 
Justices have expressed skepticism about their purely internal character.344 
But is the Court correct in assuming that adding a dose of the separation 
of powers to a policy debate will improve outcomes? That migration can 
promote some constitutional goals while undermining others. On the one 
hand, it may induce more extensive democratic debate and invite more 
focused internal deliberation. On the other hand, deliberation need not 
conduce to more empirically grounded, rational decisions. In the case at hand, 
elevating the visibility of detainee transfers into an interbranch conflict did 
not lead to more rational policymaking.345 The ensuing debate was distinctly 
asymmetrical, with disclosures highlighting the costs but not the benefits of 
transfers. It invited opportunistic political entrepreneurship. This in turn 
stoked public fears of detainee recidivism, and eventually crystallized into 
legislative constraints on transfers that derailed even transfers of detainees 
already cleared for release, such as Shaker Aamer. The interbranch context 
produced periodic bouts of panic about recidivism risk, policy elite opportunism, 
and intermittent restrictions unmoored from nuanced assessments of recidivism 
risk. Richer process, in short, paradoxically produced normatively impoverished 
outcomes. This is hardly the stabilizing, legalistic, and legitimizing outcome 
anticipated by traditional accounts of the separation of powers. Nor is it a species 
of democratic deliberation and interbranch dialogue that is obviously desirable. 
The sort of bureaucratic–legislative alliance observed here, moreover, is not 
unique. Another example is the Obama Administration’s efforts to mitigate the 
extent of deportation’s shadow on young migrants who were brought into the 
country as children. These efforts were quickly, if unsuccessfully, challenged by 
elements of the federal bureaucracy.346 The bureaucrats’ challenge complemented 
and reinforced legislative resistance to immigration reform, and provided a 
platform for legislative criticism of mitigation efforts led by the executive.347 
 
344 See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1956 (2015). 
345 Where competitive pressures on policy are more diverse and multifarious, by contrast, 
changing the institutional sites of a policy question in a way that increases its salience can have the 
opposite effect. See Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural 
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166 (1993) (arguing that “[t]ax 
institutions, because of their greater visibility and more competitive nature, are less susceptible to 
interest group capture”). 
346 See Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-0, 2013 WL 8211660, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 
2013) (dismissing the challenge on jurisdictional grounds). 
347 See Stephen Dinan, Immigration Agents Sue to Stop Obama’s Non-Deportation Policy, WASH. 
TIMES (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news2012/aug/23/immigration-agents-sue
-stop-obamas-non-deportation [https://perma.cc/83FH-KVF4] (discussing legislators’ invocation of 
immigration officials’ suit against the Obama Administration to criticize the President). 
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The joint action of bureaucrats and legislators—subsequently joined by several 
states—succeeded in delaying and ultimately derailing those mitigation efforts.348 
Another instance in which an internal separation-of-powers dynamic may 
have influenced the shape of external, interbranch contestation is Attorney 
General John Ashcroft’s 2001 effort to use the Controlled Substances Act to 
preempt Oregon’s assisted suicide regime without consulting “anyone outside 
his department.”349 In rejecting General Ashcroft’s proposed regulation, the 
Supreme Court emphasized the absence of approval from medical experts 
within the federal government or in particular the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services.350 Hence, the initial fact of disagreement within the executive 
branch catalyzed an interbranch conflict, one that was ultimately resolved by 
looking to the positions of actors within the Article II sphere. 
In sum, attention to the microfoundations of the separation of powers—the 
diversity of relevant institutional actors, the entanglement of law and politics, 
and the force of institutional incentives—point to a previously unacknowledged 
measure of complexity within interbranch relations. The separation of powers 
should, in this light, no longer be treated as something fixed and immoveable, 
or something “sacred.”351 Rather, it should be the object of careful and detailed 
inquiry in a fashion that accounts for the discrete local dynamics adumbrated here. 
E. The Road to Guantánamo’s Closure Reconsidered 
The foregoing analysis has implications for understanding the scope of 
existing restrictions on detainee transfers imposed by Congress.352 Arguments 
for the narrow construction of those limitations to date have focused on 
Article II as a limit on congressional regulation of detainee transfers.353 But the 
Supreme Court has endorsed such congressional control of detainees since 
 
348 A follow-on challenge filed by twenty-six states resulted in an injunction against the 
President’s program that remained in place after the Supreme Court split 4–4 on the matter. Texas 
v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
349 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 241, 250 (2006). 
350 Id. at 253. 
351 See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 604 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). 
352 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, §§ 1031-34, 
129 Stat. 726, 968-71 (Nov. 25, 2015) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). This 
current version of the transfer restriction again exempts judicially mandated transfers. Id. § 1034(2). 
It also bars transfers to Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Syria. Id. § 1033. 
353 See, e.g., Gregory Craig & Cliff Sloan, The President Doesn’t Need Congress’s Permission to 
Close Guantanamo, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
president-doesnt-need-congresss-permission-to-close-guantanamo/2015/11/06/4cc9d2ac-83f5-11e5-a
7ca-6ab6ec20f839_story.html [https://perma.cc/G2BT-6R67] (“Under Article II of the Constitution, the 
president has exclusive authority to determine the facilities in which military detainees are held.”). 
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the early 19th century.354 The failure of Article II arguments for narrowly 
construing transfer restrictions should not, however, end matters: transfer 
restrictions might still be read narrowly to vest with the President broad 
authority to override bureaucratic resistance. Although it seems highly 
unlikely that such power will be exercised, I explore here the legal question 
as a lens onto more general separation-of-powers dynamics. 
The pivotal question in the construction of statutory transfer restrictions 
is the partition of discretion between the President and the military bureaucracy. 
Like earlier iterations, the 2015 statute vests the Secretary of Defense with 
authority to make pivotal determinations, for instance, about whether post-transfer 
conditions will “substantially mitigate the risk of recidivism.”355 The analysis 
presented in Part II suggests that the restrictions will likely have the effect of 
thwarting a presidential agenda that would wind down detentions. The 
greater the loss of presidential control, the longer in expectation that process 
will take. If, conversely, transfer restrictions are construed to maximize 
presidential control, they are more likely to promote the speedy flow of 
detainees from the facility. 
Scholars diverge on whether statutory grants of discretion to cabinet-level 
officials implicitly limit White House control. Justice Elena Kagan argued for 
maintaining presidential control.356 In response, Kevin Stack developed 
powerful arguments for limiting presidential control over such statutory 
delegations.357 A central normative element of Stack’s argument, though, was 
the utility of external constraints on executive power.358 But this assumption 
does not hold here. The etiology of transfer restrictions demonstrates that 
they are not wholly external, but rather flow from bureaucratic efforts to 
stymie a contested presidential agenda-item. The structural justifications for 
resisting presidential control of the statutory delegation to the Secretary of 
Defense, therefore, are absent in this case. Further, the normative justifications 
for constraining presidential power are much weaker here than in other 
contexts. The separation of powers is typically justified as a means of promoting 
liberty and good governance.359 That instrumental justification loses its force 
 
354 See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128-29 (1814) (determining that whether 
to confiscate enemy property during the War of 1812 was a question of policy, “proper for the 
consideration of the legislature, not of the executive or judiciary”). 
355 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. 114-92, § 1034(b)(3), 129 
Stat. 726, 969 (2015) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note). 
356 See Kagan, supra note 10, at 2326-31. 
357 See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 263, 276-99 (2006) (arguing that congressional delegation of authority to executive officials 
alone should not be read as a grant of “directive authority” to the executive). 
358 Id. at 269. 
359 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592-93 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the Constitution’s government-structuring provisions are “critical to preserving 
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when the separation of powers is associated with arbitrary deprivations of liberty 
and a political environment dominated by deliberately inflated security fears.360 
If instrumental rationales for constrained executive power lack traction, 
statutory interpretation of transfer restrictions should instead be infused with 
a direct concern for liberty interests. That rights-oriented approach is more 
defensible than Article II constitutional-avoidance arguments given the 
political economy of federal legislation. Whereas the executive branch always 
has an opportunity to raise Article II concerns during the legislative process, 
individual rights claimants often go unattended by Congress.361 Just as the 
rule of lenity can be justified by a worry about the asymmetrical influence of 
defendants and prosecutors in the legislative process,362 so a narrow view of 
transfer restrictions can be defended as a means of correcting for asymmetries 
in the federal legislative process. 
To summarize, transfer restrictions can and should be interpreted to 
maximize presidential control and to minimize bureaucratic obfuscation and 
delay tactics. The statutory construction advanced here would promote a 
speedier drawdown of detentions, even if it provides no panacea for hard cases 
in which release is not viewed as plausible. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has presented the first comprehensive, empirically based 
account of how the prison at Guantánamo developed and, more importantly, 
persisted in the teeth of presidential directions to wind it up. This story, 
rather surprisingly, has not yet been told despite being a flash-point for 
partisan and policy debate. Attention to the specific dynamics of a particular 
separation-of-powers dynamic, I have suggested, yields dividends not only in 
our understanding of a particular, important policy question, but also more 
significantly in our sense of how the separation of powers operates in practice. 
 
liberty”); id. at 2559 (majority opinion) (“We recognize, of course, that the separation of powers can 
serve to safeguard individual liberty . . . .”); see also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. 
Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (commending the framers for devising a government 
structure promoting “liberty and accountability”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Concentration of power puts personal liberty in peril of arbitrary action 
by officials, an incursion the Constitution’s three-part system is designed to avoid.”). 
360 See supra text accompanying notes 178–94. 
361 See Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 
1076 (2012) (arguing that the “political circumstances of the moment” impact whether individual 
interests are represented in the legislative process). 
362 See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR 
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Combining econometric tools with doctrinal and institutional analysis, I 
have isolated several previously underappreciated incentives and causal 
mechanisms animating the observed separation-of-powers constraints on 
presidential initiatives. In particular, my account foregrounds the role of 
bureaucratic–legislative alliances; the importance of politics rather than law; 
and the exiguous effects of judicial review given Article III actors’ perverse 
institutional incentives. Similar dynamics, I have suggested, are likely to arise 
in whole or in part whenever the executive seeks to mitigate the harshness of 
baseline federal policy. Rather than taking the separation of powers for 
granted, this Article establishes the utility of more granular analysis of its 
effects and new theories of presidential power. Rather than a “sacred”363 
element of our legal order, I have tried to show that the separation of powers 
should be taken as a contingent, complex institutional assemblage. This 
assemblage cannot be disentangled from its larger normative and political 
context without considerable analytic loss. And it reveals its inner working 
less by the application of an abstract, theoretical lens than by granular, retail 
inquiries into the working dynamics of discrete policy questions. 
  
 
363 See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting) (referring to the separation of powers as a “sacred” principle of the Constitution). 
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APPENDIX: THE WIKILEAKS FILES AND                                                                 
OTHER DATA ON GUANTÁNAMO 
This Appendix details the three sources of data about policymaking at 
Guantánamo employed in this Article. 
A. Wikileaks 
On April 29, 2011, the Wikileaks organization disclosed 766 classified 
“detainee assessments”—one for all but about fifteen detainees held at the 
Cuban base.364 These documents were dated between 2002 and 2009, and 
were written by intelligence analysts within the military Joint Task Force 
(JTF) responsible for counterterrorism detention operations at Guantánamo.365 
Although widely varying in length, detail, and date of production, almost 
every detainee assessment contains a narrative of the reasons that the 
government credited for detaining that individual Guantánamo detainee.366 
The narratives pick out certain acts and affiliations of the individual detainee 
as relevant to the security risk posed by the detainee and to his intelligence 
value.367 In effect, the assessments provide prima facie evidence of the specific 
factual predicates used for decisions to detain (or release) an individual. Most 
assessments contain ordinal risk and intelligence values on a four-tier scale. 
Although these assessments are not self-authenticating, there is reason to 
believe they provide a unique snapshot of the government’s reasons for 
individual detention decisions. First, the government treated the assessments 
as classified documents. The Department of Justice initially instructed the 
private counsel who represented detainees at the Cuban base in habeas 
proceedings that the assessments were classified, and thus could not be 
viewed.368 Second, the government prosecuted the leaker, Private Chelsea 
Manning, on charges of having shared classified material, including the 
assessments, with Wikileaks.369 Third, of the six news publications across four 
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nations that initially received the assessments, not one has published 
allegations that the documents are anything other than what they appear to be.370 
Perhaps most strongly probative of the assessments’ nature and status is the 
prosecution witnesses’ testimony offered in the military court-martial of 
Private Manning.371 Two pieces of testimony—by Jeffrey Motes, counterterrorism 
analyst at Guantánamo Bay, and by Colonel Morris Davis, the former 
commander of the JTF-Guantánamo—directly address how the assessments 
were produced and employed by military leaders to craft detention policy.372 
Together, these two pieces of testimony suggest that the assessments were 
government-wide distillations of all available intelligence concerning given 
detainees, and as such were used by JFT-Guantánamo commanders to make 
release decisions. 
According to Motes’s and Davis’s testimonies, an intelligence analyst 
would produce a detainee’s assessment by reviewing all available intelligence 
concerning a detainee in the Task Force’s classified databases and other 
intelligence databases.373 The analyst would then use the resulting intelligence 
to draft an assessment and to reach an evaluation of an individual’s riskiness 
and his intelligence values. These were recorded on four-tiered scales ranging 
from “no” to “low” to “medium” to “high.” Assessments had to contain the 
reasons for the detainee’s transfer to Guantánamo. The assessments were then 
peer reviewed; evaluated and reviewed by senior intelligence analysts and 
officers; reviewed by lawyers in the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for legal 
content; and then submitted to the Deputy Commander of JTF-Guantánamo 
for final approval. Each assessment in net required eighty to ninety hours to 
produce. According to Davis, military personnel at Guantánamo prepared 
individual detainees assessments for “senior officials and other administration 
processes.”374 Although the assessments did not contain primary source 
intelligence material, Davis explained that they would be used by government 
personnel when making decisions concerning individual detainees. For 
example, Davis testified, he “would look at the [assessment] . . . to get an idea 
of who [a detainee] was” before signing off on a transfer to another country.375 
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For purposes of this Article, I have downloaded, transcribed, and coded 
all 766 detainee assessments. I have recorded, inter alia, individual demographic 
details; the enumeration of specific factual grounds reasons cited for each 
man’s detention; and the risk and intelligence classifications assigned by 
JTF-Guantánamo analysts from a four-point scale. Using the unique 
“Internment Serial Number” (ISN) contained in every assessment, I then linked 
the information contained in the Wikileaks documents to data about when 
detainees transferred in and out of Guantánamo kept by the New York Times. 
The remaining three sources used here can be more briefly identified. 
First, the New York Times maintains a comprehensive archive of both 
documents and data concerning the Guantánamo detainees.376 A Python 
script was written to scrape this website for data concerning the timing of 
each individual detainee’s entry and exit from Guantánamo. Two caveats are 
important here. First, the data used in this Article’s analysis was last updated 
on November 16, 2016. Second, the data used here captures only the period 
of custody at Guantánamo. But many detainees were either in custody before 
their transfer to the Cuban base, or remained in custody in the hands of a 
foreign state thereafter. Unfortunately, there is no public-domain data that 
captures this additional custody. Hence, this study relies on the available data, 
and should be read accordingly. 
B. Westlaw 
Second, using the Westlaw database of opinions from the District of 
Columbia Circuit and district courts, I finally created a database of all 
published and unpublished resolutions of habeas corpus petitions by either 
district courts or the Circuit Court in the wake of the Boumediene decision 
(n=68). I have coded these decisions by their outcome (i.e., whether the petition 
was denied or granted, or alternatively whether the case was ongoing), and 
associated them with detainee assessments by matching ISNs. In combination, 
these three unique data sets allow unprecedented longitudinal analysis of the 
institutional trajectory of the Guantánamo detentions. 
 
C. PACER 
Finally, I wrote code to search the federal courts’ PACER to identify all 
cases filed in the federal district courts in Washington, D.C. by Guantánamo 
detainees. I further examined documents in each docket to identify ISNs 
related to each individual petitioner. Where these underlying documents did 
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not contain ISN data, I cross-referenced docket numbers against lists 
produced by the government of resolved cases that relate docket numbers to 
ISNs. In forty cases, this did not yield a matching ISN. In those cases, I directly 
contacted petitioners’ counsel as listed on the docket to obtain ISN data. In 
all but seven cases, this generated ISN data. Treating each petitioner in each 
docket as a single observation, this process generated 466 observations. I was 
unable to identify ISNs for seven individual petitioners. Once petitioners 
who filed more than one petition were accounted for, I identified 408 
detainees who filed habeas petitions. 
